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Individuals take part in multiple layers of networks of interactions simultaneously. 
These interdependent networks account for the different sort of social ties individuals 
maintain per layer. In each layer individuals participate in N-Player Public Goods Games 
where benefits collected increase with amounts invested. It is, however, tempting to be a 
free-rider, i.e., to take advantage of the common pool without contributing to it, a situation 
from which a social dilemma results. This thesis offers new insights on how cooperation 
dynamics is shaped by multiple layers of social interactions and diversity of contributions 
invested per game. To this end, we resort to Evolutionary Game Theory and Network 
Science to provide a convenient framework to address the most important prototypical 
social conflicts and/or dilemmas in large networked populations. In particular, we 
propose a novel mean-field approach capable of tracking the self-organization of 
Cooperators when co-evolving with Defectors in a multilayer environment. We show that 
the emerging collective dynamics, which depends (i) on the underlying layer networks of 
interactions and (ii) on the criteria to share a finite investment across all games, often does 
not bear any resemblance with the local processes supporting them. Our findings suggest 
that, whenever individual investments are distributed among games or layers, resilience 
of cooperation against free-riders increases with the number of layers, and that 
cooperation emerges from a non-trivial organization of cooperation across the layers. In 
opposition, under constant, non-distributed investments, the level of cooperation shows 
little sensibility to variations in the number of layers. These findings put in evidence the 
importance of asymmetric contributions across games and social contexts in the 
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Every individual... neither intends to promote the public interest, nor 
knows how much he is promoting it... he intends only his own security; 
and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be 
of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as 
in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which 
was no part of his intention. 
̶  Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 
The problem of cooperation revolves around the study of scenarios in which there is a clash 
between individual and collective interests. Consider the following prototype scenario from 
Game Theory (GT): two individuals need to make, independent and simultaneously, a 
decision on either to pay a cost c and offer a benefit b to their peers or not. Four possible 
outcomes ensue: if both pay the cost then both ripen the benefit and attain a payoff of 𝑏 − 𝑐 
each; if neither pays the cost then the payoff will be 0 for each; when one pays the cost but 
the other refuses then the former attains a payoff of – 𝑐 while the latter obtains b. Whenever 
𝑏 > 𝑐 individuals are said to be playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In that context, the best 
course of action for a rational individual looking to optimize his/her rewards is to not pay the 
cost. However, such action from both players clashes with the best common outcome, in that 
if both pay the cost then the total aggregated payoff is of 2(𝑏 − 𝑐). In such scenarios, 
individuals are said to face a social dilemma of cooperation, in that the best outcome of the 
collective clashes with action that they would choose when looking to optimize their rewards. 
Game Theory provides an exceptional framework to reason over individuals’ strategic 
decision making when facing abstract scenarios. In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), 
individuals have to decide between Cooperating (C) or Defecting (D), that is, between paying 
or not the cost associated with pro-social behaviour. The payoff structure of the scenario 
described in the above paragraph can be summarized in the so called Payoff Matrix (see table 
1), where rows and columns identify strategies (actions) and Π𝑖𝑗 represents the outcome for 
the row player following strategy 𝑖 against column player who chooses strategy 𝑗.  




C b-c -c 
D b 0 
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Since a player does not know beforehand the action of the other, it can only assume that 
the other payer will do the best for himself. It is common to extend the payoff matrix into a 
more general parameterization, such as the one represented in table 2, which allows covering 
all possible two-person and two-strategy games. In such matrix the payoffs of each outcome 
are associated with parameters R, T, S, and P that stem from the following rationale: when 
both players decide to cooperate, each receives a reward R for mutual cooperation; Mutual 
defection results in a punishment P of both players; when they choose different strategies, the 
one offering cooperation receives the Sucker’s Payoff S, whereas the Defector obtains the 
Temptation payoff, T, for taking the opportunity value of exploiting a Cooperator. Different 
scenarios, or dilemmas, result from different orderings of these payoffs, leading to different 
expected rational decisions. 




C R S 
D T P 
 
More generally, a game represents a social dilemma whenever the payoff for mutual 
cooperation is larger than the payoff for mutual defection (𝑅 > 𝑃) and still there is an 
incentive to defect. Such incentive is present when 𝑇 > 𝑅, because defection is preferable 
when playing against a Cooperator; when 𝑃 > 𝑆, because defection is the best strategy in an 
encounter with a Defector, and when 𝑇 > 𝑆, as a Defector is better in an interaction with a 
Cooperator (Nowak M. , 2012).  
Game Theory thus provides the mathematical framework to create the perfect abstract 
formulation of complex decision making scenarios, allowing for the exploration of the 
resulting outcomes when conflicting interests are at stake. The formal representation of a game 
specifies (i) a set of individuals that have to make a strategic decision; (ii) the available 
strategies; and (iii) the payoff structure of the possible outcomes individuals face through 
combination of actions available to the players. The mathematics of GT provides a unified 
framework of abstract models and metaphors, together with a consistent methodology, in 
which these problems can be recast and analysed (Szabo & Fath, 2007).  
The framework discussed so far concerns one shot interaction situations, that is, individuals 
do not have memory of past interactions nor do they have information about their opponent 
until their strategy/action is revealed. However, these scenarios arguably fall short on 
capturing the full complexity of real world decision making scenarios. In that sense, Game 
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Theory literature has explored and extended scenarios as the above case in time (considering 
the repeated interaction between individuals); in strategy space (more complex scenarios 
involving more than two strategies), and in participants dimensions (when decisions have to 
be made in interactions that involve more than two individuals). 
In particular, situations that involve N individuals have been particularly researched in the 
context of Public Goods Games. In such scenarios, individuals are given the chance to invest 
towards a common pool concerning a collective endeavour. The amount collected from all 
individuals’ contributions is then multiplied by an enhancement factor, a proportionality 
constant reflecting how much bigger is the whole due to the synergies created compared to 
the sum of the parts. The final amount in the pool is then equally distributed among all 
individuals. It is up to each player to decide whether to contribute to the common pool. Being 
the yield from the game equally distributed among all participants irrespective of their 
investment decision, another social dilemma ensues: free-riding strategy, that is defecting, 
becomes the most rational decision for each individual although the best collective outcome 
is achieved when all participants cooperate. Interestingly, when we consider a Public Goods 
Game involving only two participants we obtain the same payoff structure of the Prisoner 
Dilemma. Indeed, the Public Goods Games is in many ways the group decision-making 
extension of the two player Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this simplified description, the optional 
contributions to the pool were binary, zero or a positive fixed amount. With no impact on the 
social dilemma inherent to the game, this constraint will soon be dropped and variable non-
negative values for individual contributions will be accepted. 
Interactions can be unstructured or structured by a network. In the former alternative, a 
player can potentially encounter any other player, as if all players were connected together. In 
the structured alternative, modelling real life scenarios, an underlying network has to be 
considered with players located at its nodes. The notion of neighbourhood emerges. Networks 
can be of various sorts, regular with patterns as a lattice or a ring, irregular, etc. and their links 
dictate who plays against whom. Exemplifying for a social network, individuals may be 
positioned as nodes of a single-layer representing his/her family relationships. However, along 
his/her day an individual has other arenas of intervention, as he/she is also present on many 
other networks, professional, friendship, etc. A single layer network turns out to be 
insufficient to reflect all interactions an individual participates in along its day. Therefore, 
other networks in space have to be considered and now one has a network of networks or a 
multilayer. From the moment a structure governing interactions steps in, collective dynamics 
emerge which are difficult to anticipate from the games played at individual layers.  
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In order to allow populations to evolve along time and to identify under which particular 
circumstances what strategies reveal better than others, operating mechanisms of natural 
selection in Evolutionary Games Theory must be introduced to allow individuals to updates 
their strategies. These mechanisms can rely, e.g., on a Moran birth-death process or on a 
pairwise comparison of payoffs collected between neighbours (Traulsen & Hauert, 2008). 
Networks introduce an additional challenge on the definition of an individual payoff, because 
now it results from interactions with each of his/her multiple neighbours.   
In this thesis, we explore the scenario in which individuals’ resources are finite when 
individuals participate in multiple social networks. Hence, we evaluate how different resource 
investment criteria impact the evolution of cooperation. Each criterion will govern how each 
player will distribute a limited investment among all games he/she participates in. For the 
social network example just described, the finite resource to be shared across games, i.e., 
interactions, may correspond to time. 
Along this quest to understand cooperation dynamics in multilayer networks, we pose 4 
main questions: 
1. What’s the impact of different resource investment criteria in the evolution of 
cooperation in populations interacting through a multilayer network? 
2. How do multilayer global dynamics relate with microscopic dynamics locally defined 
at individual level? E.g., will there be fractal-like cooperation patterns of “self-
similarity” at different scales? 
3. Cooperation level is expected to vary with simulation parameters such as the number 
of layers, underlying network types and others to be defined. How sensitive will the 
overall multilayer behaviour to simulation parameters be? 
4. Are there conditions more relevant than others in dictating the cooperative performance 
of the multilayer? Particularly, is there any subset of parameters such that they can 
define a configuration subdomain in parameter space determining the evolution of the 
system irrespective of the values other parameters may assume? 
 
1.1. THESIS STRUCTURE  
In Chapter 2, a literature review is conducted for setting the stage for the experimentations 
performed. Firstly, the general problem of cooperation is addressed, what it is, why it matters 
and how it is mathematically tackled via Game Theory and Evolutionary Game Theory. In 
social dilemmas, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma or Public Goods Games, selfish behaviours are 
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favoured. Yet, cooperation is observed on many levels of biological and social organizations. 
The next section attempts to explain mechanisms that may be put in place for natural selection 
to favour cooperation and how they offset the costs of cooperation by causing Cooperators to 
also be on the receiving end more often. An overview of the most relevant concepts from the 
novel field of Network Science to be used throughout the text follows with a characterization 
of the networks that support the experimentations. Game dynamics, whether unfolding over 
continuous or discrete time, governed at the microscopic-agent level by stochastic rules or 
following deterministic rules modelling the direction and intensity of selection as a function 
of relative population concentrations is focused next. For the sake of completeness, chapter 2 
finishes with a survey on publications related to the topics pursued in this thesis.  
Experiments were conducted via computer simulations that run on a framework built ad 
hoc, implementing multiple instances of agents with behaviours governed by stochastic 
processes. Chapter 3 aims to explain this framework, to detail the models constructed, to 
discuss the implementation options available and the rational beyond the options taken. 
Independent parameters, both topological and behavioural, and metrics to collect (outputs) as 
well as the methodologies followed are identified.  
Chapter 4 presents the main results collected from the simulations, highlighting the 
individual influence of the parameters on the cooperation levels attained by the system. In 
particular, it shows how the combination of topology and the criteria for deciding on how to 
share a finite investment among all games each individual participates in impacts the 
cooperation level achieved, leading, in extreme circumstances, to an enslavement in which 
the level of cooperation attained becomes insensitive to other environment parameters. A 
limited set of parameters dictate the enslavement condition. When this condition sets in, 
changes in other parameters have a marginal effect on the levels of cooperation attained which 
is preserved since multilayer initialization time. Mathematical explanations for enslavement 
to occur and for its consequences are explored. In order to better understand the dynamics 
unleashed on complex systems often unrelated to the stochastic rules programmed at agent-
level the former are built upon, one has resorted to Average Gradient of Selection (AGoS), a 
time and context independent metric, because of being averaged across time and the 
population, but dependent on parameters such as the networks supporting the interactions 
among individuals that reflects a trend for the evolution of the number of Cooperators over 
time. The use of AGoS initially conceived to a single layer is generalized to a multilayer case. 
AGoS results are interpreted and correlated with enslavement. Finally, in chapter 5, we draw 
concluding remarks and discuss future steps. 
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The thesis includes a number of appendixes complementing the results shown in chapter 
4. Appendix A complements chapter 3 in presenting the algorithm conceived in order to 
minimize the duration of the simulations executed. In appendix B, we discuss the effects of 
degree-degree correlation and overlapping on the evolution of cooperation levels reached by 
the multilayer are explored. In appendix C, a mathematical analysis explaining the topological 
and investment criteria enslavement is developed. With conditions for enslavement met and 
taking a mean field approach, expected AGoS is anticipated via a mathematical path pursued 
in appendix D. Finally, in appendix E, we present results concerning cooperation levels and 
AGoS attained in multilayers with different types of networks are presented. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section we motivate the study of the problem of cooperation. A literature review is 
undertaken from seminal papers towards a general objective of assessing the current state of 
knowledge on the subject. The literature review allowed us to identify directions of research 
and unexplored questions. It also helped in adopting a consistent terminology and on building 
up the foundations for a theoretical framework. Along this chapter, the literature review is 
presented with an emphasis on a number of concepts that are the cornerstone to the research 
conducted and presented in this thesis and that served as the ground/baseline for the extensive 
computer simulations conducted. 
Important keywords that summarize the topics researched in this section include 
Cooperation; Game Theory; Complex Networks; Evolutionary Dynamics; Public Goods 
Games; Multilayer Networks, and Gradient of Selection.  
2.1. THE PROBLEM OF COOPERATION 
All great human achievements and the emergence of human culture are results of cooperative 
enterprises. Genes cooperate to form a genome, cells cooperate to produce multicellular 
organisms, individuals cooperate to form groups and societies. Language and human culture 
are just examples of results from cooperative enterprises. 
Cooperation relates to altruism, which opposes to competition, a cornerstone of evolution 
in Biology. Cooperation can be viewed as an outcome of a game that, despite potential costs 
incurred by participating individuals, is “good” (measured by some appropriated fitness 
measure) for them and that requires some sort of collective action. In this sense, to cooperate 
means to behave cooperatively, to bring something to the table. 
The problem with cooperation is that frequently it is costly, weighs on individual wellbeing 
and prosperity and is, thus, always vulnerable to exploitation by Defectors. Individuals are, 
thus, divided between acting selfishly and sacrificing part of their self interest in exchange for 
bringing value to society. 
The theoretical framework used most frequently to study cooperation among selfish 
individuals is Evolutionary Game Theory (Nowak M. , 2006), where the concept of a social 
dilemma captures the essence of the problem. 
Social dilemmas or collective action problems are situations where there is a conflict 
between individual and group interests so that if the individuals try to maximize their own 
payoff the whole group ends up with less than if they had acted in another-regarding way. 
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This tension between rational choice and successful cooperation is the topic of a vast literature 
spread over disciplines of social science (Eriksson & Strimling, 2012). 
Because cooperation is beneficial to society, understanding the mechanisms and conditions 
that encourage it and identifying the tuning parameters that may influence and catalyse its 
emergence is of utmost importance.  
2.1.1. Two Person Games, the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Classic game theory is based on two key assumptions. One is that players act rationally, 
they are fully aware of their and their opponent’s strategy options and payoff values. They are 
capable of correctly assessing missing information (if applicable) and process new 
information revealed by the play of opponents (in dynamic games) in terms of probability 
distributions. 
The second assumption is one of common knowledge, i.e., that each player knows not only 
that all others act rationally but also that others are aware that he/she knows they know, and 
so on recursively (Szabo & Fath, 2007). 
Players’ rationality assumption has been relaxed over time in order to push further the 
limits of classic game theory. Players have well defined and consistent goals and preferences, 
which can be described by a utility function. A utility function measures the satisfaction 
resulting from a certain outcome of the game, and players’ goal is to maximize their utility. It 
must be stressed here that the maximization problem of game theory differs from a general 
one of physics. In physics, one generally has a single parametrized function whose extreme 
condition characterizes the whole system. In game theory, it is common to have instead a set 
of functions to optimize as many as the number of interacting players, as they continuously 
restructure the landscape for each other in pursuit of their selfish individual goals (optimum). 
Players need to have at least two strategies to choose from. The combination of strategies 
chosen by each player, called strategy profiles, yields a result. In classic game theory, the 
payoff corresponds to the players’ evaluations of this result. A static one-shot 2-player game 
can be represented as in table 3 by 𝑁 times 𝑀 matrices (normal form) with 𝜋1𝑖𝑗 = 𝑢1(𝑆1𝑖, 𝑆2𝑗) 
representing the utility function for player 1, when player 1 and 2 apply 𝑆1𝑖 and 𝑆2𝑗 strategies, 
respectively. Reciprocally, 𝜋2𝑖𝑗
𝑇 = 𝑢2(𝑆1𝑖, 𝑆2𝑗), where 𝑢2 represents the utility function for 
player 2 in the same circumstances. 
Roles of the players define the game (a)symmetry. In a symmetric game players’ roles are 
identical and interchangeable, which implies that they possess the same strategy options and 
payoffs, N = M and 𝜋1𝑖𝑗 = 𝜋2𝑖𝑗 . 
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Table 3 – Generalized Payoff Matrix of a 2-Player, 2-Strategy Game 
  Player 2 
  
(Payoff) 







𝑆11 (𝜋111 , 𝜋211
𝑇 ) … (𝜋11𝑀 , 𝜋21𝑀
𝑇 ) 
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ 
𝑆1𝑁 (𝜋1𝑁1 , 𝜋2𝑁1
𝑇 ) … (𝜋1𝑁𝑀 , 𝜋2𝑁𝑀
𝑇 ) 
 
A particular group of a symmetric two-player games, the only ones to be the subject of this 
thesis, happen when the number of pure strategies is 2, C (Cooperation) and D (Defection), 
with payoff matrix as in table 2. 
In order to better chart and normalize territories of fear and greed in the playground of 2-
Person games and as proposed in (Santos, Pacheco, & Lenaerts, 2006; Santos F. C., Pinheiro, 
Lenaerts, & Pacheco, 2012) payoff matrix is linearly transformed in order for and R and P to 
value 1 and 0, respectively. 
  
Figure 1- T-S Quadrants for 2-Player Games 
Having applied this transformation and as depicted in figure 1, the Stag–Hunt (SH) also 
known as the Coordination Dilemma emerges with 𝑅 > 𝑇 > 𝑃 > 𝑆 and unfolds in the lower 
left quadrant, when the fear of being cheated by 𝐷 (𝑃 > 𝑆) may justify defection instead of 
cooperation.  
In an isolated environment, each player may decide to behave as a C or a D. When both 
players decide to cooperate, each receives a reward R. Mutual defection results in a 
punishment of P. If they choose different strategies, the one offering cooperation receives S, 
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Sucker’s payoff, whereas the Defector collects T, interpreted as the Temptation to defect. 
Different dilemmas result from different ordering of these payoffs. 
Whenever 𝑇 > 𝑅, greed emerges and defection is tempting as it is the best strategy against 
a Cooperator.  In the absence of fear (𝑃 < 𝑆), greed leads to Chicken, Hawk-Dove or 
Snowdrift (SG) game with 𝑇 > 𝑅 > 𝑆 > 𝑃. With both greed and fear present, 𝑇 > 𝑅 > 𝑃 >
𝑆, the game obtained is Prisoner Dilemma (PD) (Santos F. C., Pinheiro, Lenaerts, & Pacheco, 
2012).  
More generally, a game is a cooperative dilemma when two Cooperators get a higher 
payoff than two Defectors, 𝑅 > 𝑃, and still there is an incentive to defect. This incentive must 
exists when at least one of the following conditions hold true: (i) if 𝑇 > 𝑅 then it is better to 
defect when playing against a Cooperator; (ii) if 𝑃 > 𝑆 then it is better to defect when playing 
against a Defector; and (iii) if 𝑇 > 𝑆 then it is better to be the Defector in an encounter between 
a Cooperator and a Defector (Nowak M. , 2012).  
This sort of dilemma is present in anyone’s everyday life, when one has to decide between 
committing or being lazy, being selfish or altruistic, etc.   
A game is in a Nash equilibrium (NE) if, for each player, the strategy applied is the one 
that brings him the highest payoff considering the strategies chosen by other players, with is 
the same to say that the strategy followed by each player is the one he/she has no interest to 
deviate from, as it maximizes his/her payoff, taking into account the strategies chosen by 
his/her peers. The dilemma underlying prisoner’s game is that acting rationally unable to 
anticipate opponent’s strategy, players will defect and NE occurs with mutual defection, 
although both players would be better off if they cooperated.  
NE is insensitive to payoff matrix scaling or an addition of arbitrary constants to payoff 
columns (Szabo & Fath, 2007). Thus, offsetting the matrix in order to get a null payoff when 
Defectors meet each other and further scaling it in order for a 1 unit payoff to result between 
Cooperators interaction as was performed in figure 1, is a linear transformation from which 
no loss of generality in game dynamics results (Broom, 2005). The offset is irrelevant in 
replicator dynamics based on payoff differential. As to the positive multiplicative factor, it 
only rescales the time.  
Along the text the concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategy related to the probability of a 
homogenous population to be immune against the invasion of a minority of intruders or 
mutants will emerge. A strategy S is considered to be an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) 
if a population composed only by S individuals is resilient to the invasion from a minority of 
invaders with any other strategy. Being a refinement of a NE, not all NE are necessarily ESS. 
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2.1.2. Public Goods Games 
There are many socially and economically important examples with a number of decision 
makers involved greater than two. Although sometimes these situations can be modelled as 
repeated play of simple pair interactions, there are many cases where the most fundamental 
unit of the game is irreducibly of multi-player nature. These games cannot be cast in a matrix 
or bi-matrix form. Still the basic solution concept is the same: when played by rational agents 
the outcome should be a Nash equilibrium where no player has an incentive to deviate 
unilaterally. 
One example of Public Goods Games (PGG) is the Tragedy of the Commons, an abstract 
game that exemplifies what has been one of the major concerns of political philosophy and 
economic thinking since the 19th century (Hardin, 1968) and is now part of the mainstream 
economic theory, assuming that the selfish and rational human nature will lead to the depletion 
of essential and common resources, e.g. water, soil, etc., in the absence of well-defined 
property rights, formal, top-down management institutions, rules of access and exploitation. 
In order to quantitatively better illustrate how the Tragedy of Commons unfolds, one can 
assume a common finite resource, e.g. a village green, and N players, farmers. The cost of 
taking one goat grazing in the green is c. It is up to each player i to decide on how many goats 
𝑔𝑖 he/she will take grazing. In total there will be 𝐺 = 𝑔1 +⋯+ 𝑔𝑁 goats grazing. u(G) is an 
utility function that returns the individual benefit from taking a goat grazing as a function of 




< 0, as this decrease will be sharper for higher G, which means 
𝑑2𝑢
𝑑𝐺2
< 0. The 
payoff of each player will be of 
 𝑝𝑖 = (𝑢(𝐺) − 𝑐)𝑔𝑖  (1) 
At a Nash equilibrium, famers’ decision on the number of goats grazing will be (𝑔1
∗, … , 𝑔𝑁
∗ ) 
as no farmer will be better of if he changes his/her chosen number of goats in the green. Thus, 
at Nash equilibrium 
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝜕𝑔𝑖













∗ − 𝑐 =  0 (2) 







− 𝑐 = 0  (3) 
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If 𝑢(𝐺) is known, the optimum 𝐺∗ can be found. However, were there a central management 
entity in place, the social welfare would take place at 𝐺∗∗which maximizes total payoff 𝑝 =
(𝑢(𝐺) − 𝑐)𝐺. This implies 
 𝑢(𝐺∗∗) + 𝐺∗∗
𝑑𝑢(𝐺∗∗)
𝑑𝐺
− 𝑐 = 0  (4) 
Comparing both equations and taking into account the fact of 𝑢(𝐺) and its derivate decreasing 
with 𝐺, one concludes that 𝐺∗∗ < 𝐺∗, which means that at Nash equilibrium compared with 
social welfare optimum the common resource is over utilized. This makes the game a social 
dilemma (Szabo & Fath, 2007). 
In another variation of PGG (Kleineberg & Helbing, 2018; Battiston, Matjaz, & Latora, 
2017; Li, Shen, & Jiang, 2016; Pacheco, Pinheiro, & Santos, 2009; Santos, Santos, & Pacheco, 
2008) each player 𝑖 in a total of 𝑁 makes a contribution 𝑐𝑖 to a common pool, topped arbitrarily 
by 1. The total collected, ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑖  is multiplied by an enhancement factor 𝐹, 1 < 𝐹 < 𝑁, a 
synergy factor reflecting how much the whole is greater than the sum of the parcels, to be 
equally divided among all participating players, no matter the amount of individual 
contributions,. Being a Defector in this game means contributing with 𝑐𝑖 = 0. Those who 
contribute with 𝑐𝑖 > 0 are Cooperators.  
Maximum total income is achieved if all players contribute maximally. In this case each 
player receives 𝐹𝑐, resulting in a final payoff is (𝐹 − 1)𝑐. Players are faced with the 
temptation of being free-riders, i.e., to take advantage of the common pool without 
contributing to it, as any individual investment is a loss for the player because only the fraction 
𝐹
𝑁
< 1 will be repaid. Consequently, rational players invest nothing and one ends up with 
another Tragedy of Commons, Free Rider problem, Social Dilemma on N-Player PD (Szabo 
& Fath, 2007). 
If the number of players is 2 and players’ choices are binary, i.e., they are constrained to 
not invest or to invest a fixed amount, then the game becomes a Prisoner’s Dilemma. With 
due tuning of parameters, a N-person round robin PD game can simulate a PGG. 
As it will be hereafter discussed in Network section individuals are located as nodes in a 
network. Each PGG instance makes use of a focal node such that the focal node has all its 
direct neighbours, i.e., all nodes directly linked to the focal node, constitute the N players of 
the game.  
While it is common to assume that in every game individuals can contribute/invest a fixed 
amount c to the public good, a broader scenario inspired in the 2-Player Distributed Prisoner 
Dilemma (DPD) from (Pacheco, Pinheiro, & Santos, 2009) is explored. Hence, a PGG 
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involving two individuals that participate in multiple games is considered, investment values 
being distinct per players. In the distributed scenario, individuals have to split their investment 
across a set of games they participate (that can be all of them, or part of them). In that case, 
the possible outcomes of each player actions can be summarized in a payoff matrix as in table 
4 with 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 representing, respectively, the investments of players 1 and 2. 
Table 4 - Payoff matrix for Public Goods Games in the 2-Player Distributed 


























   
 
Depending on the assumptions of the DPD the values of 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 may be computed 
differently. The single N+1-Player game is substituted by N 2-Person games, one per each of 
the N neighbours the focal node can play with. 
2.1.3. Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations 
The evolutionary game dynamics of a finite population can be described by a stochastic 
process, an approach well suited for computer simulation that models the microscopic 
mechanisms underlying strategy transference between individuals. Once the evolutionary path 
is traced, one will force both (i) population size to tend to infinity and (ii) time intervals 
between system updates to tend to zero, looking for a convergence with the solution that would 
have been reached had the population been considered infinite and dynamical rules defined at 
population level. 
As a mechanism for strategy transference, some alternatives can be considered from which 
the following are highlighted: 
 Pairwise comparison- Along this alternative, a focal individual f available to update 
his strategy is randomly selected. A second distinct individual r is also randomly 
selected. All individuals have an equal probability of being chosen in any selection. 
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The first individual copies a strategy of a second individual with a probability that 










   (5) 
with △ 𝜋 representing the maximum payoff difference that can be found between 
individuals, the numerator of the fraction standing for the difference between r and f 
individuals’ payoff and 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1 . 𝑤 measures the relative importance of selection 
compared to neutral drift. 
An alternative for not having to anticipate △ 𝜋 is to rely on Fermi distribution and 





   (6) 
In both pairwise comparisons, for 𝑤 = 0 the decision to update a strategy has 0.5 
probability and does not take into account payoff differences. For 0 < 𝑤 ≪ 1, the two 










(𝑛𝑟 − 𝑛𝑓) +
𝑂(𝑤2). Specifically for the Fermi case, if 𝑤 → ∞ the process becomes deterministic: 
an individual switches strategy if and whenever the one he compares to has an higher 
payoff (Traulsen & Hauert, 2008). 
Pairwise comparison models a process of cultural evolution by learning and imitation. 
 Moran birth-death process- Firstly a focal individual f is randomly selected for 
reproduction with a probability proportional to its fitness. His/Her offspring inherits 
ancestor’s strategy. Another r distinct individual is selected randomly with uniform 
probability. In order to preserve the size of the population, the r individual is replaced 
by the offspring. The Moran birth-death process (Moran, 1958) originated in genetics 
provides a mechanism for most fit individuals to spread across the population. Fitness 
of an individual as proxyed by its payoff can be given by 1 − 𝑤 + 𝑤𝜋, with 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤
1 standing for the balance between selection and neutral drift.  
The Moran birth-death process maps to the traditional interpretation of evolutionary 
game dynamics in which strategies are encoded in genomes and spread throughout the 
population as a function of its relative fitness. 
In order to better illustrate how finiteness impacts evolution, one starts considering a well-
mixed population with N individuals and with two strategies, A and B, available for 
individuals to choose from with a generic payoff matrix 𝜋𝑖𝑗 as in table 5.  
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A a b 
B c d 
 
The population being well-mixed means that one can assume that each individual can 
potentially encounter and interact with any other.  
The dynamics of the game will be formulated via a pairwise comparison strategy 
transference mechanism of imitation type, the one to consider along the thesis. The rational to 
apply with no loss of generality is extensible to the birth-death Moran process via minor 
tweaks to point out in due time.  
Being the population well-mixed, the identity of individuals following each strategy loses 
relevance and instead knowing the total number of followers of each strategy is what matters. 
The evolutionary dynamics of such population corresponds to a Stochastic Markov Birth-
Death process whose dynamics becomes fully described upon the computation of all transition 
probabilities between available configurations. Each state of the Markov chain reflects the 
number of followers of each strategy. 
Considering the fitness to coincide with the payoff and the mean-field hypothesis that 
individuals interact with all others, but not with themselves, and being i the number of 
individuals with strategy A, the fitness of individuals of both strategies is given by 






 , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 







 , 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 1 






where 𝑓𝐴𝑖(𝑓𝐵𝑖) stands for the expected fitness of one in a set of i individuals following strategy 
A(B) at a particular moment in time. With i followers of strategy A, one of them can interact 
with 𝑖 − 1 of the followers of the same strategy from which an 𝑎 payoff is collected or with 
𝑁 − 𝑖 followers of B strategy obtaining a 𝑏 payoff. The fractions affecting 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 and 𝑑 are 
just the probabilities of collecting these payoffs from randomly chosing a peer to play with.  
Because of the underlying Moran process, only transitions between consecutive states are 


















  , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 1 
𝑃𝑖→𝑖 = 1 − 𝑃𝑖→𝑖+1 − 𝑃𝑖→𝑖−1  , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 − 1  
𝑃0→1 = 𝑃𝑁→𝑁−1 = 0 






The probability of selection of a B individual with uniform probability as a focal individual 
coincides with the proportion of these individuals in the population. This corresponds to the 
first fraction in equation 11. Second fraction reflects the probability of finding an A individual 
to copy the strategy from. Third fraction represents the Fermi probability of a strategy 
transference. Equation 12 has an analogous rational. Were the strategy transference based on 
a Moran process, only equations 11 and 12 would be updated: their first factor would now 
stand for the proportion of B(A) individuals in the population duly weighted by their relative 
fitness whereas third term would simply be removed. 
The process has two absorbing states, 𝑖 = 0 and 𝑖 = 𝑁: when the population reaches either 
one of these states, it will stay there forever. In an absorbing Markov chain, the probability 
that the process will be absorbed is 1 (Grinstead & Snell, 1997). This is reflected in equations 
14 and 15. This Markov chain is represented in figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2- Markov Chain for a Layer with State reflecting the Number of Cooperators 
 





   0 1 2 … N-2 N-1 N  
  0  1 0 0 … 0 0 0  
 𝑃 = 
= 
 1  𝑝1,0 𝑝1,1 𝑝1,2 … 0 0 0  
  2  0 𝑝2,1 𝑝2,2 … 0 0 0  
  …  … … … … … … …  
  N-2  0 0 0 … 𝑝𝑁−2,𝑁−2 𝑝𝑁−2,𝑁−1 0  
  N-1  0 0 0 ... 𝑝𝑁−1,𝑁−2 𝑝𝑁−1,𝑁−1 𝑝𝑁−1,𝑁  
  N  0 0 0 … 0 0 1  
 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃𝑖→𝑗. The Markov transition matrix presented mixes absorbing and transient 
states. Its canonical form results from the original one with lines and columns interchanged 
coherently such that first lines/columns correspond to transient states and last ones to 
absorbing ones as in 
 





    
 Trans. 
 
𝑄𝑛 (∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑛−1𝑖=0 )R 
 
𝑃 =    𝑃𝑛 =    









        
Rearranging the lines and columns in order to have P in the canonical form, we obtain 
   Transient States  Absorbing States 
   1 2 3 … N-2 N-1  0 N  
Trans. States 
1  𝑝1,1 𝑝1,2 0 … 0 0  𝑝1,0 0  
2  𝑝2,1 𝑝2,2 𝑝2,3 … 0 0  0 0  
3  0 𝑝3,2 𝑝3,3 … 0 0  0 0  
…  … … … … … …  … …  
N-2  0 0 0 … 𝑝𝑁−2,𝑁−2 𝑝𝑁−2,𝑁−1  0 0  
N-1  0 0 0 … 𝑝𝑁−1,𝑁−2 𝑝𝑁−1,𝑁−1  0 𝑝𝑁−1,𝑁  
             
             
Abs. States 
0  0 0 0 ... 0 0  1 0  
N  0 0 0 … 0 0  0 1  
 
For an absorbing Markov chain P in canonical form, the matrix N = ∑ 𝑄𝑘+∞𝑘=0  = (𝐼 − 𝑄)
−1 
is called the fundamental matrix for P. The entry 𝑛𝑖𝑗 of N reflects the expected number of 
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times the process visits the transient state 𝑠𝑗 starting in the transient state 𝑠𝑖 and before ending 
up in an absorbing state. Thus, 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  𝑠𝑗  | 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑠𝑖)  =  
𝑛𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑗
  (16) 
reflects the probability distribution of next transient states to visit until one of the two 
absorbing states is reached, given that at present the system is in transient state 𝑠𝑖.  
Because of ephemeral character of transient states, equally interesting as calculating the 
probability of visiting them, particularly for biology applications, is to calculate the 
probability of fixation of a strategy, i.e., the probability of the population reaching a state N 
(or 0), i.e., all individuals with the same strategy, starting from state 𝑠𝑖 (Nowak M. , 2006). 
As matrix P is stochastic, i.e., ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 1𝑗 , the absorbing probabilities are given by the right-
hand side eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue, which is 1. So one can write 𝑢 =
 𝑃𝑢, with 𝑢 =  {𝑢0, 𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑁}
𝑇. If 𝑢𝑖 denotes the probability for the system to end up in state 
N when starting in state 𝑠𝑖, the following recursive relation hold 
 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖→𝑖−1𝑢𝑖−1 + 𝑃𝑖→𝑖𝑢𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖→𝑖+1𝑢𝑖+1 =  
          𝑃𝑖→𝑖−1𝑢𝑖−1 + (1 − 𝑃𝑖→𝑖−1 − 𝑃𝑖→𝑖+1)𝑢𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖→𝑖+1𝑢𝑖+1 
𝑢0 =  0 










= 𝑒−𝑤(𝑓𝐴𝑖−𝑓𝐵𝑖)  (21) 
equations 17 and 18 can be simplified to 
 𝑢𝑖+1 − 𝑢𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖  (𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖−1)  (22) 
As na aside, if one considers a strategy transference based on a Moran process, equation 22 
still applies, but in equation 21 𝛼𝑖 would value 𝑓𝐵𝑖/𝑓𝐴𝑖, as a result of the aforementioned 
adaptation of equations 11 and 12 to a Moran process. 
1 − 𝑢𝑖 represents the probability of reaching state 0 stating from state 𝑠𝑖, because there are 
only two absorbing states and the system must end up in one of them. Introducing 






− 𝑢0 + 𝑢2 − 𝑢1 +⋯+ 𝑢𝑁 − 𝑢𝑁−1 = 𝑢𝑁 − 𝑢0 = 1  (24) 
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 𝑦𝑖+1 = 𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑖  (25) 
Additionally, 
 𝑦1 = 𝑢1 
𝑦2 = 𝛼𝑖𝑦1 = 𝛼𝑖𝑢1 







Considering that all 𝑦𝑖 sum 1, one is left with 
 𝑢1  = 
1






















and then, the probability of reaching state 𝑠𝑁 departing from state 𝑠𝑖 resumes to: 
 𝑢𝑖 = ∑ 𝑦𝑘 = 𝑢1
𝑖




𝑗=1 )  
 = 












The fixation probability for population A is the probability of a single A individual in a 
population of 𝑁 − 1 others following strategy B taking over the all population and values  
 𝜌𝐴 =  𝑢1  (29) 
Reciprocally, the fixation for population B, i.e., the probability of a single B individual in 
a population of 𝑁 − 1 A individuals, values 
 𝜌𝐵 = 1 −  𝑢𝑁−1  (30) 
 
The Replicator Equation 
Equations 17 and 18 relate the probability of states with probabilities of transitions in a 
discrete system at any instant of time because of system stationarity. If time is introduced the 
master equation describing the evolution of process with 𝜏 discrete (Traulsen & Hauert, 2008) 
is given by 
 𝑝(𝑖, 𝜏 + 1) = 𝑝(𝑖 − 1, 𝜏)𝑇+(𝑖 − 1) + 𝑝(𝑖 + 1, 𝜏)𝑇−(𝑖 + 1) +  (31) 
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 𝑝(𝑖, 𝜏)(1 − 𝑇+(𝑖) − 𝑇−(𝑖))  
with 𝑝(𝑖, 𝜏) representing the probability of a stochastic process being found at time 𝜏 in state 
i. 𝑇±(𝑖), a shortcut to 𝑝𝑖→𝑖±1, represents the probability of a population with i followers of 
strategy A to increase/reduce its number by 1 unit. This quantity is invariant with time. 
Basically equation 31 states that the probability of the system being found in state i at the next 
birth-death occurrence equals to the probability of system being in same state i with no change 
in the numbers of strategy followers plus the probability of being in a neighbour state and the 
system evolving to state i. Only neighbour states of 𝑖 are considered as in each evolutionary 
step of the birth-death process considered the number of Cooperators in the system can change 
up to 1 unit. 
Time taken into account evolves by fixed steps. In what follows and in order to perform a 
macroscopic approach as the limit of microscopic one with well-mixed populations, the size 
of population increases unboundly, 𝑁 ≫ 1, in such a way that instead of counting the number 
of followers of a strategy its frequency will be accounted for. Moreover, time steps are reduced 







and 𝜌(𝑥, 𝑡) transformed into 𝑝(𝑖, 𝜏), equation 31 becomes 
 
𝜌 (𝑥, 𝑡 +
1
𝑁
) −  𝜌(𝑥, 𝑡) =  𝜌 (𝑥 −
1
𝑁




 𝜌 (𝑥 +
1
𝑁




 𝜌(𝑥, 𝑡)(𝑇+(𝑥)+𝑇−(𝑥)) 
 (32) 
𝑥 stands now for the proportion over the entire population of individuals with A strategy. 
Considering second order Taylor series expansion at 𝑥 and 𝑡 of a generic 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑡) function of 
class 𝐶2, i.e., twice continuously differentiable, with t fixed  
 








𝑓(𝑥, 𝑡)𝑑𝑥2  (33) 






























𝑇±(𝑥0, 𝑡)  (35) 




Substituting the last two expansions in right hand side of equation 32 and on the other side 


















 + 𝑂(𝑁−2) 
 (36) 
𝑥0 and 𝑡0 are points within intervals ]𝑥, 𝑥 +
1
𝑁
[ and ]𝑡, 𝑡 +
1
𝑁
[, respectively, with 𝑁 tending to 
infinity. In order to solve this equation, a parenthesis is opened to derive the same equation 
via a Stochastic Differential equation of the form 
 𝑑𝑋𝑡 = 𝜇(𝑥, 𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎(𝑥, 𝑡)𝑑𝐵𝑡  (37) 
𝑋𝑡 is a stochastic process with a drift over time of 𝜇(𝑥, 𝑡) and a local volatility given by 𝜎(𝑥, 𝑡). 
Both 𝜇 and 𝜎 functions are deterministic. 𝐵𝑡 is a Brownian process, also known as Wiener 
process, resulting from the integration of white noise. It is characterized by being stationary 
with 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐵0 = 0) = 1 and 𝐵𝑡 − 𝐵𝑠~𝑁(0, |𝑡 − 𝑠|). Differential calculus will be of no use 
here as 𝐵𝑡, although continuous, is not differentiable. However, Itô lemma can be applied. 
Further calculating density probability 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑡) of process X, one gets a similar Fokker-Planck 
equation (Oksendal, 2003) 
 𝜕
𝜕𝑡
𝑝(𝑥, 𝑡) = −
𝜕
𝜕𝑥





(𝜎2(𝑥, 𝑡)𝑝(𝑥, 𝑡))   (38) 
Comparing equation 36 to 38 and considering process X as defined in 37 to be a solution for 
equation 38, a solution for equation 36 is 
 𝑑𝑥(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= (𝑇+(𝑥) − 𝑇−(𝑥)) + √
𝑇+(𝑥)+𝑇−(𝑥)
𝑁
𝜂(𝑡)   (39) 
Second term on the right hand side, which includes a white noise component 𝜂(𝑡) derivate of 
the Brownian process can be discarded, because of 𝜂(𝑡) having a normalized Gaussian 
amplitude probability and the population size 𝑁 tending to infinity. Payoff of followers of A 
and B strategy from a Stochastic Markov Birth-Death process as in equations 7 and 9 adapted 
to the continuous case and still considering payoff as a proxy to fitness results in 
 𝑓𝐴(𝑥) = 𝑎𝑥 + (1 − 𝑥)𝑏 
𝑓𝐵(𝑥) = 𝑐𝑥 + (1 − 𝑥)𝑑 
(40) 
(41) 
𝑇±(𝑥) for the Fermi distribution pairwise comparison, the one to be explored along the thesis, 
values  
 𝑇±(𝑥) = 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)
1
1+𝑒±𝛽(𝑓𝐵(𝑥)−𝑓𝐴(𝑥))
  (42) 
For 𝑇+(𝑥), 1 − 𝑥 stands for the probability of first individual to be randomly selected from B 
population, 𝑥 for the probability of second selected individual to be from population A and 
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finally the fraction represents the Fermi probability of first individual to copy strategy from 
second one.  
Introducing equalities from equation 40 to 42 into equation 39 and considering in this last 
equation only the first term from right side, as second one is discardable when N tends to 
infinity, one gets 
 𝑑𝑥(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡







 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)tanh (
𝛽
2
(𝑓𝐴(𝑥) − 𝑓𝐵(𝑥)))  
 (43) 






𝑥(1 − 𝑥)(𝑓𝐴(𝑥) − 𝑓𝐵(𝑥)) =
𝛽
2
𝑥(𝑓𝐴(𝑥) − 〈𝑓(𝑥)〉)  (44) 
with 〈𝑓(𝑥)〉 standing for the average payoff of the population, equal to 𝑥𝑓𝐴(𝑥) + (1 −
𝑥)𝑓𝐵(𝑥). 
This is the replicator equation, a deterministic equation for infinite populations to be 






) is proportional to the differential of its fitness to average fitness. It assumes 
individuals are equally likely to interact with any others. (Traulsen, Claussen, & Hauert, 2006; 
Traulsen & Hauert, 2008) show that the replicator equation is also the limit of equation 36 for 
infinite populations for Moran birth-death process. 
2.1.4. The Replicator Dynamics 
On a large unstructured population tending to infinity, the rules describing the selection 
among a limited number of strategies is defined at macroscopic level. They assume the form 
of nonlinear differential equations coined as the replicator dynamics that take into 
consideration the selection mechanism applicable, modelling the evolution of the populations’ 
frequency by means of fitness comparisons. The replicator equation provides a mean-field 
deterministic description of a population evolutionary dynamics, which means considering an 
infinite and well-mixed population driven by a continuous time dynamical process.  
Concretizing, by taking a dynamic perspective in Evolutionary Game Theory and by 
interpreting the rate of reproduction of a population as its fitness, a population with x(t) 
individuals at time t without environment constraints against its growth and reproducing at a 
rate of r per individual and unit of time has an evolution over time that can be described by 





 = rx  (45) 
with the solution 
 
x(t) = 𝑥0𝑒
𝑟𝑡  (46) 
where 𝑥0 represents the size of the population at 𝑡 = 0. If 𝑟 is positive, the population growths 




= (𝑟 − 𝑑)𝑥  (47) 
with 𝑑 representing the death rate per individual and unit of time. 
If one considers additionally a maximum environment carrying capacity 𝐾, growth rate can 
be topped by a (1 −
𝑥
𝐾
) factor as in 
 𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
 = (𝑟 − 𝑑)𝑥 (1 −
𝑥
𝐾
)  (48) 
with solution 
 
𝑥(𝑡) =  
𝐾𝑥0𝑒
(𝑟−𝑑)𝑡
𝐾 + 𝑥0(𝑒(𝑟−𝑑)𝑡 − 1)
 (49) 
So far, a single population of individuals was considered. When second population is 
introduced, natural selection gets in the play because it is a key mechanism of evolution that 
operates whenever different types of individuals reproduce at different rates. 
With more than one population and considering a scenario in which the total population is 
held constant, e.g. due to the ecosystem having a maximum constant carrying capacity, on the 
macroscopic level the replicator dynamics can be postulated directly with the reasonable 





, is proportional to the 
population fitness to average fitness differential (Szabo & Fath, 2007; Nowak M. , 2006),. 
The fitness measures the individual’s evolutionary success, i.e., the payoff of the game in this 
game theory context. 
Along this rational, let 𝑥 and 𝑦 represent the ratio of individuals over total population and 
let 𝑎 and 𝑏 stand for reproduction ratios for X and Y populations, respectively. Obviously 
𝑥 +  𝑦 =  1. Let also ∅ = ax + by stand for the average fitness of the all population. Then, 
according to assumptions about populations’ growth, one has 
 𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡






 = 𝑦(𝑏 − ∅) 
Because the sum of 𝑥 and 𝑦 proportions is fixed, the sum of their derivate equals 0. So, if right 
sides of both equations are added one gets (ax +  by)  − (x + y)∅, which equals zero as 
expected. Previous system of equations is redundant, so replacing y by 1 – 𝑥 in first equation 
(or vice-versa) one gets 
 𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
 = 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)(𝑎 − 𝑏)  (52) 
Equilibrium is reached when 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
= 0, i.e., when 𝑥 = 0 or 𝑥 = 1. This makes sense, because it 
corresponds of all population consisting only of X or Y individuals. The equation highlights 
another aspect. If 𝑎 > 𝑏, 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
> 0, which implies that X population will dominate and Y be 
extinct. If 𝑎 < 𝑏 it is Y time to dominate. If 𝑎 = 𝑏, whatever the initial relative proportions 
of X and Y population, they are preserved. 
The evolutionary scenario analysed is an example of the survival of the fittest, but other 
scenarios can be anticipated in which both population can co-exist. Such scenarios can be 
represented by more general evolutionary equations such as 
 𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
 = 𝑎𝑥𝑐 − ∅𝑥 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑡
 = 𝑏𝑥𝑐 − ∅𝑦 
 (53) 
 (54) 
where 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑎, and 𝑏 maintain their previous meaning. There is now a new variable, 𝑐. If 𝑐 =
1, the previous scenario is recovered. In order to keep total population constant, i.e., for the 
sum of variations in X and Y populations to be zero, ∅ is updated to ∅ = 𝑎𝑥𝑐 +
𝑏𝑦𝑐. Substituting ∅ in first system of equations one gets 
 𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
 = 𝑎𝑥𝑐 − (𝑎𝑥𝑐 + 𝑏𝑦𝑐)𝑥 = 
             𝑥(𝑎𝑥𝑐−1 − 𝑎𝑥𝑐 − 𝑏𝑦𝑐) = 
        𝑥((1 − 𝑥)𝑎𝑥𝑐−1 − 𝑏(1 − 𝑥)𝑐−1 = 
 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)(𝑎𝑥𝑐−1 − 𝑏(1 − 𝑥)𝑐−1) 
 (55) 
The derivate of X population frequency is zero for 𝑥 = 0 or 𝑥 = 1, as in previous scenario. 



















𝑥(1 −  𝑥)(𝑎𝑥𝑐−1 − 𝑏(1 − 𝑥)𝑐−1) equation. Left panel obtained with 𝑎 = 9, 𝑏 = 2, 𝑐 = 3 has an unstable root. 
In right panel, the combination 𝑎 = 3, 𝑏 = 8, 𝑐 = 0.5 leads to a stable root. 
 
Figure 3 presents examples of both sorts of roots. The root 𝑥∗ naturally belongs to interval 
]0,1[. However, depending on 𝑐 −  1 signal, the behaviour of the system changes. If 𝑐 >  1, 
the derivate of X population frequency will be negative in interval ]0, 𝑥∗[, positive in ]𝑥∗, 1[. 
If the derivate is positive, the trend of the population is to grow. Thus, in first interval the 
population shrinks, to grow on the second one.  
No matter how small the perturbation is, if 𝑥 surpasses 𝑥∗, because of 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
 being positive, 𝑥 
keeps increasing until 𝑥 = 1. The reciprocal happens if a perturbation makes 𝑥 smaller than 
𝑥∗, with 𝑥 darting to 0. This makes 𝑥∗ is an unstable equilibrium point. 
The remarkable aspect to stress is that this conclusion is irrespective of the rates of growth 
of X and Y populations. Even if Y has a higher reproduction rate, if at a certain point in time 
frequency of population X goes beyond 𝑥∗, population Y is doomed. 
If 𝑐 < 1, 𝑥 = 0 and 𝑥 =  1 are still equilibrium points but unstable. The introduction of a 
minimum number of individuals from X or Y population in a population of all Y or all X 
individuals, respectively, drives the system to a co-existence scenario with 𝑥∗ and 𝑦∗  =
 1 – x∗ as the relative frequencies for X and Y populations, respectively. Again, irrespective 
of the reproduction rates of both populations. The relative reproduction rates of the 
populations only determines where x* is located. 
Because starting relative frequency dictates the stable equilibrium point to converge to, 
superexponential growth (𝑐 > 1) favours whoever was there first (survival of the first), 




2.2. THE MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION 
Cooperation problems emerge as a result from a misalignment between individual 
motivations and collective goals. This tension is best captured by the prisoner's dilemma a 
2-Player game with 𝑇 > 𝑅 > 𝑃 > 𝑆, played in both territories of greed, as it is tempting to 
defect against a Cooperator because 𝑇 >  𝑅, and fear as with 𝑃 >  𝑆 defection arises as the 
best strategy against a Defector (see figure 1). Thus, no matter the strategy followed by the 
opponent, the best option for a rational player is always to defect. By seeking selfishly to 
maximize his/her own profits, rational players end up in a less desirable collective outcome, 
instead of 2𝑅 they get 2𝑃.  
Natural selection is a key mechanism of evolution that operates whenever different types 
of individuals reproduce at different rates (Nowak M. , 2006) which leads one to expect that 
every individual should be designed to promote its own evolutionary success at the expense 
of its competitors. This is why, in the absence of any other assumption and in a well‐mixed 
population, Defectors always have a higher expected payoff than Cooperators, and therefore 
natural selection rewards selfish behaviour and favours Defectors. 
In opposition, cooperation is an altruistic act that is costly to perform, because it means 
individuals giving up part of their (reproductive) potential in order to benefits others and in 
favour of a common good 
Besides, cooperation is always vulnerable to exploitation by Defectors. Thus, this stated, 
cooperation future does not look promising.  
Yet cooperation is observed on many levels of biological organization, from bacteria and 
cellular organisms to animals (Nowak M. , 2007). Cooperation is the decisive organizing 
principle of human society. Many great achievements of humankind were accomplished via 
cooperation. Additionally, populations of Defectors have a lower fitness than if they played 
the cooperation role. 
So, besides relying on individual social value orientation (Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2007), 
a concept from social psychology attempting to reflect how much weight a person attaches to 





Figure 4- Mechanisms of Cooperation. Clockwise from top left corner direct reciprocity mechanism is 
presented with individuals repeatedly interacting and helping each other. Indirect reciprocity follows. By 
helping a peer an individual builds on his reputation. In kin selection the level of help depends on peer 
relatedness. In group selection when a an individual reproduces in a group already at its maximum capacity the 
group splits in two and another already existing group is chosen for extinction. Population structure dictates 
who interacts with whom allowing the formation of cluster 
 
emergence of cooperation requires certain mechanisms in place for natural selection to favour 
cooperation over defection and to prevent Cooperators from losing ground to Defectors. Such 
mechanisms will have for sure to offset the costs of cooperation by causing Cooperators to 
also be on the receiving end more often.  
In (Nowak M. , 2007) 5 such mechanisms are identified: kin selection, direct reciprocity, 
indirect reciprocity, group selection and network reciprocity, which are schematically 
represented in figure 4. For each mechanism, the authors start from a PD payoff matrix duly 
adapted with new parameters in order for it to correctly reflect the interaction between two 
basic strategies with the mechanism in action. In doing so rewards from choosing a 
cooperation strategy get more appealing. Conditions are even created for cooperation to 
become an evolutionary stable strategy. A sixth mechanism of punishment was also 
considered as studied in (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fowler & Harpending, 2005). 
These mechanisms can be briefly summarized as follows: 
 Kin Selection- Kin selection operates whenever interactions occur among genetic 
relatives, i.e., among individuals who are more probable to share a common ancestor 
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than if they were randomly sampled from the whole population. Relatedness of 
individuals is defined as the probability of them sharing a gene. The coefficient of 
relatedness between two individuals, 𝑟, a value in the interval [0,1] equals 1/2 for two 
brothers, 1/8 for cousins (Nowak M. , 2007). 
 Direct Reciprocity- In nature cooperation between unrelated individuals is noticeable, 
so kin selection fails short to explain cooperation in more general circumstances. In 
order to tackle this limitation, (Trivers, 1971) proposed direct reciprocity as another 
mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based upon the principle of “I will help 
you if you help me later”. The fact of encounters between the same players been 
repeated turns cooperation more inviting. 
 Indirect Reciprocity- Direct reciprocity relies on repeated encounters between the 
same two individuals. Help provided by the donor is less costly than beneficial for the 
recipient. However, particularly in human relations, interactions are asymmetric and 
unbalanced. Indirect reciprocity relies on reputation and applies mostly to human 
relationships. “For direct reciprocity one needs a face, but for indirect reciprocity a 
name is needed instead”. Indirect reciprocity is build out of direct reciprocity 
witnessed by an interested audience. Encounters are observed by others and 
information spreads through communication channels, allowing individuals to adopt 
conditional strategies depending on the reputation of the peer in the game. Direct 
reciprocity relies on a player’s own experience with someone, while indirect 
reciprocity uses the experience of other players. In indirect reciprocity the help 
provided may never be returned by the beneficiary, or by individuals who in turn have 
been helped by the beneficiary (Nowak M. S., 1998). 
 Group Selection- Group selection also known as multilevel selection is based on the 
assumption that competition occurs not only between individuals but also between 
groups. (Traulsen & Nowak, 2006) propose a minimalist stochastic model of group 
selection where the population is subdivided into 𝑛𝑔 groups, which grow in size as 
individuals within them reproduce. In any one time step, a single individual from the 
entire population is chosen for (genetic) reproduction with a probability proportional 
to its payoff. The offspring is added to the same group. When a group reaches a 
threshold size N, it either divides into two child groups with probability q (in which 
case a random group from the population is eliminated), or it does not divide (with 
complementary probability 1 − 𝑞), in which case a random individual in the group is 
 
29 
eliminated so that groups do not get over populated. Social interactions occur only 
among members of the same group and individuals bearing a mutant allele, a particular 
form of a gene, help others by decreasing their payoff by 𝑐 as the counterpart of 
generating a benefit 𝑏 to be shared by all other group members. As a result, selfish 
individuals tend to replicate faster than helpers within groups, but groups comprising 
helpers grow faster and have a greater chance of dividing before risking extinction. 
 Network Reciprocity - With no mechanisms to catalyse cooperation, natural selection 
favours defection because a well-mixed population is assumed where a player 
potentially can play any other with equal probability. This approximation is used by 
all standard approaches to evolutionary game dynamics (Nowak M. , 2007). However, 
in reality populations are not well-mixed and it is not equally likely that a player meets 
any other. In fact individuals tend to interact with a limited number of peer per 
geographic reasons or any others. Thus, with network reciprocity populations are 
supported in networks with individuals at their nodes, links represent interactions and 
determine who can interact with whom. In this context, it has been shown that 
cooperation may emerge (or not) depending on the topology of the interaction graph 
(Santos & Pacheco, 2005; Santos, Pacheco, & Lenaerts, 2006). As discussed in more 
detail below, the network structure changes the effective game played at a population-
wide level, even if, locally, individuals continue to face the same dilemma (Pinheiro, 
Pacheco, & Santos, 2012). The network reciprocity mechanism relies on two factors. 
The first is a limitation in the number of game opponents, that is, “depressing 
anonymity,” rather than having an infinite and well-mixed population (Ohtsuki, 
Hauert, Lieberman, & Nowak, 2006). Second one is a local adaptation mechanism, in 
which a player can only copy a strategy from a directly linked neighbour as determined 
by underlying network (Tanimoto, 2015). 
 Punishment- From an evolutionary perspective, cooperation is a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, it brings an edge advantage to a community, since some tasks can 
only be achieved through cooperation. On the other hand, since punishment involves 
additional costs (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fowler & Harpending, 2005) from an 
individual's perspective it becomes tempting to enjoy the results of cooperation, 
without investing in it. This is the typical free-rider problem that characterizes social 
dilemmas and if allowed to proliferate can break down cooperation. Since selection in 
evolution takes place on the level of the individual, Cooperators are replaced by free-
riders, putting cooperation to an end. In order to discourage free-riders behaviour, a 
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mechanism of punishment is considered with two main objectives: first one is to expel 
from the group free-rider members, from which decision a payoff per capita increase 
results; second one is to account for the costs of a group exclusion in defection strategy, 
which ends up as a dissuasive measure. 
 
A more exhaustive list of supporting mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation can be 
found in (Zaggi, 2013). 
Of all these cooperation mechanisms considered, this thesis focus on network reciprocity. 
 
2.3. THE SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 
A network in its simplest form is a collection of points joined together in pairs by lines. 
Points are referred to as nodes or vertices (V) and represent the elements in a system, e.g. 
stations in subway map, and the lines, referred to as links or edges, represent a direct relation 
between the nodes they connect, e.g. a line connection between two stations. 
Many objects of interest in the physical, biological, and social sciences can be thought of 
as networks. From a modelling standpoint, a network is a relatively simple object, consisting 
of only nodes and links formally described by 𝐺 =  (𝑉, 𝐸) where 𝑉 represents the set of nodes 
and 𝐸  𝑉 𝑥 𝑉 the set of links considered as pairs of nodes linked together.  
Social networks is a recent jargon referring to the mesh of social relationships between 
individuals in a group, community or population. The type of relationships dictates the type 
of network, be it scientific collaboration, professional, hobby-oriented, etc. The ubiquity of 
networks far extend social domain, to enter those of transportation /subway, airlines), power 
grid, telecommunications, health care and others (Kim, Olave-Rojas, Álvarez-Miranda, & 
Seung-Woo, 2018). 
In general, not only are networks shaped from individuals’ actions as reciprocally 
individuals’ traits and behaviour are largely influenced by the network (Girard, Hett, & 
Schunk, 2014). In the particular case of social networks, this individual versus collective 
behaviour had already been addressed decades ago in Sociology with Structuration theories 
which emerged as an attempt to dispel division within the social sciences between those who 
considered social phenomena to be determined by objective social structures (determinism) 
and others who saw social phenomena as the outcome of human agents subjectively 
interpreting the world (voluntarism) (Timbrell, Delaney, Chan, Yue, & Gable, 2005). 
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Most networks being dealt with do not have the regularity of a crystal lattice or the 
predictable architecture found in throughout biology, e.g. in a flour or in an orange slice. 
Instead, at first inspection they look as if they were drawn randomly. Identified the nodes, the 
challenge is to decide where to place links between which nodes in order for the complexity 
of a real system to be well modelled.  
A network as in figure 5 can be completely described by means of the so-called adjacency 
matrix, A, a squared V x V matrix whose entry 𝑎𝑖𝑗 values 1 if nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗 are connected by 
a link; 0, otherwise. The matrix is symmetric, i.e., 𝑎𝑖𝑗  =  𝑎𝑗𝑖 if links are bidirectional. In some 
situations, it may be useful to represent links as having a strength, weight or value assigned, 
usually a real number. This value can represent a bandwidth in an internet link, the electrical 
tension between two power stations or the travel time between two subway stations. In these 
circumstances, 𝑎𝑖𝑗 is no more binary and stores these weights. The diagonal, 𝑎𝑖𝑖, concerns 
loops, i.e., links that start and terminate in the same node. 




Figure 5- Network Adjacency Matrix 
Since the adjacency matrix is not handy to deal with, because its size raises with the square 
of the number of nodes, and above all is inefficient for sparse networks, a number of concise 
statistical indicators of centrality are defined in an attempt to capture the essence of the 
network and allow the generation of a new ones with similar properties. In that sense, it is 
relevant to revise some of the most important metrics. 
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Let us consider a network with N nodes and L links. The density of such network is given 
by the ratio between the effective number of links and the potential number of links the 
network can accommodate. 






  (57) 
The number of links that a node 𝑖 participates can be readly computed from the adjacency 
matrix as 
 𝑘𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑗   (58) 
and corresponds to the degree of node i. The degree distribution, D(k), reflects the probability 
of a node in the network randomly chosen having degree k. The average of D(K) is given by 
 𝐸(𝑘) = 〈𝑘〉 = ∑ 𝑘𝐷(𝑘)
max (𝑘)
𝑘=1  = 
2
𝑁
 ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑖>𝑗  = 2 
𝐿
𝑁
  (59) 
The second moment of D(k) is given by 
 𝑘
2  =  𝐸(𝑘2) – 𝐸2(𝑘)  =  〈𝑘2〉 – 〈𝑘〉2  (60) 
The degree distribution is perhaps the simplest and most frequent property used to characterize 
networks, as real world networks often exhibit different degree distribution signatures at fixed 
instants of time and evolving over time. 
D(k) describes individual nodes’ degree distribution regardless of any degree-degree 
correlation, which are characteristics of many real networks. Thus, in order to address degree-
degree correlation, 𝐷(𝑘|𝑘’) should be calculated. Degree correlations capture the relationship 
between the degrees of nodes that link to each other. One way to quantify their magnitude is 








  (61) 








  (62) 
where 𝑘𝑘𝑖 values 1 only for those nodes with degree k. This apparently complex formula 
boils down to firstly identify all k-degree nodes. Secondly, for each of k-degree nodes, average 
degree of their neighbours is calculated. Lastly, the average of average degree of k-degree 
nodes’ neighbours is calculated.  
In accordance to 𝑘𝑛𝑛(𝑘) dependency on 𝑘, networks can be classified as: 
 Assortative, In this networks, as 𝑘𝑛𝑛(𝑘) increases with k, the higher the degree k of a 
node, the higher is the average degree of its nearest neighbours 
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 Neutral, 𝑘𝑛𝑛(𝑘) has no dependency on k. 
 Disassortative, 𝑘𝑛𝑛(𝑘) decreases with k, so higher degree nodes tend to link with 
lower ones and vice-versa. 
The networks that will be experimented along the thesis, Horand and Scale-free BA to be 
described in next sections, are neutral. Examples of assortive and disassortive networks are 
illustrated in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6- Examples of Network Assortativity and Disassortativity. Source: (Barabási & Pósfai, Network 
Science, 2016) 
 
Left network concerns an assortative network, where nodes with higher/lower degree 
connect preferentially with  nodes with higher/lower degree. The reciprocal takes place on 
the right side for a disassortative network. Node colour reflect their degree.  
The degree of a node contains no information about the relationship between node’s 
neighbours. For any two neighbours of a node, two patterns can be anticipated: either these 
nodes are directly connected or they are not. Clustering coefficient captures the degree to 
which the neighbours of a given node link to each other. As in (Watts & Strogatz, 1998), for 
a node 𝑖 with degree 𝑘𝑖 , the local clustering coefficient measuring the density of links in 









  (63) 
where Li represents the number of links between the 𝑘𝑖 neighbours of node i. 𝐶𝑖 values: 
 0, if none of the neighbours of node i link to each other 
 1, if all neighbours of node i link to each other 
In general, 𝐶𝑖 measures the network’s local link density and represents the probability of 
two randomly chosen neighbours of node i having a common link. The more densely 
interconnected the neighbourhood of node 𝑖 are, the higher is its local clustering coefficient. 
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The clustering of a whole network is captured by the average clustering 








  (64) 
The clustering coefficient is particularly meaningful in social networks where nodes 
represent individual and links social relations, e.g. friendship. A node having a high clustering 
means that its related friends are also friendship and that “my friends’ friends tend to be my 
friends”. Figure 7 illustrates the calculation of the clustering coefficient. 
 
  
Figure 7- Examples of Clustering Coefficient Calculations for 3 Networks. From left to right panel, node 1 
has 2, 3 and 3 neighbours. This means potentially there could be 𝐶2
2 = 1 , 𝐶2
3 = 3 and 𝐶2
3 = 3 distinct triangles 
with node 1 on one of its vertices and two of its neighbours on the other vertices. These values are the 
denominators of fractions in the figure. Effectively, the numbers of such triangles found in networks from left 
to right are 0, 1 and 2. On the right panel, triangle 1-2-4 is missing for clustering coefficient to reach value 1. 
 
 
In networks, physical distance is replaced by path length. A path is a route that runs along 
the links of the network. A path’s length represents the number of links the path contains 
(Barabási & Pósfai, Network Science, 2016). The shortest path between nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗 is the 
path with the fewest number of links. By definition, the shortest path can never intersect itself, 
which means it cannot contain loops. The shortest path is often called the distance between 
nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗, and is denoted by 𝑑𝑖𝑗. Multiple shortest paths of the same length d between a 
pair of nodes can exist.  
The average shortest path length of a network, 〈𝑑〉, is given by 










𝑖,𝑗=1,𝑖<𝑗   (65) 
where 〈𝑑〉 is only meaningful for single connected network, i.e., for networks with at least a 
path connecting any pair of nodes. The average path length, 〈𝑑〉, gives the expected distance 
between two randomly chosen different nodes. 
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The notion of distance can be extended to take into account the weight of each link 
reflecting space or time separation between nodes. E.g. the algorithms of Dijkstra and Floyd 
used in navigation applications calculate shortest paths using weighted links (Buescu, 2018).  
2.3.1. Models of Networks 
It is common to use the terms network and graph interchangeably, however there is a subtle 
difference. Network refers to real systems with nodes representing entities and links standing 
for their relationships. Graph is used for the mathematical representation of these networks 
(Barabási & Pósfai, Network Science, 2016). Network theory by studying graphs as 
representations of relationships between entities, which can be unidirectional or bidirectional, 
has applications is diverse areas, both technological and social, such as physics, computer 
science, engineering, biology, sociology or social networks.  
In order to better understand the phenomena modelled by a network, it needs to be 
characterized by indexes such as the ones presented hereinabove.  
These indexes, however, only provide a model of the reality, like a blur photograph. 
However, and for some applications, having a faithful but static representation of reality only 
allows anyone to recognize it but an understanding of the process leading to that reality is still 
lacking. This is exactly what evolving network models attempts to achieve. They capture the 
way networks are built up by reproducing the steps followed by nature or society when they 
created the complex systems 
Thus, the goal is shifted from simply describing the topology of a network to understanding 
the mechanisms that shape its evolution allowing its reproduction in laboratory or simulation.   
2.3.1.1. Random Networks 
A random network, also known as Erdős-Rényi, can be created from a set of N nodes as 




, a link is traced between the 
node pair with a probability p.  
This implies that the degree of a node follows a binomial distribution. From the N-1 possible 
links that converge to a node 𝑘 are activated with probability 
 D(k) = 𝐶2
𝑁−1𝑝𝑘(1 − p)𝑘  (66) 
First moments are: 
 𝜇𝑘  =  〈𝑘〉  =  (𝑁 − 1)𝑝 
𝜎𝑘





Most real networks are sparse, meaning that for them 〈𝑘〉 ≪ 𝑁. Keeping 〈𝑘〉 = (𝑁 − 1)𝑝 
constant, 〈𝑘〉 ≪ 𝑁 is equivalent to make N tend to infinity. Under these circumstances, the 





  (69) 
with 
 𝜇𝑘  =  〈𝑘〉 
𝜎𝑘
2 = 〈𝑘〉  
 (70) 
(71) 
For most random networks, 〈𝑑〉 ≈
ln (𝑁)
ln (〈k〉)
 offers a good approximation to the average 
distance between nodes (Barabási, 2013). 
This dependency of 〈𝑑〉 on ln(N) on random network and not on any power of N as in 
lattice cases is relevant because in many real networks the average distance between two nodes 
depends logarithmically on N. A network is classified as small-world if the average distance 
between nodes or the network diameter, i.e., maximum distance between any two nodes, 
depends logarithmically on the system size.  
Apart from all its simplicity, random networks lack two important properties observed in 
many real-world networks: 
 They do not generate local clustering. Because they have a constant and independent 
probability of two nodes being connected, random networks tend to have a 
low clustering coefficient. 
The cluster coefficient for a general node in a random network is given by the ratio 
between the number of triangles formed by a focal node and any two of its neighbours 










  (72) 
a number tending to zero for sparse networks. 
 Random networks do not lead to the formation of hubs. Additionally, they are 
characterized by a degree distribution converging to a Poisson distribution, rather than 
to a power law observed in many real-world networks. 
In order to tackle the first of these limitations, the Watts-Strogatz model was conceived, 
which attempts to reconcile two observations: 
 Small-World Property 
In real networks, the average distance between two nodes depends logarithmically on 
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N (see 2.3.1.1), rather than following a polynomial expected for regular lattices.  
 High Clustering 
The average clustering coefficient of real networks is much higher than the one 
expected for a random network of similar number of nodes and links. 
 
 
Figure 8- From Regular to Random Neworks. (source: (Watts & Strogatz, 1998)). L is defined as the 
number of edges in the shortest path between two vertices, averaged over all pairs of nodes. C measures 
clustering coefficient averaged over all nodes. A probability of 10−3is enough for making average distance in 
the network to decay around 45%. A probability of 10−2already makes average distance to decay 80% with 
almost no degradation of clustering index.  
 
As in figure 8, one starts with a regular ring lattice where nodes are positioned. Each node 
is connected to 
<𝑘>
2
 neighbours on each side, with 〈𝑘〉 denoting the intended average degree. 
If 〈𝑘〉 is odd it is arbitrated which side has regularly minus one neighbours. 
In a second step, for each node 𝑛1, the connection to each of its 𝑛2 right side neighbours is 
considered for rewiring with probability p, a parameter of the algorithm. In case of rewiring, 
a node 𝑛3 is randomly chosen with uniform probability among those with which 𝑛1 has not 
yet a connection and excluding 𝑛1. Rewiring consists of 𝑛1 connecting to 𝑛3 and 
disconnecting from 𝑛2. 
The Watts-Strogatz network interpolates between a regular lattice, which has high 
clustering but lacks the small-world phenomenon, and a random network, which has low 
clustering, but displays the small-world property.  
Because of the small-world character inherited from random network influence via the 
rewiring mechanism activated, Watts-Strogatz networks are also known as small-world 
networks .  
This small-world effect had already been identified by Stanley Milgram in an experiment 
conducted in the late sixties that was later coined as six degrees of separation. Surprising 




results showed that despite society huge size of 6 billion individuals, by following social links 
any pair of nodes is on average six links apart, requiring each person to have an average degree 
lesser than 2 (Barabási & Frangos, Linked, 2002).  
2.3.1.2. Horand Networks 
In a homogeneous networks such as lattices, all nodes share the same degree implying 
degree distribution to be a delta function exhibiting a single peak at 〈𝑘〉. 
This useful feature is combined with the small-world one in Horand networks (Santos, 
Rodrigues, & Pacheco, 2005; Santos F. C., Pinheiro, Lenaerts, & Pacheco, 2012). The 
construction of a Horand network as in Watts-Strogatz model starts with a regular ring lattice 
where nodes are positioned. Being 〈𝑘〉 the intended degree of the network, each node connects 
to the closest 
<𝑘>
2
 nodes on its left and right side. Up to now, the network exhibits the intended 
degree, has maximum clustering coefficient but lacks small-world feature. Second step of 
Watts-Strogatz algorithm provides the small-world character but at expenses of degree 
variation among nodes. To acquire the small-world feature without sacrificing degree 
homogeneity a pair of links is chosen randomly. Subject to a certain probability p, one node 
of one link is exchanged with one node in the other link, ensuring no duplication of links 
among the same pair of nodes. The process is repeated iteratively until a fraction p of all links 
has been rewired. 
The appearance of a Horand network is similar to a Watts-Strogatz one but with a fixed 
degree distribution. 
2.3.1.3. Scale-Free Networks 
The degree distribution of a random network is of Poisson form, which means that most 
nodes have a degree that is close to its average. It implies additionally that there are extremely 
few nodes highly connected, because the curve falls away from its peak faster than 
exponentially. 
The random model of Erdős-Rényi rests on two simple and often disregarded assumptions. 
The first one is that the set of nodes if fixed, remains unchanged throughout the network 
lifetime and is known upfront from the beginning of network conception. The second one is 
that all nodes are equal. Unable to distinguish between the nodes, they link randomly to each 




Figure 9- Poisson versus Power-law Distributions. (Source: (Barabási & Pósfai, Network Science, 2016)) 
 
On the left panel of figure 9 a Poisson distribution for the probability of finding a node with 
degree k (𝑝𝑘) from random networks is compared to a power-law distribution (γ= 2.1) from 
Scale-free networks on a log-log plot. Both distributions have ⟨k⟩= 11. 
On the central and right panel a random and a scale-free networks are plot. Both networks 
have 50 nodes and 〈𝑘〉 = 3. The size of each node is proportional to its degree. 
(Reka, Jeong, & Barabasi, 1999) studied the World Wide Web and found out that degree 
distribution follows a power law, where the probability of a node having degree 𝑘 is 
proportional to 𝑘− with   2. The same conclusion was drawn for other networks analysed 
as power-grid, Hollywood network of actors or IBM chip wiring diagram. A Scale-Free (SF) 
network is a network whose degree distribution follows a power law as in figure 9. The SF 
qualifier derives from the fractal-like character of the network, namely that the distribution of 
the nodes’ degree is preserved no matter the scale of analysis. Thus, for populations tending 
to infinity, the distribution of the node degree in interval [a, b], apart from a multiplicative 
factor, is invariant whenever interval boundaries are multiplied by another positive factor.  
The second and higher moments of the degree distribution goes to infinity when  < 3. For 
many SF networks,  is located between 2 and 3. 
This type of dependency on k, which is not exclusive to the technology field or online 
communities but also characterizes other networks in the natural world and social fields, is 
not fortuitous but derives instead from the process conducting to network growth over time.  
In (Barabási, 2013) four organizing principles are identified for networks such as web and 
social networks to be held together. SF is the first organizing principle, which implies that 
hubs are not only tolerated, but expected. Small-world is the second principle, which states 




large and sparse SF network as the Web. The third principle is of preferential attachment by 
which newcomers to the network preferably connect to nodes with higher degree. The forth 
principle is related to the notion of fitness and allows merit to prevailed over seniority and 
provide competition. Network growth develops over time, new links are stablished between 
old nodes, but the rate of growth is controlled by the fitness and the nodes with a greater fitness 
will tend to ‘win out’ and become very highly connected. This explains why Google or 
Facebook arrived late to the web but became winners. By viewing networks as dynamical 
systems that change continuously over time, the SF model embodies a new modelling 
philosophy. 
SF topology is the result of organizing principles acting at each stage of the network 
formation process. Growth and preferential attachment explain the basic features of many of 
the networks seen in nature, social networks included. As long as these ingredients are present, 
it will maintain its hub-dominated SF topology. 
One important property of SF networks is resilience against random error. If nodes are 
removed at random from most types of networks they will eventually fragment into a set of 
smaller networks or individual nodes, but instead a SF network will remains robust against 
random decay; it may shrink but not fall apart. It even remains connected indefinitely if  < 3 
as in the case of World Wide Web. The Achilles’ heel of a SF network is an intentional attack 
targeting the most connected nodes (Barabási, 2013). 
(Barabási, 1999) propose an algorithm to generate a SF network with  = 3 used extensively 
along the simulations in this thesis. It starts with 𝑚0 nodes fully connected. Then iteratively 
nodes are added. Each new node is connected to 𝑚 distinct nodes (𝑚  𝑚0) already part of 
the network. A new node choses randomly a node in the network to connect to with a 
probability proportional to its degree. This mechanism favours seniority and creates hubs. In 
order to avoid a correlation between the index of the nodes and its degree, a final step once 
the network is constructed consists of scrambling the indexes of the nodes. The average degree 
of created network tends to 〈𝑘〉 = 2𝑚. SF networks with  = 3 are called Barabási-Albert. 





  (73) 
2.3.1.4. Multilayers 
Networks consisting of a set of nodes or vertices connected by links or edges have been 
typically used to describe for example traffic in a city, interactions between individuals, the 
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trade among markets or the World Wide Web. Information in the form of news, messages, or 
digital viruses can be transmitted through networks, as well as infectious diseases or general 
goods. Several algorithms have been proposed to generate and replicate the most important 
structural properties of real-world networks from which examples were presented in previous 
chapters. 
In spite of the progress achieved in network science during recent decades, traditionally 
one has assumed that nodes are connected to each other within the same, isolated 
infrastructure, the so-called single-layer network. 
This assumption, however, may in some circumstances be an oversimplification, 
considering that some nodes can simultaneously be the building blocks of more than just one 
network. This important consideration applies to natural as well as to social systems. Many 
complex systems demand manifold resources to be supplied from distinct channels to function 
properly, such as water, gas, and electricity for a city (De Domenico, et al., 2013). 
As major cities are interconnected not just by means of roads, but also by means of rails, 
as well as by means of air transportation, similarly, people interact face-to-face, via phone, on 
online social networks, in their work environment, and so on (Min, 2014). It is thus often 
justified to abandon the traditional assumption of a single-layer network and replace it with a 
multilayer network formalism. Not surprisingly then, the multilayer network, defined as a 
combination class of networks that are interrelated in a nontrivial way, has recently emerged 
as a fundamental concept to quantitatively describe the interactions not just within, but also 
among different networks. 
Networks of networks have been brought to the spotlight by the discovery that even small 
and seemingly irrelevant changes in one network can have catastrophic and very much 
unexpected consequence in another network (Buldyrev, Parshani, Paul, Stanley, & Havlin, 
2010). 
 
What sets a multilayer network apart from the traditional single-layer network is that a 
multilayer network typically consists of 𝑀 (𝑀 >  1) networks (or layers), where the nodes in 
each network (layer) are connected via intra-layer links, but there may be also inter-layer links 
that connect together nodes from other networks. Sometimes the inter-layer links do not serve 
to connect the nodes, but merely serve to communicate information or some other form of 
influence between the nodes forming the 𝑀 networks. 
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The same node may appear in more than one network and sometimes all the nodes pertain 
to all 𝑀 networks with the difference between them being the intra-layer links. Depending on 
these particularities, the terminology that is used also varies. 
One of the challenges in network theory is therefore to treat together ties of different kind 
preserving existing differences. The multilayer metaphor, which allows to distinguish the 
different kinds of relationships among a set of nodes, constitutes a promising framework to 
study and model multilayer systems. 
If evolutionary games are played on multiplex networks, strategy imitation and payoff 
accumulation can take place either in the local neighbourhood of a particular layer or across 
the layers, since all nodes exist in all layer. 
2.3.1.5. Definition of a Multilayer Network 
When nodes are connected to each other in a single infrastructure one has a single-layer 
network or graph formally described by G = (V, E) where V represents the set of nodes and E 
 V x V the set of links considered as pairs of nodes linked together. 
However, a single-layer can be an oversimplification, e.g. if nodes represent airports and 
the links the different airline companies flights. Airlines have their own set of connections 
linking the airports, constituting a layer of coverage independent from the ones corresponding 
to other companies. Whenever there are different infrastructures to consider and there are costs 
flowing between them, it is preferable to consider a multilayer formally described as 𝐺𝑀 =
 (𝑉𝑀, 𝐸𝑀) where 𝑀 represents the number of layers, 𝑉𝑀 =  𝑈𝛼=1
𝑀    𝑉𝛼 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑉𝛼 = {𝑉1
𝛼, … , 𝑉𝑁𝛼
𝛼 } 
and 𝑁𝛼 equal to the number of nodes in layer α. 𝑉𝛼 and 𝑉𝑀 represent, respectively, the set of 
nodes in layer α and in the all multilayer. 
In what concerns multilayer edges one has 𝐸𝑀  =  {𝐸𝛼  𝑈 𝐸𝛼: 𝛼,  𝜖 {1, … ,𝑀}, 𝛼 ≠  } 
with 𝐸𝛼 ⊆ 𝑉𝛼𝑥 𝑉𝛼 and 𝐸𝛼𝛽 ⊆ 𝑉𝛼𝑥 𝑉𝛽. 
According to (Wang, Wang, Szolnoki, & Perc, 2015) and as in figure 10 multilayers can 
be classified into three broad categories: 
 Multiplex Networks 
In a multiplex network all the layers contain the same set of nodes or share at least 
some fraction of the nodes. The difference between the layers is the way the nodes are 
connected with each other in each particular layer. 
The network of airports can be translated into a multiplex form with different layers 
consisting of the routes of different airplane carriers. The collaboration and the citation 




Figure 10- Multilayer Networks. Multiplex network have the same nodes across all layers. Interdependent 
networks typically have different nodes in different layers. Additionally well-being of nodes in one layer may 
depend of the well-being of other nodes in other layers. Interconnected network are like interdependent ones 
but with physical connections inter-layer. In all the three types of multilayers intra-layer connections are 
independent across layers. 
 
All layers having the same nodes and no inter-layer links can be formally expressed as 
𝑉𝛼  ∩  𝑉  =  𝑉𝑀  =  𝑉, ∀ 𝛼 ≠  . Additionally, Eα  = ∅, ∀ α ≠   , i.e., no links 
between layers. 
 Interdependent Networks 
An interdependent network is typical made up of two or more different networks, such 
that there is little or no overlap between the nodes in the different layers. The 
performance of nodes in a particular layer depend on the performance of nodes in a 
different layer, and vice versa. Thus, there exists the so-called dependency links 
between the nodes that are part of different layers. These links are not actual physical 
links, but rather imaginary links that denote the co-dependence; hence the name 
interdependent networks. 
The concept of interdependent networks is referred to in (Buldyrev, Parshani, Paul, 
Stanley, & Havlin, 2010) where cascading failures between an electrical grid network 
and a computer network are studied. Airports and seaport networks can be interpreted 
as interdependent networks, because the proper functioning of a seaport may depend 
on goods delivered by air. 
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Each layer having different types of nodes and there being no dependency links (not 
physical connections) between the nodes can be formalized as 𝑉𝛼  ∩  𝑉 =  ∅ ∀ 𝛼 ≠
 𝛽. 
 Interconnected networks 
An interconnected network is similar to an interdependent network in that it is typical 
made up of two or more different networks, such that there is little or no overlap 
between the nodes in the different layers. In the interconnected network, however, 
there are actual physical links that connect together the nodes from different layers. 
Interconnected networks can thus be regarded as interconnected communities or 
clusters within a single larger network.  
The climate network can be decomposed into different network interconnected layers 
in exploiting the stratification and circulation of the terrestrial atmosphere. 
Each layer having different types of nodes and there being actual physical links 
between the nodes in different layers can be formalized as ∃𝛼, 𝛽 ∈  {1, … ,𝑀} 𝑉𝛼  ∩
 𝑉 ≠  ∅  ⋀ 𝛼 ≠  𝛽. 
 
Real multiplex networks are far from random superposition of their constituent layer 
topologies. Instead, the degrees of the same nodes in different layers may be correlated, as 
they may tend to connect to similar nodes in different layers creating overlapping edges. 
In this thesis only multiplex networks will be addressed. Whenever hereafter multilayer 
social network are referred to, it is its multiplex variant to be assumed.  
2.3.1.6. Degree-Degree Correlation 
An interesting property observed in real multiplex networks is the presence of correlations 
between the degrees of the same node at different layers. This is normally signalled by the 
fact that the probability 𝑃(𝑘𝛼 =  𝑘11, 𝑘
 =  𝑘2) to find a node with degree 𝑘1 on layer α and 
degree 𝑘2 on layer  does not factorize in the product 𝑃
𝛼(𝑘)𝑃(𝑘) of the degree distributions 
of the two layers. 
Within a layer, degree correlation captures the relationship between the degrees of nodes 
linking to each other. Layers can be assortative, if nodes with a higher (lower) degree tend to 
link to nodes with a higher (lower) degree, disassortative if the trend is the other way around 
or neutral if no trend is identified. 
Multiplex networks, because of having the same nodes in all layers, allow the extension of 
intra-layer degree correlation concept to multiplex scope. This is the rationale behind degree-
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degree correlation index designed to quantify assortative (disassortative) mixing pattern 
between layers. The degree-degree correlation is evident in social networks. If a famous 
individual like a singer or a sportsman is famous in one network, e.g. Facebook or Twitter, 
probability he/she will also be famous in another one. Degree-degree correlation is supposed 
to reflect this assortative pattern. 
(Nicosia & Latora, 2015) propose several methods to calculate degree-degree correlations. 
One possibility is the Pearson's linear correlation coefficient. If 𝑘𝑖
𝛼and 𝑘𝑖
𝛽
 denote respectively 
de degree of node 𝑖 in layer 𝛼 and 𝛽, Pearson's correlation coefficient of the two-degree 
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are the ranks of node i due to its degree in layers α and β, respectively, and 
𝑅𝛼̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝑅𝛽̅̅ ̅̅  are the average ranks of nodes in the same layers1. 
A third alternative would be to use Kendall’s 𝜏 rank correlation coefficient. 
(Nicosia & Latora, 2015) calculate the 3 correlation coefficients for American Physical 
Society co-authorship network with 10 layers each one assigned to subfields or research area. 
The procedure is repeated for IMDb network of collaboration between actors with layers 
defined according to movie genre. In both networks, the 3 correlation coefficients provide a 
consistent indication about assortativeness between layers.   
(Nicosia & Latora, 2015) provide two algorithms based on simulated annealing to construct 
multiplex networks with controllable inter-layer degree-degree correlation, useful for 
                                                 
1 Within layer 𝛼, node 𝑖 having rank 𝑅𝑖
𝛼 means that in this layer nodes with an higher 
degree than 𝑖’s have 𝑅𝑖
𝛼 − 1 distinct values of degree. E.g., nodes with second greater degree 
in a layer have rank 2 in that layer. 
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simulations in order to better understand how degree correlations across layers influence 
multiplex performance.  
2.3.1.7. Overlapping 
In multiplexes, networks nodes take part in all layers of networks simultaneously. Social 
networks where each individual node has different kind of social ties, one for family ones, 
another for friendship, for professional, etc., or transportation systems where each location is 
connected to another location by different types of transport, one per layer, are just examples 
of multiplex characterized by a significant overlap of the links in different layers (Bianconi, 
2013). 
Overlapping between two layers 𝛼 and 𝛽 provides an indicator on how probable it is for an 
arbitrary pair of nodes to be linked in both layers. It is defined according to (Battiston, Matjaz, 
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with 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼  and 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛽




1, if nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗 are linked in layer 𝛼 
0, otherwise                                                 
  (78) 
Overlap between two layers falls in the interval [0,1]. Minimum value is achieved if layers 
have no links in common. Maximum value reflects the case of both layers coinciding. Degree-
degree correlation is a more relaxed measure of the similarity between layers, because a 
correlation of 1 does not imply layers’ coincidence. It only concerns the same node on 
different layers having the same number of neighbours no matter if they differ between layers.  
The overlapping of the whole multiplex can be defined as the average of the overlap for 
every pair of layers: 






           
2
𝑀(𝑀−1)
∑ overlapping𝛼𝛽𝑀𝛼=1,𝛽=1,𝛼<𝛽  
 (79) 
   
2.4. EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ON STRUCTURED POPULATIONS 
Evolutionary Game Theory is a mathematical approach aiming to describe the competition 
of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between individuals of distinct populations, 
whether they are molecules, living organisms or humans ideas and behaviours. The 
mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial 
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selection’: Cooperators prevail against Defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces 
(Nowak, Tarnita, & Antal, 2010; Szabo & Fath, 2007).  
Mean-field-type behaviour occurs for two drastically different graph structures with N, the 
number of nodes, tending to infinity. Mean-field approximation is exact by definition for those 
systems where all pairs are linked, i.e., the corresponding graph is complete. A similar mean-
field behaviour arises if each player’s payoff derive from games with only a finite number of 
players chosen randomly in every evolutionary step, as long as choice of a peer in one step is 
memoryless, i.e., with no correlation with previous choices (Szabo & Fath, 2007). 
In the mean-field approach, a macroscopic population-level aggregated description of the 
state of the population expressed as a frequency is adequate. However, when mean-field 
conditions do not apply, a more detailed, lower-level analysis is required. Such a lower-level 
approach is usually termed “agent-based”, since on this level individual agents are the basic 
units of the model. The agent-level dynamics of the system are usually defined by strategy 
update rules, which describe how the agents perceive their surrounding environment, what 
information they acquire, what believes and expectations they build from experience, and how 
this all maps to strategy updates during the game. These rules can genetically code Darwinian 
selection or boundedly rational human learning. 
In real-world systems players do not interact with all other players but instead are located 
as nodes of a network, which determines who interacts with whom (Santos & Pacheco, 2005), 
but also who may be imitated. (Ohtsuki, Pacheco, & Nowak, 2007) propose a model with two 
networks, one determining the peers playing the game from which payoff is collected and 
fitness calculated; another one specifying the geometry of evolutionary competition and 
updating. Latter one can potentially have weights on the links characterizing the strength of 
influence among neighbours and have them unidirectional if asymmetry in the teaching-
learning activity between the connected players is relevant (Szolnoki & Szabo, 2007). Along 
this thesis, both the game interactions and the learning mechanisms will be based on the same 
network of undirected connectivity and with unitary link’s weight. 
The effects of population structure on the outcome of evolutionary games is sensitive to a 
number of factors: population dynamics (Zukewich, Kurella, Doebeli, & Hauert, 2013), 
translation of payoffs into fitness, the diversity of players (Pacheco, Pinheiro, & Santos, 
2009), and the type of game played. For example, spatial structure tends to support 
cooperation in the PD but conversely, in the snowdrift game, spatial structure may be 
detrimental (Hauert & Doebeli, 2004). Global dynamic features of the evolutionary process 
experimented at population level, such as the frequency and distribution of Cooperators, are  
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 Horand Network BA Network 
 
 
Figure 11-Effects of Population Structure on 2-Player Games. On the left panel, population was supported 
on a Horand network with 𝛽 = 1, 〈𝑘〉 = 4. Left panel concerns a BA network with 𝛽 = 0.1, 〈𝑘〉 = 4. For both 
panels 𝑅 = 1, 𝑃 = 0. Cooperation territory is larger in left panel. Yellow areas in Prisoner Dilemma Game 
quadrant correspond to a global coordination dynamic. This heat map reproduces results already obtained in 
(Pinheiro, Pacheco, & Santos, 2012)   
 
determined by local mechanisms at individual level, such as the way payoffs are calculated 
and the rate at which interactions take place (Maciejewski, Fu, & Hauert, 2014). 
Figure 11 compares two network structures illustrating how underlying network affects 
cooperation. 
 
2.4.1. Accumulated versus Average Payoffs 
Individuals collect payoffs, a proxy for fitness, from interaction with their neighbours. For 
homogeneous network, accumulated versus average payoffs is an issue of minor relevance. 
However, things are different for heterogeneous networks. If payoffs are accumulated, 
heterogeneous structures further promote the evolution of cooperation (Santos & Pacheco, 
2006); in contrast, averaging the game payoffs can remove the ability for SF graphs to sustain 
higher levels of cooperation. 
In heterogeneous populations, the range of payoffs depends on the payoff accounting: if 
payoffs are averaged, the range is determined by the maximum and minimum values in the 
payoff matrix but if payoffs are accumulated the range additionally depends on the size and 
structure of the population. The frontier in T-S plan (see figure 11) between the cooperative 
and defective regions get blurred, wider besides moving South-Eastwards (Maciejewski, Fu, 
& Hauert, 2014).  
When accumulated payoff is adopted and considering payoff matrix from table 2, partial 














𝐶  and 𝑘𝑖
𝐷 represent, respectively, the number of Cooperators and Defectors 
neighbours of individual i. Were average payoffs considered instead and the sum of previous 
partial payoffs would have to be divided by 𝑘𝑖
𝐶 + 𝑘𝑖
𝐷. 
These calculations are extendable to multiplex scenarios. Accumulated payoffs for an 
individual are the sum of all payoffs acquired with all neighbours in all layers. Average payoff 
is the average across layers of the accumulated payoff in each layer (Kleineberg & Helbing, 
2018). 
The intrinsic advantage of some vertices in a graph over others can be further enhanced 
through game interactions leading to differences in fitness that depend on an individual’s 
strategy as well as its position on the graph. For example, a Cooperator occupying a favourable 
vertex can more easily establish a cluster of Cooperators, which creates a positive feedback 
through mutual increases in fitness. Conversely, a favourable vertex also supports the 
formation of a cluster of Defectors but this results in a negative feedback and lowers the fitness 
of the Defector in the favourable vertex. The fact that heterogeneity can promote cooperation 
was first observed for the PD and snowdrift games (Santos & Pacheco, 2005; Santos, Pacheco, 
& Lenaerts, 2006; Santos F. C., Pinheiro, Lenaerts, & Pacheco, 2012) and was subsequently 
confirmed for PGG (Santos, Santos, & Pacheco, 2008; Santos M. , Pinheiro, Santos, & 
Pacheco, 2012). However, the detailed effects not only crucially depend on the dynamics but 
also on how fitness is determined. For example, heterogeneous population structures favour 
cooperation if payoffs from game interactions are accumulated but that advantage disappears 
if payoffs are averaged (Szolnoki, Perc, & Danku, 2007). 
2.4.2. Update Rules 
Strategy revision opportunities can happen synchronously or asynchronously. In 
synchronous update, the whole population updates simultaneously in discrete time steps, 
resulting in a discrete-time dynamics at the macro level. Synchronous update is typical of 
biological models when generations are discernible in time or with seasonal character.  
In many real social systems, the players modify their strategies independently of each other. 
For these systems, random sequential (asynchronous) update provides a more appropriate 
description. 
Asynchronous update is the option taken along the thesis. Time is discrete and an 
opportunity for a strategy update occurs at every time step. 
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Defined the timing for strategy update, the attention is now turned to the underlying 
population dynamics. In heterogeneous graphs, nodes vary in their degree and have therefore 
a different number of interactions contributing to their fitness. Because of this, with 
accumulated payoff, some node positions become more advantageous to occupy than others. 
Which sites are favoured depends on the type of population dynamics. E.g., for the Moran 
process in structured populations it is important to distinguish between birth-death and death-
birth updating. In the former case, a node is randomly selected for reproduction with a 
probability proportional to its fitness and then the cloned offspring replaces a uniformly 
random selected neighbour. In the latter case, firstly an individual is selected at random to die 
and then the vacant site is repopulated with the offspring of a neighbouring node with a 
probability proportional to its fitness. Even in homogenous populations the sequence of events 
is of crucial importance but becomes even more pronounced in heterogeneous structures 
(Ohtsuki, Hauert, Lieberman, & Nowak, 2006). Because of its dynamics, in death-birth 
updating, all nodes share the same expected life time, but highly-connected nodes will get 
more frequently a chance to produce offspring, since they have more dying neighbours and 
are thus more favoured than vertices with few neighbours. 
In social networks, reproduction assumes the form of a cultural process of learning and 
imitation. Imitation constitutes a wide class of microscopic update rules. The essence of 
imitation is that an individual having the chance to revise his strategy copies the one from a 
neighbour with a certain probability. The neighbour’s strategy is preserved, it only plays a 
catalysing role. Imitation is non-innovative because it may never introduce a strategy which 
is not already present in the population. Two variables are relevant in an imitation processes: 
whom to imitate and with what probability. A node with a strategy to be copied can be 
identified by randomly choosing among neighbours with a probability uniform or proportional 
to node fitness. The imitation probability may depend on the information available for the 
copying node, depending whether only the strategy used by neighbours is known or if both 
strategies and payoffs are available. 
Along this thesis, at each time step a node A is chosen with uniform probability to revise 
its strategy. Afterwards, a reference node B candidate to have its strategy copied is randomly 
chosen with uniform probability from the set of A neighbours. If nodes have different 
strategies, node A will copy node B strategy with a probability given by Fermi distribution 
(Traulsen, Nowak, & Pacheco, 2006) 
 
Prob(𝑆𝐵 → 𝑆𝐴) =  
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛽(𝑃𝐵−𝑃𝐴)
  (82) 
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, a positive amount, stands for the intensity of selection, also known as selection pressure, 
a factor amplifying payoff differential. 𝑃𝐴 and 𝑃𝐵 represent the payoffs accomplished so far 
by nodes A and B. Two extreme cases are to be considered depending on the argument of the 
exponential. If node A has a much higher payoff than node B, then the exponential tends to 
positive infinity, and with probability tending to zero node A will copy node B strategy. In 
the opposite extreme, node B being the one to have a much higher payoff, then with a 
probability close to 1 node A will copy node B strategy. In an intermediate scenario where 
both nodes have equal probabilities, there is a 50% chance of node A copying the strategy 
from node B.  
For the multiplex case, there is a previous additional action in each time step: choosing a 
layer with uniform probability. With a layer chosen, the algorithm for the identification of 
nodes A and B just presented applies but circumscribed to the chosen layer. Node A and node 
B payoffs to consider in Fermi distribution encompass all layers. More precisely, as stated in 
previous section, the payoff of each individual to be compared in equation 82 accounts for the 
sum of payoffs collected by the individual in each game played against his/her neighbours 
across all layers. 
Firstly a layer, layer l, is selected with uniform probability. Within this chosen layer l, a node is selected with 
uniform probability: node A. Next, with uniform probability one of the neighbours of node A in selected layer l 
is chosen: node B. 
  







Figure 12- Application of Update Rule in a Multiplex 
Considering only the two layers presented in the figure, i.e., 𝑀 = 2, and according to 
payoff matrix recovered from table 2, node A has an accumulated payoff of 𝑅 + 3𝑇 + 𝑆. Node 
B has an accumulated payoff of 𝑅 + 6𝑇 + 3𝑆. Were averaged payoff considered and the 
calculated payoffs would have to be divided by 𝑀. With the probability given by Fermi 
distribution applied to payoffs differential, node A copies strategy from node B. Even if node 
B is performing poorly in the chosen layer, 𝑅 + 3𝑆, it may have a good global payoff, 
becoming appealing for strategy copy. Moreover, it is node B’s strategy in the chosen layer 
to be copied, although it may differ from strategies in other layers, which may have 
contributed the most to overall node payoff. In the example, the blue strategy of node B is 
appealing to be copied in layer M, although its payoff is mostly due to red strategy followed 
in first layer. 
 
2.4.3. Gradient of Selection 
Dynamical processes involving populations of individuals constitute challenging examples 
of complex systems, in which the behaviour of the whole is difficult to predict from 
behaviours at individual level.  
Studies developed to understand the global dynamics of cooperative scenarios promoted 
by network topologies and how they relate to local self-regarding actions result either from 
numerical simulations and analysis of equilibrium, e.g. (Santos & Pacheco, 2005; Santos, 
Santos, & Pacheco, 2008; Szabo & Fath, 2007; Szabo & Tőke, 1998), or from an analytical 
determination of the conditions for fixation of strategies in the population, e.g. (Ohtsuki & 
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Nowak, 2006; Traulsen, Shoresh, & Nowak, 2008), failing to explain how a strategy co-exists 
or outcompetes another. The weakness of analytical studies stem from their validity scope, 
often requiring unrealistic population structures or other extreme conditions such as weak-
selection for Moran processes, which means having 𝑤 ≪ 1 when fitness (𝑓) is related to 
payoff (𝜋) as in 
 𝑓 = (1 − 𝑤) + 𝑤𝜋   (83) 
Besides, these studies target on fixation probabilities, a concept specific to biology, missing 
the nexus between the network topology and the evolutionary dynamics created. Until  
(Pinheiro, Pacheco, & Santos, 2012), network studies failed to characterize the self-organizing 
process by which one strategy co-exists with or displaces the other. 
In order to shed some light on the topological mechanism that departing from networked 
individuals engaged in a local game leads to a global, population wide, behavioural dynamics 
which deviates strongly from the original one, (Pinheiro, Pacheco, & Santos, 2012) define an 
average gradient of selection (AGoS) to track the self-organization of Cooperators when 
interacting with Defectors under network reciprocity. At any point in time, AGoS reflects the 
expected increase in the number of Cooperators in the population. In arbitrary network 
populations, it is not possible to derive a closed form expression for the AGoS, but it can be 
numerically calculated. It allows assessing the role of population structure in the evolutionary 
dynamics since it is by design similar to the replicator equation in an infinite well-mixed 
population. 
For AGoS calculation, evolution is modelled via a stochastic birth-death process where 
each individual 𝑖 with payoff 𝑝𝑖 adopts the strategy of a randomly selected neighbour 𝑗 with 
payoff 𝑝𝑗 with probability given by the Fermi function  
 𝑝 =  
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛽(𝑝𝑗−𝑝𝑖)
  (84) 
For each individual i, the probability of imitating the behaviour of any of its neighbours at 
time 𝑡, 𝑇𝑖(𝑡), is given by 
 









with 𝑘𝑖 and 𝑛𝑖 representing, respectively, the degree of 𝑖 and the number of its neighbours 
with a different strategy then the one from 𝑖. 
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If 𝑇𝑖(𝑡) is averaged across all Cooperators or Defectors, one obtains the probability for the 
population at time 𝑡 to decrement or increment by 1 the number of Cooperators, respectively, 
𝑇𝐴
−(𝑐, 𝑡) and 𝑇𝐴
+(𝑐, 𝑡), given by 
 
𝑇𝐴







  (86) 
The first parameter in 𝑇𝐴
±(𝑐, 𝑡) was added to make explicit the dependency of this variable 
on the number of Cooperators in the population. 
During the course of simulation s at time t, the expected increase in the number of 
Cooperators in the population already with c Cooperators is given by 
 𝐺𝑠(𝑐, 𝑡) = 𝑇𝐴
+(𝑐, 𝑡) - 𝑇𝐴
−(𝑐, 𝑡) (87) 
a quantity with an absolute value no greater than 1. 
Trusting on the ergodicity of the process, which means that averages over probability space 
and over time coincide, AGoS is obtained by averaging 𝐺𝑠(𝑐, 𝑡) across the time of a large 
number of samples: 
 AGoS(c) = 
1
ΛΩ
∑ ∑ 𝐺𝑠(𝑐, 𝑡)t ∈ Ωs ϵ Λ   (88) 
where Λ represents the space dimension of all network evolutionary simulations. Ω represents 
the number of time steps per simulation.  




 distinct configurations with c 
Cooperators. Along the evolution simulations, some strategy configurations will be more 
likely than others, e.g. movements from uncorrelated assortments to correlated ones should 
be more probable than the other way round, which will make the probabilities of the various 
configurations with c Cooperators unequal. 
In order for AGoS to be drawn for all possible c number of Cooperators and for a maximum 
number of distinct configurations with c Cooperators to be evaluated, each simulation in the 
Λ space is to be initialized with Cooperators randomly positioned in the network in a number 
given by a uniformly distributed variable in the interval [0, N], in order to prevent lack of 
observations in the state space. 
AGoS being a topology dependent mean-field descriptor for a structured population can be 
computed for arbitrary population structure and arbitrary game parameterization. 





Figure 13-Average Gradient of Selection 
Average Gradient of Selection in structured populations are measured across networks 
randomly sampled from a set of networks of the same type, e.g. Horand vrs BA, degree, 
assortativity, etc. 
Clockwise, starting in top left corner in first panel, the network will evolve towards Full 
Cooperation. In next panel the evolution is toward Full Defection. In next panel, the network 
is bound to either Full Cooperation or Full Defection, final destination depending on initial 
Cooperator frequency in relation to critical frequency x*. One has a Coordination Game. In 
last panel, the system converges to a strategy co-existence scenario. The type of network or 
the relative values of payoff matrix contribute to dictate the type of AGoS applicable.  
2.4.4. The Structure of Social Graphs 
The connectivity structure can be characterized by a number of topological properties 
presented in section 2.3. The graphs to consider along the thesis are all connected, meaning 
there is at least one path along links between any pair of nodes.  
Networks co-exist in different layers of a multiplex. All layers share the same set of nodes, 
but with a layer specific link set. Nodes in different layers may have degree-degree correlation 
or links have a certain amount of overlapping between layers. 
Square lattices are one of the simplest networks. They can be a lattice with von Neumann 
neighbourhood, 4 connections between nearest neighbour nodes, or Moore neighbourhood 
with connections between nearest and next-nearest neighbours, in a total of 8, etc. It may be 
the case that regular lattice only provides an initial structure for the creation of more realistic 
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social networks where a portion of players and/or interactions are randomly removed (Nowak 
M. , 2006). 
Lattices lack the small-world typical characteristic of real-networks. Along the thesis, 
Horand networks will be considered. Due to their construction process not only do they exhibit 
the small-world characteristics but also a fixed degree, useful when trying to understand 
analytically certain phenomena or the role of another property, without degree variation. 
Homogenous networks, in which category Horand networks fit in, allow the creation of 
clusters of Cooperators that interact and maximize payoff in order to better resist Defectors 
exploitation, although with an high sensitivity on the intensity of selection (Pinheiro, Pacheco, 
& Santos, 2012).  
A pattern observed in numerical simulations is that for games played on networks, at the 
beginning the number of Cooperators decreases, as a Defector playing against a Cooperator 
gets a higher payoff. However, on the long run, small clusters of Cooperators form on the 
lattice, because Cooperators playing against each other perform better than Defectors against 
Defectors. The initial decrease in cooperation is the price to pay for Cooperators to reorganize 
and assemble (Perc, 2013). 
For Moran process of death-birth type in a donation game with weak selection (see equation 




> 〈𝑘〉, with b standing for the benefit of an altruistic act, c for its cost and 〈𝑘〉 for 
the degree of the networks. The authors also concluded that the aforementioned condition 
leads Cooperators (Defectors) to a fixation probability 𝜌𝐴(𝜌𝐷), such that 𝜌𝐴 >
1
𝑁
> 𝜌𝐷, with 
1
𝑁
 standing for the fixation of a single Cooperator with neutral drift, i.e. w=0 in equation 83. 
These results holds for large populations with 𝑁 ≫ 〈𝑘〉. 
Real networks that evolved by adding nodes, such that new nodes attach randomly to 
existing nodes with a probability proportional to the degree of the latter are better described 
by a SF network. Aged nodes tend to have greater degree. Along the thesis, the BA model, a 
SF network with  = 3, is adopted. These heterogeneous networks provide not only an 
adequate topology for Cooperators to gather, interact and reinforce mutual payoffs, but also 
function as a reference landmark of cooperation strategy influence over the neighbourhood 
due to the high payoff achieved. 
The impact of heterogeneous networks on cooperation reflected in the right panel of figure 
11 is pointed out in (Santos & Pacheco, 2005) for 2-Players games and later on extended for 
PGG in (Santos, Santos, & Pacheco, 2008). Initially Defectors perform well interacting with 
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high-degree nodes, but soon are victims of their own success as their neighbours cease being 
Cooperators. This allows a Cooperator to invade the hub, seed a cluster and avoid exploitation 
by other Defectors. 
(Gómez-Gardeñes, Campillo, Floría, & Moreno, 2007) show that a more heterogeneous 
degree distributions results in increased cooperation by measuring the frequency or proportion 
of players that consistently play either cooperation or defection after the system reaching 
equilibrium. In SF networks, there is a single large core of pure Cooperators difficult to invade 
organized in hubs. The smaller number of hubs on random network is the reason for the lower 
level of cooperation in these networks. 
2.5. OTHER RELEVANT BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE THESIS 
If previous sections targeted to establish a common ground of consistent terminology and 
to build up the foundations for a theoretical framework, this sections accounts for bibliography 
more specific to the subjects of multilayer networks, modelling and structural measures, 
support for evolutionary dynamics and the sort of Public Goods Games (PGG) that can be 
played in these structures. 
(Santos, Santos, & Pacheco, 2008) focus on PGG in a single layer. Each node with k degree 
participates in 𝑘 + 1 games with a start topology, centered on each of its 𝑘 neighbours and 
itself. 
The only two strategies considered are cooperation and defection. The fitness of a player 
is associated with the accumulated payoff resulting from all PGG in which he/she participates. 
Strategy evolution is implemented via replicator dynamics: at each time step, each individual 
adopts the strategy of a randomly chosen neighbour with a probability proportional to the 
payoff (fitness) difference. 
The two parameter variables considered are the type of network, either regular graphs or 
SF, and the investment to apply per player in each game. Per Cooperator player, either there 
is a fixed investment to be applied per game, or there is a fixed investment per player to be 
equally divided among the k+1 games he/she plays. Simulation results show that network 
heterogeneity favours cooperation. Additionally, sharing a fixed investment across all games, 
i.e., having fixed investment by player, lowers the synergy factor normalized by 𝑘 + 1 
threshold beyond which cooperation becomes viable. 
A mathematical analysis to the results presented in (Santos, Santos, & Pacheco, 2008) is 
developed by (Pacheco, Pinheiro, & Santos, 2009) in order to explain why diversity on 
contribution and on network favour cooperation. Conditions for a Cooperator to invade a 
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Defector hub are presented for both cases of fixed investment per player or per game. 
Condition for latter alternative is less stringent that its counterpart for the former one. As in 
(Santos F. C., Pinheiro, Lenaerts, & Pacheco, 2012) the AGoS reflecting the variation 
(increase or decrease) in the number of Cooperators as a function of Cooperators frequency is 
plot. The plots unveils that the underlying structure effectively transforms a local cooperative 
dilemma into a global coordination game. For fixed investment per game with underlying SF 
networks, there is a critical initial level of cooperation, function of applicable synergy factor, 
below (above) which the level of cooperation tends to an All-Defectors (Cooperators) 
network.   
Moreover, changing the contributive scheme from fixed investment per game to fixed 
investment per player in a SF network population structures changes a PD effectively into a 
Harmony Game where cooperation become advantageous irrespectively of their 
concentration, which means evolution moved to an ALL-Cooperators network. 
2.5.1. Multilayer networks 
A formalism to deal with systems composed of several layers, either with binary or 
weighted links, is proposed by (Battiston, Nicosia, & Latora, 2014). Different perspectives of 
description of a multiplex network are introduced: the aggregated topological matrix, the 
overlapping and the weighted overlapping matrix, which are simpler and more compact 
structures, but not so rich as the adjacency matrix 𝐴𝑖𝑗 per layer. Basic metrics to characterize 
the structural properties of a single layer network such as degree distribution, node clustering, 
shortest paths, betweenness or closeness are extended to a multiplex scenario. New measures 
as multiplex degree entropy emerge. There is a focus on the quantification of the participation 
of single nodes to the structure of each layer, and on its importance for the overall efficiency 
of the multiplex network, in terms of node reachability and clustering. Proposed measures are 
tested and validated on a genuine multiplex real-world dataset, the one of Top Noordin 
Terrorist Network (Battiston, Nicosia, & Latora, 2014). 
2.5.2. Cooperation in Multilayer Networks 
(Li, Wang, & Sheng, 2017) study in a single layer representing a 2D space the evolution 
of cooperation on networks that incorporate geographical costs into the payoff function of 
evolutionary games. The longer the distance between a pair of players, the higher the spatial 
cost incorporated into the payoff matrix of the game.  
Nodes have weights standing for its relevance, e.g. population of a city. Networks are fully 
connected with structures geographically induced, as both nodes’ relevance and their distance 
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are taken into account in a gravity alike function, used in cost-benefit analysis when deciding 
which links to incorporate in the network.  
 
Nodes have 2D coordinates and each link is characterized by the Euclidean distance 
between the nodes it connects. PGG are played but the amount invested by a player in each 
game is now proportional to a cost function given by a Fermi distribution applied to the 
Euclidean distance to each of his neighbours. 
A relevant result is that a polarized distribution of geographical costs can significantly 
lower the threshold value of the synergy factor for cooperation in networked PGG to succeed. 
In other words, the geographical mechanism, which polarizes cooperative costs is able to 
lower the threshold value of the synergy factor for cooperation in PGG. On the other hand, 
more uniform alike distribution of geographical costs hinders the evolution of cooperation. 
(Nakamur, Nagashim, & Yasutak, 2015) study a two layer multiplex with random 
networks, small-world networks, following Watts-Strogatz model, and SF graphs, based on 
Barabási-Albert model. Nodes appear in all layers with no inter-layer links and have a single 
strategy across layers. 3 network types in 2 independent layers, in a total of 32 combinations 
are simulated. In each layer, PD is played taking into account payoffs acquired exclusively in 
that layer. Each nodes updates its strategy by copying it from a neighbour with a probability 
linearly proportional to their layer payoff difference normalized by the maximum degree 
between them. Once a node updates its strategy on one layer, it assumes it in all other layers 
so that a node’s strategy is coherent across layers. In this model, cooperation only has a chance 
if both layers are SF.  
(Battiston, Matjaz, & Latora, 2017) explore multiplexes with layers formed by regular 
random graphs, nodes with independent strategies per layer. Player’s playoff is accumulated 
across layers. For a common synergy factor across all layers, the more overlapping are links 
across layers, the lesser is the critical synergy factor for cooperation to set in. Moreover, for a 
given positive average node overlapping, the bigger the number of layers the smaller the 
critical synergy factor for cooperation to prevail. In a two layer multiplex case, having 
different synergy factors in the layers allows new absorbing states with Full Cooperation on 
one layer and Full Defection on the other.  
(Li, Shen, & Jiang, 2016) tackle a scenario of players having limited resources available to 
be spent in PGG played across all multiplex layers. An agent is represented by a tuple of 
nodes, one per layer. The synergy factor is common to all layers. Layers have homogeneous 
networks, Erdős–Rényi or small-world models, or SF heterogeneous models. Each agent has 
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an investment allocation, an array of investments, one element per layer, such that the 
investment per layer is non-negative and the total investment per agent is topped. Agent 
payoffs are calculated per layer. 
Agents have variable contributions across layers with null contributions allowed. An Agent 
behaves as a Cooperator or a Defector when his/her contribution is positive or null, 
respectively. Per iteration, an agent is randomly selected. Selected agent payoffs across layers 
are compared and based on Fermi distribution, a layer is selected. In the chosen layer, the 
focal node adopts the allocation strategy of a random neighbour in the same layer with Fermi 
probability distribution applied to focal and neighbour nodes’ payoffs in that layer. In case 
allocation strategy is copied, further normalization of the new investment allocation of the 
focal agent is required in order to keep its total topped. 
Greedy-first mechanism was coined for the scenario when an agent in choosing the layer 
to play prefers to update the allocation strategy in the higher payoff layer as determined by 
Fermi distribution.  
Simulations for 2-layer multiplex reveal that greedy-first agents can perform cooperative 
behaviours in multiplex networks when one layer is SF network and degree differences 
between peer nodes increase. An additional conclusion is that degree diversity and greedy-
first mechanism can defeat temptation of defective behaviours and avoid the extremely biased 
cooperation in a certain layer. 
A critic to the paper from the author of this thesis is that parts of the formalism introduced, 
in particular the greedy-first mechanism, lacked generalization to multiplexes of more than 2 
layers. 
 
(Hayashi, Suzuki, & Arita, 2016) address a multiplex scenario where an agent cannot afford 
to play PGG in more than 1 layer at any instant of time. Thus, an agent can have a node in any 
layer, but exclusively, i.e., in any point in time an agent will have a single node that will be 
positioned in only one layer, although this presence layer can dynamically evolve over time. 
Cooperation and defection are the applicable strategies. Game evolution allows an agent to 
change the layer where its single node lays.  
All layers, independent, are defined as Erdös–Rényi random graph with the same constant 
degree. 
The game roughly evolves as follows. For each agent the payoff of its representative node 
is calculated in its layer of presence by playing PGG with its neighbours as dictated by layer 
network who are necessarily present in that layer. With payoffs calculated, for each agent a 
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potential neighbour, not necessarily present in the same layer, is identified. A reference value 
function of node’s payoffs dictates the probabilities with which strategy and layer of presence 
is copied from focal agent to its neighbour or the other way around. 
With arbitrary probabilities mutations hit agents: layer of presence of its single node 
updates to a randomly chosen new one and strategy of its node changes.  
As the number of layers increase, other things being equal, cooperation frequency 
increases, so does the normalized entropy of the distribution of the presence of agents per 
layer, resulting this increase from the cyclic coevolution processes of game strategies and 
layer selection strategies.  
Departing from a scenario with the same Erdös–Rényi random graph across all layers and 
then randomly rewiring them in each layer, it was also showed that heterogeneity among 
layers is a catalyst in multiplex networks to facilitate the evolution of cooperation. In a way, 
this result is a reminiscence of the results obtained by (Santos F. C., Pinheiro, Lenaerts, & 
Pacheco, 2012) in a single layer case. 
(Kleineberg & Helbing, 2018) study multiplexes with independent SF networks. Nodes 
have independent strategies per layer. Evolution of the system is governed by imitation 
dynamics, which means individuals tend to adopt the strategy of more successful neighbours. 
In each round of the game, firstly each node chooses one layer randomly and then, within this 
layer, one neighbour at random. Neighbour’s strategy for that layer is copied with a probability 
given by Fermi distribution applied to the differential of nodes payoff. The payoff of a node 
is calculated as the average payoff accomplished across all layers.  
If PD is the game played and there is no degree correlation between layers, increasing the 
number of layers only leads to minimum changes in final level of cooperation from a single 
layer scenario. However, if degree correlations are present and the number of layers is large 
enough, an average level of cooperation of 0.5 dominates the whole T-S parameter space and 
justifies the ‘topological enslavement’ title of the article. Topological enslavement emerges 
and highlights payoff irrelevance as both the number of layers and the strength of degree 
correlations are increased.  
Topological enslavement is also observed with the Harmony game (𝑆 = 𝑇 = 0.5) and PD 
with 𝑆 = −0.5, 𝑇 = 1.5. In a single layer, former game tends to All Cooperators; latter one to 
All Defectors. However, the same games with a sufficient large number of layers and strong 
degree correlation among layers converge to a Cooperator concentration of 0.5. 
Topological enslavement implies also that the initial multiplex level of cooperation 
determines the final distribution of the level of cooperation across layers, almost irrespective 
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of T-S parameter combination supporting the game played, subject to the condition of existing 
a strong degree correlation across layers. 
Topological enslavement is not exclusive to 2-Player games like the PD or the Harmony 
game. It also occurs in PGG. PGG are played independently in different layers, and the total 
payoffs are aggregated and averaged per node. There is a fixed investment per player per layer. 
Cooperators’ frequency gets larger in the absence of degree correlations, but if this correlation 
is present and the number of layers increases, Cooperators’ frequency drops to a fixed value 
around 50%. These results are independent of similarity correlation or overlapping, a trend 
nodes may have to connect to the same neighbours in different layers. 
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3. MODEL AND METHODS 
In this section we briefly describe the model and methods used in chapter 4 to analyse how 
distributed investments in multilayer social networks impact the evolution of cooperation. 
3.1. MODEL 
Population Structure 
Interactions between individuals in the population are captured by a multiplex, a particular 
subclass of a multilayer social network with only intra-layer links, no inter-layer links, and 
the same individuals present in all layers. Layers are supported in distinct networks. In that 
sense, we will use either Scale Free Barabási-Albert (BA) networks or Homogeneous Random 
Networks (Horand) as the two main models for the networks of each layer. The former is best 
suited to model social networks, while the latter is used as a benchmark. We will consider in 
all scenarios that networks have an average degree of four links (〈𝑘〉 = 4) and a size 𝑍 of 1000 
nodes.  
Networks also define the paths of strategy spreading via imitation processes. Unless 
explicitly stated, networks supporting each layer of the multilayer result from independent 
instantiations of a single type of network, leading to an expected zero degree-degree 
correlation between layers. Having no inter-layer links in addition to layers built from the 




The Distributed Prisoner’s Dilemma (DPD) is a 2-Person version of a Public Goods Games, 
where individuals have to choose between investing an amount to a common pool 
(Cooperating) or not (Defecting). When Player1 (Player2) cooperates he/she invests an 
amount of 𝐶1 (𝐶2). Defectors invest zero. Total investment is then multiplied by an 
enhancement factor 𝐹 and the result is equally distributed between the two players no matter 
the strategy they followed or the amount they invested, in case they played as Cooperators.  
The game is deemed asymmetrical because, although the template of the payoff matrix is 
symmetrical, each of its instances for a particular pair of players will be in general 
asymmetrical, as investments from players can be distinct. From Player1’s perspective the 































With each individual involved in many pairwise DPD interactions, there is room for criteria 
decisions on how to calculate 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 to apply in each game. Three formulations for 𝐶1 and 
𝐶2 are explored along this work: 
 Baseline (1 unit per game) 
In every layer an individual plays as a Cooperator, he/she invests 1 unit per game. So 
the total investment of an individual in the multilayer amounts to 
∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑖 ∈{𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝐶}  with 𝑘𝑖 representing the degree of the individual in layer i. 
All individuals invest the same amount in any game in any layer where they cooperate: 
1 unit. Thus, 𝐶1 = 𝐶2.  
 Distributed per Layer (1 unit to divide per cooperative layer) 
A total of 1 unit of investment is equally divided among all layers where an individual 
plays as a Cooperator. The quantity assigned to a layer i is then equally applied to each 
of the 𝑘𝑖 links of an individual in that layer. 
So the total investment of an individual in the multilayer values 
 ∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑖 ∈{𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝐶}
 ∑ 1𝑖 ∈{𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝐶}
. For a particular individual, all games in any layer where 
he/she cooperates benefit from an equal investment. Distinct individuals apply 
different investments per layer, if they cooperate in a different number of layers.  
 Distributed per Game (1 unit to divide per all distinct games as a Cooperator) 
In this alternative the investment of an individual in all games played across the 
multilayer and where it plays the Cooperator role is the same, this investment being 
equal to 
1
∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑖 ∈{𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝐶}
. Total investment of an individual in the multilayer 
values 1.  
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Whenever an individual switches to a Defector strategy in a layer, the investment 
he/she previously applied in that layer is equally distributed among all the other games 
in the multilayer where he/she still plays as a Cooperator. 
The first criterion is unconstrained, the remaining two are constrained, representing scenarios 
where players have limited resources that have to be divided among layers or games.  
3.2. COMPUTER SIMULATIONS  
In order to study the evolution of behaviour/strategy abundance in the population, we resort 
to extensive computer simulations. Simulations are conducted in multilayer networks with a 
variable number of layers. All layers have the same number of nodes or individuals. Unless 
explicitly stated, networks are of the same type across the layers of the multilayer. For all 
purposes, we consider that the same individual participates in the different layers but with an 
independent connectivity (degree) in each layer. 
The total payoff of an individual 𝑖 in layer 𝑙, 𝜋𝑖
𝑙, is given by the sum of the payoffs collected 















𝑗∈{𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑙}
  (89) 
with 𝑘𝑖
𝑙 representing the degree of individual 𝑖 in layer 𝑙, 𝐶𝑖
𝑙 standing for the amount player 𝑖 




1, if node 𝑖 is Cooperator in layer 𝑙
0, if node 𝑖 is Defector in layer 𝑙   
  (90) 
The total payoff collected by an individual (player) 𝑖 throughout the multilayer, to be 
mapped to his/her fitness, is given by the sum of partial payoffs acquired across all multilayer 
layers and is expressed as 
 




  (91) 
with M representing the number of layers of the multilayer. 
Metrics concerning a particular point in parameter space result from averaging metrics 
collected from a set of independently run simulations.   
A simulation starts with the construction of the multilayer social network. Hence, and in 
the case of uncorrelated layers, each layer is populated by randomly sampling with 
replacement networks from a pre-generated pool of BA and Horand networks. Each pool 
contains 3.000 independently generated instances of each type of network. Any randomly 
chosen pair of distinct BA network instances has an expected zero degree-degree correlation.  
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Each simulation is supported on a set of networks, 1 per layer, chosen independently from 
networks used in previous simulations. Additionally, for each simulation initialization of 
nodes makes use of random variables independent from the ones used in previous simulations. 
The simulation or the evolutionary dynamics is an iterative process with the following 
stopping conditions: 1) a simulation reaches 3𝑥106 times the number of layers iterations; or 
2) all layers saturate, each one into a state of ALLC (All Cooperators) or ALLD (All 
Defectors). 
At each iteration, strategy update proceeds asynchronously.  
Firstly, a layer from the multilayer is randomly selected with uniform probability. 
Subsequently and within this layer, an individual is randomly selected with uniform 
probability and is given the chance to revise his/her strategy by putting in action its agent level 
update mechanisms. This means that each individual in each layer has on average up to 3.000 
chances to revise its strategy during each simulation. 
The levels of cooperation achieved to present in chapter 4 result from averages calculated 
across 5.000 simulations. 
For AGoS related computations, 300.000 simulations are performed and averaged. Each 
simulation lasted until the first of the two possible events occur: 1) the number of iterations 
reaches the number of 150 generations; or 2) all layers saturate each one as ALLC or ALLD.  
A generation equals the product of the number of individuals per layer times the number 
of layers2.  
Because simulations are very CPU demanding, an algorithm optimization was conceived 
in order to save CPU time at expenses of internal memory consumption. Along each 
simulation iteration, both global and individual payoffs of all individuals in every layer are 
kept in memory, in order to recalculate the minimum set of these indicators at each iteration. 
                                                 
2 AGoS requires much computation and is noisier than level of cooperation values, i.e. 
for a given number of simulations, it was verified that the variations in the scalar level of 
Cooperation achieved was less pronounceable than variations in vector AGoS entries indexed 
by the number of Cooperators. In order to reduce AGoS entries variances, the number of 
simulations AGoS is averaged on was increased. The counterpart of this decision was to make 




The same applies to AGoS. Thus, in each iteration whenever an individual 𝑖 in a layer 𝑙 
updates his/her strategy, the following minimum of incremental updates are performed: 
- If the baseline criterion is used, the payoffs of i and all its neighbours in that layer are 
to be recalculated. If a distributed investment criterion is the option, payoffs of 𝑖 and 
any of his/her neighbours in any layer are revised. For the baseline case, there is no 
need to recalculate payoffs in other layers than 𝑙, because payoffs result from 
investments and these ones only changed in layer 𝑙.   
- Applicable to any layer and investment criteria, individuals that had his/her payoff 
updated plus their neighbours need to have their individual AGoS updated. Thus, 
whenever an individual updates his/her strategy in one layer, he/she, his/her 
neighbours and neighbours of his/her neighbours in any layer have to update their 
AGoS in all layers. 
This is because within a layer a strategy update of a single individual has a payoff and 
AGoS impact range of 1 and 2 links, respectively. If baseline criteria is in place, payoff impact 
is circumscribed to the layer where strategy upgrade occurred; otherwise, this impact spreads 
to all layers. Whatever the criteria applicable, AGoS impacts are transversal to all layers. 




At the start, individuals are assigned a random initial strategy, that is, Cooperation or 
Defection. Depending on the simulation objectives, the number of Cooperators to initialize 
each layer with varies. Namely, for determining the level of cooperation layers are initialized 
with half the individuals as Cooperators. If instead the objective is to determine (i) the quasi-
stationary distribution or the (ii) Average Gradient of Selection (AGoS), then in each 
simulation each layer is initialized with a random number of Cooperators uniformly 
distributed between 0 and Z. In either case, layers are independently initialized. 
Individual payoffs and AGoS, accumulated payoff across all layers and layer AGoS are 
calculated. This finishes multilayer initialization. Now an iterative cycle is launched. In each 
iteration, an individual 𝐴 (player) is randomly chosen from a layer 𝑙 also randomly chosen. 
All layers are chosen with equal probability. So are individuals within the chosen layer. In the 
selected 𝑙 layer, accordingly to the supporting network a 𝐵 𝐴‘s neighbour, with a different 
strategy is selected again with an uniform probability. 𝐴 will copy his/her selected neighbour’s 
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strategy with a probability proportional to individuals’ accumulated payoffs differential given 




1 + 𝑒−𝛽(𝜋𝐵− 𝜋𝐴)
  (92) 
keeping its strategy with complementary probability. In Equation 92,  is the intensity of 
selection. It is common to define two limits according to the intensity of selection: 1) Strong 
selection (  + ∞) imply deterministic actions by individuals, i.e., given the chance an 
individual will always copy its neighbour’s strategy if latter’s payoff is minimally higher than 
former’s; 2) weak selection (  0), average payoff difference becomes less relevant in the 
decision-making of an individual and approaches a random walk scenario. 
An individual updates his/her strategy in a layer without concern to other strategies it may 
follow in other layers, apart from the influences of these strategies in the individual payoff. 
After an individual updates his/her strategy in a single layer, its investments are 
recalculated with possible impacts in all layers, depending on investment criteria. In all layers, 
the investment of an individual is updated, its partial layer payoff and the one of all its 
neighbours are updated.  
For AGoS an individual strategy update is even more far reaching because of this indicator 
being based on the probability of individuals copying strategies from their neighbours, which 
is a function of a differential of accumulated payoff across layers. In all layers that an 
individual changed its investment, which are not confined to the one its strategy was updated, 
AGoS has to be recalculated for the individual, for its neighbours and for neighbours’ 
neighbours. 
Both aggregated payoffs and aggregated AGoS at layer level resulting from accumulation 
or averaging of parts at individual level are differentially updated in each iteration. In order to 
avoid the recalculation of the aggregations at each iteration, the differential between new and 
old values of parts are added to totals with due weighting applied. Measures were taken against 
cumulative numeric errors. 
 
Summary of parameters metrics collected from computer simulations 




Table 6- List of the Parameters used in the Computer Simulation model 
List of parameters used 
 
 Investment Criteria 
 Network type, BA or Horand, common across all layers 
 Number of layers (M) 
 Intensity of selection (), within the interval between 0.01 and 10.0 
 Enhancement factor (F), within the interval between 1 and 2 
 
Table 7Error! Reference source not found. summarises the metrics obtained from 
computer simulations used to conduct the discussion and support our findings. 
 
Table 7- List of all the Metrics collected from Computer Simulations 
Metrics to collect from Computer Simulations 
 
 Level of Cooperation corresponding to the average level of cooperation over all layers snapshotted at 
the end of each simulation 
 Distribution of the probability of the number of Cooperators per layer and aggregated, i.e., averaged 
across all layers, as observed during simulations period 
 Distribution of the probability of the number of Cooperators per layer and aggregated as snapshotted at 
the end of each simulation 
 Level of Cooperation corresponding to the average level of cooperation over all layers snapshotted at 
the end of each simulation 
 Distribution of the probability of the number of Cooperators per layer and aggregated, i.e., averaged 
across all layers, as observed during simulations period 
 Distribution of the final evolutionary outcome discriminated per layer 
 Average Gradient of Selection (AGoS) per layer and averaged across all layers snapshotted at the end 
of regular number of generations and at the end of each simulation 
 Strategy coherence or node consistency 
 
Distribution of the final evolutionary outcome per layer is snapshotted at the end of 
simulations in each of the following disjoint conditions: (i) All layers saturated as ALLC;  (ii) 
All layer saturated as ALLD; (iii) All layers saturated, at least one as ALLC and at least one 
as ALLD; and (iv) At least one layer not saturated as ALLC or as ALLD. 
Strategy coherence or node consistency, which is computed as  



















1, for a Cooperator
-1, for a Defector   
 (94) 
is measured at the end of each simulation and averaged across all simulations. If there are 𝑀 
layers and the node is Cooperator in 𝑀𝐶 of them, then consistency equals |1 − 2𝑝|, with p = 
𝑀𝐶/𝑀. Consistency as a function of 𝑝 is a 𝑣 line with a minimum of 0 at 𝑝 = 0.5. 
3.2.1. Numerical Methods 
Calculating AGoS is very CPU demanding. Taking into account that the consequence of 
an individual updating his/her strategy is that its investments across layers vary, its neighbours 
at distance 1 across all layers have their payoff updated and that the impact on individual 
contributions to AGoS at layer level is circumscribed to neighbours at distance up to 2 in any 
layer, an algorithm was conceived to incrementally update multilayer payoffs and AGoS at 
each stochastic process iteration, instead of recalculating these metric integrally from scratch. 
Appendix A presents the algorithm followed to incrementally calculate AGoS and payoffs 
at each iteration of the stochastic process having numerical optimization in mind. The 
algorithm conceived results from a trade-off between a lesser burden on CPU time and an 
increase in memory consumption, with more auxiliary variables being considered. Although 
attractive because of its performance, the downside of adopted incremental updating of  
 
Table 8- Comparison on the Number of Operations required for Payoff and AGoS Calculation with and 
without Numerical Optimization  
Average number of Operations per a Node Strategy update in a Layer 
Operations Unoptimized Version Optimized Version 













# of individual AGoS 
Calculations 
𝑁𝑀 




𝑀(3〈𝑘〉 + 1) (3) 
(1)From steps 2, 5 and 6 of the algoritm (see appendix A) 




variables per iteration is that rounding errors due to machines finite precision accumulate. 
Measures to mitigate and control this consequence are also mentioned in appendix A.   
The compared number of operations in optimized and non-optimized calculations for each 
iteration of the stochastic process on a multilayer with 𝑀 layers of networks, each with 𝑁 
nodes and 〈𝑘〉 average degree, is as in table 8. 
In non-optimized version it is assumed that at every iteration all payoffs and AGoS are 
calculated from scratch. 
As 𝑁 ≫ 〈𝑘〉, the saving of CPU utilization in the optimized calculus of stochastic process 
evolution is evident. Were other operations as the calculus of layer and multilayer aggregated 
AGoS considered and the gain on the optimized version side would be strengthened.   
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The goal of this work is to explore how different investment criteria impacts the evolution 
of cooperation. Given the large parameter space, our first approach was to slice it along a 
number of dimensions. That means, keeping some variables constant while exploring the 
impact of varying the remaining along a predefined domain. Hence, it made it possible to 
investigate the impact of different conditions graphically and derive some intuition on the 
underlying mechanics of cooperation promotion.  
Figure 14 results from a coarse grain sweeping of the parameter space and plots levels of 
cooperation averaged across all layers of the multilink colour coded. It is an eagle’s eye view 
on how the 5 parameters considered, investment criteria, network type, number of layers, 
intensity of selection (𝛽) and enhancement factor (𝐹), determine the levels of cooperation 
attained. In a single go it attempts both to roughly assess the impact of different resource 
investment criteria in the evolution of cooperation in populations interacting through a 
multilayer network and to assess how sensitive is the overall multilayer behaviour to 
environment parameters, in particular the number of layers and underlying network types. 
 
 
Figure 14- Level of Cooperation as a Function of Network type, Investment Criteria, Number of Layers, 
Intensity of Selection (𝛽) and Enhancement Factor (𝐹). Each layer with 𝑁=1000 individuals was initialized 
with half of them randomly chosen as Cooperators. There is no degree-degree correlation or overlapping. 
 
Overall, we concluded that in the presence of distributed investment criteria, levels of 
cooperation increased with increasing number of layers. In opposition, for baseline criteria the 
level of cooperation has little sensibility to variations in the number of layers. This is because 
adding more layers to a multilayer with baseline criteria has a limited impact on original 
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layers. Partial payoff of individuals on original layers suffers no change; only the probability 
of copying the strategy from a neighbour changes as accumulated payoff per individual is 
updated. On the other hand, with distributed investment the addition of a layer completely 
changes the game. By forcing a fraction of the investment of each individual to flow towards 
the new layer, as long as the individual cooperates in the new layer, such flow of investment 
impacts on the payoffs of individuals’ neighbours in all layers he cooperates. This creates a 
new dynamics by changing both individuals’ partial payoffs in original layers as well as the 
probability of copying strategies from neighbours.   
When all other variables are set as constant, cooperation improves with increasing 
enhancement factor (𝐹) as expected, because a greater F implies that in the payoff matrix of 
DPD Cooperators’ payoffs get closer to Defectors’ ones, thus promoting Cooperation3. 
Additionally, BA networks lead to broader conditions for the promotion of cooperation than 
Horand networks. 
Concerning the role of the intensity of selection (𝛽), we observe that cooperation is 
favoured in strong selection regimes with large enhancement factors. When the number of 
layers increases, cooperation becomes dominant across the entire range of selection pressures 
for an intensity of selection above a critical threshold that raises with the number of layers, 
but in a way that is not transversal to all parameter scenarios and thus requires a segmented 
analysis. Noticeable in each heat map (see figure 14), under distributed investment criteria 
and for increasing number of layers there is a region on the left side with an uniform colour 
corresponding to half way the colour map considered, precisely the same level of cooperation 
with which layers were initialized. Noticeable also is that this region gets larger with its right 
frontier moving rightwards as the number of layers increases. Within this region, the 
cooperation level tends to become insensitive to enhancement factor (𝐹). The formation of 
this region is more evident in Horand networks and with investment distributed per layer 
criteria, but although not experimented in the parameter subdomain underlying the figure it is 
extensible to the other distributed investment criteria and BA networks. The phenomenon in 
place is a combined topological and criteria enslavement that further on we will elaborate on 
and that in short boosts multilayer inertia to change, leading the multilayer to preserve 
                                                 
3 In each iteration, would the choice of the layer where to play the DPD game be 
deterministic, e.g. by choosing the layer where an individual maximizes its local payoff, and 
cooperation level would not increase with enhancement factor. 
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throughout simulations whatever level of cooperation it was initialized with. Characteristic of 
this enslavement region is also that the maximum intensity of selection (𝛽) delimiting its 
border varies in the same direction as the number of layers. 
Under the baseline criteria and with four BA layers or more, cooperation levels are high 
(around 80%) in strong selection and high enhancement values (F). This trend has a different 
motivation than the one pointed out for distributed investment criteria cases and had already 
been identified in (Kleineberg & Helbing, 2018). What happens is that in the absence of 
correlations between layers as their number increases so do the odds of an individual being a 
Cooperator and a hub in at least one of the layers. As payoffs are accumulated and new layers 
do not change investment already applied, the contribution from new cooperative hubs helps 
an individual both to hold his/her ground in layers where he/she plays cooperation with few 
neighbours as in layers where defection was the option. We considered F = 1.7 in baseline 
criteria, and we observed that average cooperation level tops at around 80% with the 
multilayer in a stable equilibrium point with layers holding individuals with both strategies 
and individuals with distinct strategies across layers. Figure 15 plots the probability of finding 
an 8-layer baseline multilayer at a particular average level of cooperation by the end of a 
simulation. The expected value of this distribution corresponds precisely to the values 
measured in figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 15- Quasi-Stationary Probability for an 8-Layer Multilayer with BA Networks and Baseline 
Investment Criteria. Intensity of Selection (𝛽) values 1 and the number of individuals (𝑁) per layer equals to 
1000. Probabilities were calculated at the end of simulations. Each layer was initialized with half individuals 




In order to shrink the parameter space and zoom in into different sub-domains where 
cooperation is experienced, reference values were identified for the intensity of selection (). 
Values chosen were 1.0 and 0.1, based on the rational that multilayers with this 
parametrization can span the entire range of cooperation levels.  
Figure 16 explores how the level of cooperation responds to different slices in parameter 
space defined by an intensity of selection (); enhancement factor (𝐹) and number of layers 
(M). In each column we consider scenarios where two parameters are constant and the 
remaining ones vary within the interval of analysis.  
 
 
Figure 16- Level of Cooperation in Multilayer Networks in 2-Player Distributed Prisoner Dilemma (=0.1). 
Level of cooperation was measured and averaged at the end of simulations. Networks in each layer have 1000 
individuals (𝑁), half random and independently initialized as Cooperators.  
 
 
The upper and bottom left panels show the level of cooperation as a function of 
enhancement factor (𝐹), with the number of layers set to 8 and intensity of selection 𝛽 = 0.1. 
For BA networks, under the baseline criteria for F lower than 1.5 we observe that full defection 
(ALLD) is the dominant outcome, and for F greater than 1.8, population reaches a full 
cooperation state (ALLC). In between these values, we witness individuals changing strategy 
from Defection to Cooperation. The existence of a critical enhancement factor (𝐹) beyond 
which cooperation levels rise had already been identified in (Pacheco, Pinheiro, & Santos, 
2009) for a single layer. Although not shown, results from this article were recovered. 
Investment distributed per layer line has a similar trend to the one concerning baseline. If 
investment is distributed per game cooperation raises steadily with 𝐹, but with a low slope. 
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Under the baseline criteria with Horand networks the critical enhancement factor (𝐹) is 
located near 𝐹 = 1.9, meaning that it is a more stringent context for the evolution of 
cooperation. Only beyond this value, there is room for cooperation. Under the distributed 
investment criteria the level of cooperation increases monotonically with F until reaching a 
level of cooperation of 0.5 for 𝐹 = 2.0. This behaviour is due to these slices cutting the 
parameter space almost entirely within the aforementioned regions of uniform cooperation 
level of 0.5 in figure 14.  
The middle top and bottom panels show the evolution of cooperation while varying number 
of layers in the multilayer. We consider a constant enhancement factor of 1.7 and an intensity 
of selection of 𝛽 = 0.1. The selection of the enhancement factor took into consideration the 
location of the level of cooperation phase transition observed on BA on top left panel.  
On BA networks (upper middle) panel we observe the existence of an optimum number of 
layers that maximizes cooperation. This maximum can be explained by the combination of 
two mechanisms with opposing effects: first, as the number of layers increases the critical F 
beyond which cooperation is triggered decreases, as the case for investment per layer criteria 
is the most evident one; secondly, as the number of layers increases the cooperation level 
tends to reach a fixed value determined by the initial proportion of cooperation, a phenomenon 
known as enslavement region (see appendix C). The baseline related curve raises with the 
number of layers but topped by the already mentioned barrier around 80%.  
On Horand networks and in the bottom middle panel we explore a scenario where the 
enhancement factor (𝐹) lies in a region of full defection. Hence, a similar outcome is obtained 
when we increase the number of layers. However, when investment is distributed per layer, 
cooperation becomes feasible in networks with four or more layers. For investment distributed 
per game, cooperation becomes feasible for networks with two layers or more. Under 
distributed investment criteria, there is thus a critical number of layers for cooperation to 
emerge.  
Relevant from middle panels is also that for both distributed investment criteria and for 
both types of networks, although more evident in the Horand case, the level of cooperation 
converges to 0.5 as the number of layers increase. Again, this is due to point {𝛽, 𝐹} =
[0.1, 1.7} for the number of layers sampled lying within the aforementioned regions of 
uniform level of cooperation of 0.5 in figure 14.  
Finally, on the upper and bottom right panels we explore the level of cooperation as a 
function of the intensity of selection (), for networks with 8 layers and an enhancement factor 
of 1.7. On BA networks, cooperation is sustained in the entire interval of selection pressures 
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investigated. Moreover, there is an optimal intensity of selection () that maximizes the level 
of cooperation. A finding that has been observed previously in single layered networks 
(Pinheiro, Pacheco, & Santos, 2012).   
On Horand networks, since for F = 1.7 under the baseline criteria a regime of full defection 
is in place, there is little impact in varying the intensity of selection (). However, for the 
distributed investment criteria, we observe significant gains in the level of cooperation for 
increasing selection pressure and in particular when investments are distributed per layer.  
For both distributed investment criteria and both networks, right panels also highlight the 
fact that for minimal intensity of selection (), the level of cooperation reached coincides with 
the one of multilayer initialization. The deviation increases as intensity of selection () raises. 
As experimentally verified, were the figure replicated with a higher number of layers and the 
critical  until which initial and final levels of cooperation are convergent would increase.   
Although not shown here, we have repeated the case where the fitness of individuals 
corresponded to the averaged payoff across layers, that is, instead of the accumulated payoff. 
In that context, the results are similar to the ones discussed in here with a rescaled selection 
pressure to account for the normalization done by the number of layers. 
Moreover, in appendix B we explore the impact of degree-degree correlations in multilayer 
social networks in the evolution of cooperation for the three investment criteria under analysis. 
We show that while increasing degree-degree correlations widens the range of dilemmas for 
which cooperation is prevalent, the region of parameters where the population is able to reach 
an ALLC state decreases substantially. 
4.1. TOPOLOGICAL ENSLAVEMENT UNDER DISTRIBUTED INVESTMENTS AND 
LARGE NUMBER OF LAYERS 
It is important to detail the limiting case of topological enslavement that emerges when the 
number of layers is very large. This scenario is specific to distributed investment criteria, 
although it can also be observed under the baseline criteria in restricted subdomains of the 
parameter space, eventually requiring additional conditions on the multilayer degree-degree 
correlation. 
The prevalence of topological enslavement stems from the fact that, in opposition to 
baseline criteria, in distributed investment criteria when an individual becomes a Defector in 
one layer he/she will redistribute his/her investment towards the other layers where he/she 
remains a Cooperator. As a result, all individuals will have the same expected accumulated 
payoff with minimal variance. From this, it results that in the limit of many layers the 
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evolutionary dynamics recovers a random walk pattern, where the outcome is a function of 
the initial abundance of Cooperators and Defectors.  
 
 
Quasi-Stationary Distribution for Horand Multilayer averaged across Layers ( =




Quasi-Stationary Distribution for BA Multilayer averaged across Layers ( =




Figure 17- Experimental Quasi-Stationary Distribution for Multilayers averaged across Network Layers. 
Layers with 1000 individuals (𝑁) are uncorrelated and were independently initialized, each one with a number 




Under topological enslavement, evolution is invariant to changes in the intensity of 
selection () and the enhancement factor (𝐹). Appendix C elaborates analytically on the 
underlying mechanics of topological enslavement under distributed investment criteria. 
Appendix B had already pursued the same goal for the baseline case. 
The footprint of topological enslavement can be identified when studying the quasi-
stationary distributions. Figure 17 considers networks with different number of layers, 
enhancement factor 𝐹 of 1.7. Moreover, we consider both Horand networks with intensity of 
selection 𝛽 = 1, and BA networks with 𝛽 = 0.1. In order to evaluate multilayer response to 
different initialization conditions, each layer was independently initialized with a number of 
Cooperators sampled from an uniform distribution. Quasi-stationary distributions identify the 
proportion of times the population was observed in a particular number of Cooperators during 
the simulations.  
For Horand networks, the most notorious fact is the perfect match in the bottom right 
graphic between experimental multilayer quasi-stationary probability and theoretically 
computed outcome under a random walk (see appendix C). The almost insensitivity of quasi-
stationary probability to the number of layers for baseline criteria or the invariance to 
investment criteria up to 3 layers are other highlights from the figure. Also noticeable is that 
the quasi-stationary distributions for multilayers with investment distributed per layer tend to 
follow the ones for multilayers with investment distributed per game but with a gap in the 
number of applicable layers. For Horand networks, this is as analytically expected, because 
the investment of an individual per layer is 〈𝑘〉 times greater in investment per layer criteria 
case than in investment per game alternative. Now, one of the mechanisms leading to 
enslavement is that all individuals collect a payoff targeting 𝐹 − 1 with variance tending to 
zero, inversely proportional to the number of layers. If in investment per layer criteria payoff 
is 〈𝑘〉 times higher than in investment per game criteria, the former case has a variance 〈𝑘〉2 
higher than the latter, requiring a compensation via an increase in the number of layers for the 
quasi-stationary distribution for both distributed investment criteria to look alike (see 
appendix C). 
On the other hand, BA networks for the baseline criteria have quasi-stationary distributions 
almost insensitive to the number of layers. Under distributed investment criteria the same 
trend is observed as on Horand, but less pronounced and with peaks near the absorbing states 
(ALLC and ALLD). Such peaks, however, gradually fade away as the number of layers 
increases. For instance, on BA networks with three layers and an investment distributed per 
layer, the quasi-stationary distribution peaks at both extremes. These results mean that 
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evolutionary trajectories converge quickly to scenarios where each layer is either ALLC or 
ALLD. Hence, their relative proportion dictates averaged multilayer level of cooperation. 
Another example concerns BA networks with 16-layers multilayer and a distributed 
investment per game criteria. As will be shown in next section, with BA networks, simulations 
terminate due to all layers saturating. At the end of each simulation at least one layer saturates 
as ALLC and at least one as ALLD. For the Horand case, it may happen that simulations 
terminate under the same conditions as with BA networks, although taking a longer time, but 
it also happens that simulations terminate by reaching the limit of evolutionary steps with 
layers where Cooperators and Defectors co-exist. These two factors eliminate in Horand case 
the peaks at absorbing states observed in BA figure. 
 
Similar to both distributed investment criteria is that as either the number of layers 
increases or the intensity of selection () decreases, the variance of accumulated payoff 
collected by individuals is smashed, resulting in topological and criteria enslavement setting 
in, expressed as the preservation of the initial proportion of Cooperators in the multilayer 
along time, irrespective of the tuning of other environment parameters as enhancement factor 
(𝐹). This phenomenon is experimented with both Horand and BA networks, although former 
ones do not require so extreme conditions on the number of layers or intensity of selection 
(). Thus, at least in extreme conditions, the pair of number of layers and intensity of selection 
() attributes can determine by themselves the cooperative performance of a multilayer.   
4.2. LAYER AND POPULATION POLARIZATION 
Stating that evolution on multilayer social networks leads to a particular level of cooperation 
requires further exploration. That is, multilayer social networks can reach such outcome by 
various means. An observed level of cooperation, 𝜂, can result from the saturation of all layers 
(a proportion 𝜂 saturate as ALLC and the remaining 1 − 𝜂 as ALLD) or all layers can end up 
in a co-existence characterized by a balance of 𝜂 Cooperators and 1 − 𝜂 Defectors. In order 
to disambiguate such outcomes, we start by comparing the average individual strategy 
consistency on an 8-layer BA multilayer with intensity of selection of 𝛽 = 0.1 for different 
values of 𝐹. See figure 18.  
Around F = 1.7 for baseline and investment distributed per layer, there is a minimum in 
consistency. Until this critical F, individuals are consistently Defectors across all layers. For 
higher F, they become consistently Cooperators. The decrease in the levels of consistency in 





Figure 18- Individual Strategy Consistency across an 8 layer BA multilayer with 〈𝑘〉 = 4, 𝛽 = 0.1, 𝑁 =
1000. Layers were independently initialized with half individuals as Cooperators  
 
the level of cooperation raises with F not as abruptly as in the baseline case. We conclude that, 
in the range of parameters associated with cooperative behaviour, on average each individual 
plays different strategies across layers. Anyway, whether there is any trend for individuals to 
align their strategies in each layer is still an open question that requires further investigation. 
The evolutionary outcome of the multilayer can be characterized by scenarios where all 
layers always reach a monomorphic state of ALLC or ALLD in all its layers. Another possible 
outcome is that all layers reach a monomorphic but heterogeneous outcome, that is, some as 
ALLC while others ALLD. Hence, the relative occurrence of the two outcomes dictates the 
observed level of cooperation. This is the case when individuals have their strategies aligned 
per layer. Finally, the evolutionary outcome can be characterized by layers that do not reach 
a monomorphic state, but instead stay in a co-existence of Cooperators and Defectors. Other 
alternatives can be identified and even a mix between previous alternatives is possible. As 
mentioned in Section 3.2, the complementary conditions considered to find at the end of each 
simulation were reduced to the following set: 
1. All layers reach a state of ALLC; 
2. All layers reach a state of ALLD; 
3. All layers reach a monomorphic state, at least one as ALLC or ALLD, but there is a 
co-occurrence of both states in the multiple layers; 
4. At least one layer did not reach a monomorphic state and stays in a co-existence.     
When condition 3 applies we say that there is layer polarization. When condition 4 is observed, 
polarization happens at population level. Figure 19 illustrates the relative proportions of 
conditions found at the end of simulations for different combinations of investment criteria, 
 
82 
types of networks, and number of layers and for a fixed network average degree and 
enhancement factor (𝐹), 
 
 
Figure 19- Saturation in Multilayers as the Number of Layers vary. Enhancement factor has value 1.7 and 
networks have 1000 individuals (𝑁) with 〈𝑘〉 equal to 4. Layers were initialized with half nodes as Cooperators 
randomly chosen. 
 
For baseline criteria and BA networks, as the number of layers increases we witnesses a 
progressive substitution of ALLC layers by layers with Cooperators and Defectors in co-
existence. In what concerns scenarios with layer polarization they have a maximum with 8 
layers. The same investment criteria with Horand networks has a full defection until 8 layers 
inclusive. Then, as the number of layers increases, the new condition to emerge is that of 
population polarization with co-existence in layers. 
For investment per layer criteria ALLC and layer polarization scenarios are almost 
perfectly balanced with minor intrusions of ALLD conditions. As the number of layers 
increases, some ALLC layers became ALLD and layer polarization steps in. From 8 layers 
onwards, layer polarization is the rule. The same investment criteria with Horand networks 
leads to full defection in multilayers with up to 4 layers. From then on layer polarization is 
the general applicable condition with an increasing relevance as the number of layers increase, 
an ephemeral minor appearance of ALLC condition for 8 layers and an additional occurrence 
of population polarization with 8 layers but fading away as the number of layers increases.  
With investment per game criteria and BA networks, the trade-off is exclusively between 
ALLC and layer polarization. ALLC predominance with 2 layers steadily decreases to 
disappear with 11 layers. As it disappears, it is replaced by layer polarization. For Horand 
networks defection is the applicable condition until 4 layers. Between 8 and 11 layers ALLD 
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fades away to make room for layer polarization with occasional appearances of population 
polarization.  
Not surprisingly for the same type of network, distributed investment criteria tend to the 
same condition as the number of layers increases. Moreover, each distributed investment 
criteria for different types of networks also tend to the same condition as the number of layers 
increases. The number of layers plays again the role of a uniforming factor. 
As the number of layers increases and mostly for distributed investment criteria, it is 
common for ALLC or ALLD conditions to open room for layer polarization. The latter is a 
coarse grained condition spanning scenarios from just one layer as ALLC and remaining ones 
as ALLD to the reciprocal scenario. 
In order to break down layer polarization meaning, the following additional indicators were 
calculated: 
- 𝜇𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶 and 𝜇𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷 to account for average number of layers saturated as ALLC and 
ALLD, respectively, at the end of each simulation; 
- 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶−𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷 to tackle the standard deviation of the difference between the number of 
layers saturated as ALLC and ALLD at the end of each simulation; 
- Node consistency as defined in 2.1.3 and  
- Layers consistency, with the same definition as node consistency, but applied 
exclusively to saturated layers. 
  
 
Figure 20- Saturation of Layers in a Multilayer as Investment Criteria and the Number of Layers vary. 
Enhancement factor (𝐹) has value 1.7 and networks have 1000 individuals (𝑁) with 〈𝑘〉 equal to 4. Layers were 





Figure 20 presents first two indicators for the same types of networks and enhancement 
factors (𝐹) as previous figure. For baseline criteria and BA networks, as the number of layers  
increases, so does the gap between the number of ALLC and ALLD layers, the number of 
layers that do not saturate and the standard deviation between the number layers saturating as 
ALLC and ALLD. For Horand networks and from 11 layers onwards, ALLD layers lose 
ground to layers where Cooperators and Defectors co-exist. As there are no conditions for 
ALLC layers 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶−𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷 measures the standard deviation of the number of ALLD layers. 
For all distributed investment criteria, all layers always saturate. Noticeable also is that 
standard deviation of the differential between the number of saturated layers as ALLC and 
ALLD is significant but does not grow as much as the number of layers. For investment 
distributed per game and Horand networks, the number of layers as ALLC and ALLD 
coincide, which means a 50% level of cooperation, precisely the proportion of Cooperators 
with which the multilayer was initialized.   
 
 
Figure 21- Layer and Node Consistency in a Multilayer as Investment Criteria and the Number of Layers vary.  
Enhancement factor has value 1.7 and networks have 1000 individuals (𝑁) with 〈𝑘〉 equal to 4. Layers were 
initialized with half nodes as Cooperators randomly chosen 
 
Figure 21 presents node and layer consistency for the same types of networks and 
enhancement factor (𝐹) as in figure 19. More evident in Horand case but also noticeable for 
BA networks, is that for baseline investment criteria layer and node consistency deviate from 
each other from 11 layer multilayer onwards, precisely when non saturated layers start 
appearing.  
For both distributed investment criteria and as had already been depicted in figure 20, all 
layers always saturate, which implies node and layer consistency to coincide. 
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This section shed light on how the microscopic dynamics locally defined at individual level 
relates to the resulting global dynamics and allowed to conclude on the inexistence of patterns 
of “self-similarity” at different scales. 
 
4.3. AGGREGATED AVERAGE GRADIENT OF SELECTION 
Up to now, we have analysed the evolutionary dynamics of distributed investments in 
multilayered social networks on the attained level of cooperation. We now introduce the 
Aggregated Gradient of Selection (AGoS) tool in order to obtain a more accurate description 
of the underlying dynamics that leads to the observed outcomes. Hence, we aim at answering 
what is the population-wide dynamics that characterizes the social-dilemma faced by the 
population. 
In a single layer with finite population, the AGoS is calculated as the difference in the 
probability to increase of the number of Cooperators by one and the probability to decrease 
the number of Cooperators by one. The AGoS, which must be computed numerically, aims to 
estimate these two quantities for all possible state transitions through a large number of 
computer simulations of the evolutionary process. The AGoS is, by definition, network 
dependent but context independent, as it recovers the population mean-field character. The 
AGoS captures dynamical information equivalent to that provided by replicator equation in 




Figure 22- Averaged Aggregated Gradient of Selection (AGoS) averaged across Layers and Time. All 
networks have 1000 individuals (𝑁) with 〈𝑘〉 = 4, 𝛽 = 1. Layers were independently initialized with a number 




In order to extend the AGoS to multilayer social networks, we opted to compute the AGoS 
independently per layer, which is then averaged to obtain a population and layer wide AGoS 
representation of the dynamics at hand. 
Figure 22 shows the average AGoS on multilayers with different number of layers and 
types of networks. We consider an intensity of selection of 1.0 ( = 1.0) for both types of 
networks. The criteria for selecting the enhancement factor (𝐹) follows from the outcomes 
shown in figure 14 for both network topologies and involves selecting an enhancement factor 
that is precisely at the transition between ALLD and ALLC outcomes. In that sense, we will 
be using 𝐹 = 1.6 for BA networks and 𝐹 = 1.9 for Horand networks. 
For baseline criteria and BA networks, the multilayer behaviour is one of coordination. In 
that case, the evolutionary dynamics is characterized by an unstable fixed point. From it results 
that depending on the initial abundance of Cooperators and the location of the internal fixed 
point all layers will be driven towards an ALLC or an ALLD outcome. In addition, the location 
of the fixed point is seemingly invariant with the number of layers. Would the enhancement 
factor (𝐹) increase (decrease) the fixed point would move to the left (right). The BA type of 
network is responsible for transforming a defection dominant DPD game in a well-mixed 
population into a game that is commonly associated with a mild social dilemma for 
cooperation, a coordination game often known as a Stag Hunt. 
Cooperation in Horand multilayers under the baseline criteria is doomed for a small number 
of layers. However, for 8 layers population evolution is such that the possibility of a co-
existence scenario with a stable equilibrium root emerges. The multilayer jointly with the 
baseline criteria transform a defection dominant DPD game in a well-mixed population into a 
game with an AGoS typical of a co-existence game. This means that even tough individuals 
are locally engaged in a DPD, multilayer leads to the emergence of a global population wide 
dynamics that promotes the co-existence of Cooperators and Defectors.  
In the case of a single layer and baseline criteria, results are aligned with those obtained in 
(Pinheiro, Pacheco, & Santos, 2012). For investment distributed per layer and BA networks, 
the curves have a similar shape to the baseline case but move leftwards and cease sharing the 
same equilibrium point. With increasing number of layers, the fixed point moves towards 0. 
Moreover, in a case in which the number of layers is very high the AGoS tend to be fully 
positive, typical of a system evolving to full cooperation. With Horand network and a small 
number of layers, all defection is multilayer fate as with baseline criteria. However, as the 
number of layers increase, a stable equilibrium point emerges, and the absolute value of the 
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averaged AGoS tends to zero. In fact, this reduction of AGoS magnitude was already 
experienced in the BA case. 
With investment distributed per game and BA networks multilayer evolves to full 
cooperation. It is also noticeable the decrease of the averaged AGoS magnitude as the number 
of layers increases. In the case of Horand networks, a similar behaviour is observed with the 
exception that evolution is directed towards full defection in the cases that have been studied. 
Common to both distributed investment criteria is that the magnitude of the average AGoS 
decreases as the number of layers increases, something that had already been anticipated in 
previous section. Having AGoS with magnitudes close to zero simply means that multilayer 
trend is to preserve the level of cooperation with which it was initialized. In other words, 
evolution approaches neutral drift. For distributed investment criteria and Horand networks, 
appendix D presents a mathematical explanation to why AGoS magnitude tends to zero as the 
number of layers increases. 
Figure 22 shows results for the average AGoS, that is the average AGoS of all layers 
computed independently. However, as layers are statistically indistinguishable among 
themselves, individual AGoS concerning each layer are very close between themselves and 
thus close to their average AGoS. Figure 23 illustrates this result for multilayers with 4 layers 
and on both types of networks topologies. 
 
 
Figure 23- Aggregated Gradient of Selection (AGoS) for 4 Layers Multilayer over Time. All networks have 
1000 individuals (𝑁) with 〈𝑘〉 = 4, 𝛽 = 1. Layers were independently initialized with a number of 
Cooperators given by a random variable uniformly distributed between 0 and 1000, inclusive. 
 
Moreover, the computed AGoS presented so far results from a time average that spans over 
150 generations. This disposition has the drawback of not capturing the eventual evolution 
over time that AGoS may experience, thus fails to capture the self-organizing process that 
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occurs as strategy assortments in the networks build up. In order to report the AGoS temporal 
dynamics, the time interval was fractioned in 150 intervals of 1 generation each. In each of 
these intervals, AGoS was calculated independently. 
  
BA Multilayers with 𝜷 = 𝟏, 𝑭 = 𝟏. 𝟔, 〈𝒌〉 = 𝟒 
 
 
Horand Multilayers with 𝛃 = 𝟏, 𝐅 = 𝟏. 𝟗, 〈𝐤〉 = 𝟒 
 
Figure 24- Aggregated Gradient of Selection (AGoS) for Multilayers averaged over Time. Layers with 
1000 individuals (𝑁) were independently initialized with a number of Cooperators given by a random variable 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1000, inclusive. The noise increases with generation index due to 
generations having fewer samples. Were the number of 300.000 simulations increased and this noise would be 
reduced. 
 
Figure 24 exhibits snapshots of the AGoS at different generations for multilayers with 
different networks and with different number of layers. A common observation to all 
multilayers considered is that during the first generations AGoS is always negative, which 
means that multilayers in first evolutionary steps witness an increase in the number of 
Defectors. Gradually in subsequent generations AGoS changes and results in the emergence 
of a basin of attraction that favours cooperation. The initial increase in the number of 
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Defectors results from two motives. First one is related to the fact of Cooperators and 
Defectors in the initial configuration of the multilayer are randomly positioned in the network 
making the clustering of nodes with the same strategy extremely improbable. With DPD being 
played locally, an arguably difficult game for the promotion of cooperation, the AGoS 
becomes negative. Secondly, may be simply that in the multilayer cooperation is doomed. As 
population evolve and Cooperators is adopted via the investment they are willing to apply, we 
witness assortment of strategies with the formation of hubs of cooperation.  
For baseline strategy and BA networks, AGoS recovers the unstable fixed point as 
generations evolve. Around the 10th generation, the fixed point emerges for levels of 
cooperation close to 1. As generations unfold, the fixed point moves to lower levels of 
cooperation (decreasing the coordination threshold) until stabilizing at a value with little 
sensibility to the number of layers. A similar behaviour is depicted on Horand networks. 
Here the fixed point is stable, thus promoting a co-existence, and starts emerging with 
levels of cooperation close to 0. As generations unfold the fixed point moves to higher levels 
of cooperation until it stabilizes.   
For investment per layer criteria and BA networks, AGoS also recovers from negative 
values to acquire an unstable fixed point that initially also arises close to full cooperation. The 
difference is that this point moves to lower levels of cooperation faster as generations progress 
and with greater number of layers. With investment per layer in Horand networks and from 
four layers onwards an AGoS characterized by a co-existence point emerges. For a given 
number of layers the co-existence root moves towards larger levels of cooperation for later 
generations. Additionally, not only the difference in co-existence root between the same 
generations shrinks as the number of layers increases as the fixed point moves closer to full 
cooperation.  
For investment per game criteria and BA networks, apart from first generations, all 
subsequent ones have positive AGoS. As the number of layers increases, AGoS magnitudes 
for the same generations decrease. A similar behaviour is observed on Horand networks, 
where the AGoS is negative for all generations. As the number of layers increases, the 
magnitude of AGoS reduces drastically. For 8 layers, AGoS beyond the 10
th
 generation look 
like white noise with minimum magnitude. 
The simple qualitative comparison of successive generations of AGoS concerning the same 
investment criteria and network combination may be misleading unless we take into account 
their relative magnitudes. For instance, for one layer the AGoS magnitude for the first 
generations is much higher than for subsequent ones. If for a given investment criteria and 
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number of layers combination all generation dependent AGoS are averaged, we recover the 
AGoS presented in figure 22. 
Here, we have focused only in multilayers built from a single type of network. Appendix 
E addresses the case of a multilayer with heterogeneous layers: half as Horand, another half 




In this thesis we have used methods from Evolutionary Game Theory to study the evolution 
of cooperation in multilayers made up of distinct and topologically independent networks of 
a single type, be it homogeneous or heterogeneous. Game dynamics were modelled at 
microscopic agent level via the Fermi-update dynamics and explored through computer 
simulations. In each layer, individuals engaged in the simple Public Goods Games in the form 
of the Distributed Prisoner Dilemma.  
Intrinsic to Public Goods Games is a criteria on how much to invest in a game an individual 
participates as a Cooperator. Three criteria were explored. One scenario of unconstrained 
resources, the baseline one, considered that individuals contributed a fixed amount of 1 unit 
per game, irrespective of the number of distinct peers they may interact with. A second one 
had investment distributed per layer. That is, individuals had to distribute the same unit of 
investment equally through all layers where he/she participated as a Cooperator. Third criteria 
of investment was distributed per game, meaning that under that criteria individuals had to 
split equally a fixed investment across all the games they participated as Cooperators on all 
layers.  
For the baseline investment criteria, we have shown that it has little sensibility to variations 
in the number of layers. For homogenous networks of Horand type, the parameter domain 
where cooperation is possible has a minimum enlargement with the number of layers 
increasing. Adding layers just increases the size of regular space, without breaking its 
symmetry, as new layers are statistically identical to previous ones with no impact on the 
investments already applied. If the networks are heterogeneous of BA type, the ones that better 
map social networks, a slight degradation in cooperation levels is even experienced when the 
number of layers increases with minimum change of the domain where cooperation is viable. 
For distributed investment criteria, as the number of layers increases, we see the emergence 
of cooperation for lower levels of selection pressure (). In the case of investment per layer 
and as the number of layers increases, the promotion of cooperation is more consistent in the 
homogeneous case than in heterogeneous one. Moreover, the fluctuations of cooperation level 
in the parameter domain are smaller in the homogeneous case. For investment per game, 
heterogeneous networks favour cooperation for any number of layers. With homogeneous 
networks, a higher number of layers is required for Cooperation to succeed.  
Similar to both distributed investment criteria is that as either the number of layers 
increases or the intensity of selection () decreases, a topological and criteria enslavement 
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emerges, causing final level of cooperation to coincide with the initial proportion of 
Cooperators, irrespective of the values enhancement factor (𝐹) environment. In the parameter 
space of the number of layers versus intensity of selection (), a conceptual line with these 
parameters varying in the direct ratio can be traced such that for any combination of these 
parameters below the threshold defined by the line enslavement rules.  
Moreover, in the distributed investment criteria, as time unfolds layers saturate becoming 
either ALLC or ALLD for heterogeneous networks and a layer polarization is reached. Thus, 
the initial proportion of Cooperators reflects in the proportion of layers that saturate as ALLC. 
For homogeneous cases, we find a mix of polarized layers and polarized populations, i.e., 
layers where both strategies coexist. However, as the number of layers increases the number 
of layers with polarized populations fades away until complete disappearance. Because the 
number of layers is discrete, when it increases also decreases error grain for difference 
between the proportion of layers saturating as ALLC and initial Cooperator concentration. 
This layer polarization is of no surprise, as the increasing number of layers leads the 
evolutionary dynamics to converge to neutral drift having two absorbing states, ALLC or 
ALLD, with complementary probabilities of being reached, the probability assigned to former 
state resulting from the level of cooperation the multilayer was initialized with.  
By definition for homogeneous networks cooperation levels attained with investment 
distributed per game coincide with the ones obtained with investment distributed per game 
with an higher intensity of selection () factor. This behaviour is also experienced with 
heterogeneous networks. 
Another challenge targeted was to understand multilayer global dynamics and how they 
relate with microscopic dynamics locally defined at agent level. To tackle this, we resorted to 
AGoS, a numerically computed measure that is network dependent. Initially conceived for a 
single layer, it was here extended to the case of multilayered social networks. The AGoS 
measures the balance of probabilities to increase and decrease the number of Cooperators by 
one at a given strategy configuration.  
Firstly, the single layer concept was generalized to a multilayer resulting in an averaged 
AGoS across layers. What averaged AGoS across layers demonstrates is that for 
homogeneous networks, regardless of the investment criteria, as the number of layers 
increases the magnitude of AGoS tends to zero (i.e., to neutral selection). This trend is even 
emphasized for distributed investment, which explains why the proportion of Cooperators 
with which a multilayer is initialized is preserved. Still for distributed investment criteria, 
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AGoS also shows that as the number of layers increases, although with a magnitude tending 
to zero, AGoS can become positive with an overall dynamics of a co-existence scenario.  
For heterogeneous networks, the magnitude of AGoS also tends to zero as the number of 
layers increases. For baseline and investment per layer criteria, global dynamics is one of 
coordination. In the former case the root proportion of Cooperators is insensible to the number 
the layers whereas in latter case it moves leftwards tending to zero. A signal of what is to 
come for investment distributed by game with an higher number of layers is already verified 
for investment distributed per game with AGoS always positive and tending to zero as the 
number of layers increases. 
An immediate takeaway from this thesis is that with distributed investment available, 
which can be time to share among many social networks of interest, in scenarios as the ones 
explored along the study developed, when the number of layers increases individuals tend to 
synchronize their strategies and cooperate (defect) in the same layers.  
Having this thesis been mostly theoretical in character, with due humility and comparisons 
apart, the author reminds the anecdotic Hardy example. Hardy was an English mathematician 
and pacifist who lived during two previous centuries. He claimed to have never done anything 
useful during his life. By useful he meant applied, that could be used by the army. Because he 
insisted on only working on pure and abstract mathematics, he never dreamed of it, but much 
of his work was later on applied in various branches of science as e.g. population genetics.  
5.1. FUTURE WORK 
As to suggestions for continuing this work, a number of directions can be anticipated. The 
dependency of cooperation levels on average network degree was not experimented, because 
although trying different types of networks, all network instances shared the same average 
degree. When increasing 〈𝑘〉 no significant changes in the results are expected, although 
according to equation 15 in appendix C topological enslavement may require an higher 
number of layers to emerge as 𝜎𝐶2
2 ∝ 〈𝑘〉, where 𝜎𝐶2
2  accounts for the variance of an individual 
payoff from neighbours investment. In each multilayer experimented all layers had the same 
average degree and type of network, no assortiveness. It would be interesting to break this 
symmetry in three independent directions: cease to have the same average degree across all 
layers of the same multilayer, allow different types of networks in different layers as it is 
performed in appendix E and vary assortiveness. A major impact is expected on calculating 
AGoS in scenarios where symmetry across layers is broken. In terms of characterization, 
layers share no more a number of indicators or statistical distributions, e.g. 〈𝑘〉, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘), 
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assortiveness, etc., which certainly implies AGoS per layer to differ. The challenge is now if 
and how partial layers AGoS could be combined and summarized in a single one explaining 
the evolution of cooperation. i.e., if there is a coherent game played across all layers or in 
opposition if different games are played in different layers such that a summary AGoS ends 
up reflecting an “average” game played nowhere. 
Interesting to find out is also whether asymmetry between layers in a multilayer can break 
topological and criteria enslavement.  
A simple extension to Public Goods Games and to its Distributed Prisoner Dilemma 
version would be to address voluntary participation, i.e., to allow each player to adopt a third 
strategy in each interaction, the one of Loner. When an individual abstains from playing by 
deciding to be Loner, his/her peer in pairwise interaction is compelled to also act as Loner and 
both players are rewarded by an amount 𝜎, positive but smaller than the typical value 
corresponding to a cooperation interaction. Because a Loner is better off than a non-Loner 
playing against a Defector, although with a smaller reward than if playing against a 
Cooperator, Loner is an attractive strategy for the risk averse players. 
Different sets of stochastic rules can be conceived for an individual in a layer to become or 
cease behaving as a Loner. In the limit when 𝜎 = 0, whenever an individual acts as a Loner 
in a layer, it is as his/her relationships were temporarily erased from the layer at least during 
the time interval he/she insists on playing as Loner. An alternative to the game having 3 
individual strategies, would be for players to adhere to one of two mixed strategies, Loner 
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Appendix A. Algorithm for Payoff and AGoS Calculation 
The numeric optimization considered in order to make the simulations less demanding on 
CPU requires more variables (memory) as a trade-off. The relevant set of variables considered 
for the optimization of the simulations’ duration is as follows: 
 
Variable  Meaning 
   𝑛 - Chosen node which strategy is to be updated in… 
𝑙𝑛 - … layer 𝑙𝑛 
F - Enhancement factor 
M - Number of layers 
𝛽 - Intensity of selection 
𝑁𝑙 - Number of nodes in layer 𝑙 with 𝑁𝑙 = 𝑁 
𝑆𝑖
𝑙 - Strategy of node 𝑖 in layer 𝑙 
It can value 𝐶 (Cooperator) or 𝐷 (Defector) 
Invest𝑖




 - Payoff collected by node 𝑖 in layer 𝑙 
Payoff
𝑖












 - Set of nodes with direct links to node 𝑖 in layer 𝑙 






 - Set defined as {𝑥: ∃𝑗 ∈ Neigh
1𝑖
𝑙 , 𝑥 ∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ1𝑗
𝑙 , 𝑥 ≠ 𝑖, 𝑥 ∉ Neigh
1𝑖





𝑙 = ∅. 




𝑙 - Number of neighbours of node 𝑖 in layer 𝑙. 
𝑘𝑖
























































The AGoS variables are stored in an IEEE 754 double format with 8 bytes, 52 bits (plus 1 
more implicit bit) for the significant digits of a number in binary format. This means a 
precision of at least 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(𝑙𝑜𝑔10(2
53)) = 15 decimal digits, more than enough to 
accommodate the cumulative effects of rounding errors resulting from the iterations of each 
simulation.  
In each iteration of the stochastic process modelling the evolution of cooperation on a 
multilayer with 𝑀 layers of networks, after focal node 𝑛 in layer 𝑙𝑛 has been selected, pairwise 
comparison of its payoff with the one of its neighbour with a distinct strategy in the same layer 
may dictate with a Fermi-like probability that strategy 𝑆𝑛
𝑙𝑛 is to be updated. In case it is and 
before it is, the following steps are taken in order to incrementally update individual and global 
payoffs and AGoS with minimum CPU consumption:  
 
1. At every layer, delete (i) contribution of node 𝑛 to AGoS of the layer, (ii) contribution of 
direct neighbours of node n to AGoS of the layer and contributions of nodes at distance 
1 from node 𝑛 to (iii) the partial AGoS of nodes at distance 2 of node 𝑛 and (iv) to the 
AGoS of the layer: 
For every 𝑙 ∈ {1, … ,𝑀} do  
 AGoS𝑙 ← AGoS𝑙 ‐ AGoS𝑛
𝑙       -- (i) 





𝑙 ← AGoS𝑙 ‐ AGoS𝑥
𝑙       -- (ii) 






𝑙  THEN 
aux ← contribution to 𝐴𝐺𝑂𝑆𝑦





𝑙 − aux     -- (iii) 
AGoS
𝑙 ← AGoS𝑙 − aux     -- (iv) 
END IF 
 
2. Delete contributions of node 𝑛 to its neighbours’ payoffs at (i) layer and (ii) multilayer 
level: 
Set 𝐿𝑆 = {𝑙𝑛} or 𝐿𝑆 = {1,… ,𝑀}, depending on investment distribution criteria being 
baseline or other, respectively. 
For every 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝑆 do 
IF 𝑆𝑛
𝑙 == 𝐶 THEN 


















− aux      -- (ii) 
END IF  
 
3. Update focal node 𝑛 strategy in layer 𝑙𝑛 
𝑆𝑛
𝑙𝑛 ← 𝑆𝑛
𝑙𝑛 == 𝐶  ?𝐷: 𝐶4 
 
With strategy 𝑆𝑛
𝑙𝑛 updated, following steps close current iteration of stochastic process: 
 
4. In case of distributed investment, i.e. not baseline, update investment Invest𝑛
𝑙  across 
all 𝑙 layers. 
 
5. Update contributions of node 𝑛 to its neighbours’ payoffs at (i) layer and (ii) multilayer 
level: 
Set 𝐿𝑆 = {𝑙𝑛} or 𝐿𝑆 = {1,… ,𝑀}, depending on investment distribution criteria being 
baseline or other, respectively. 
                                                 
4 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 ?  𝑣𝑎𝑙1 ∶  𝑣𝑎𝑙2 values 𝑣𝑎𝑙1 or 𝑣𝑎𝑙2 depending on Boolean condition 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 being 
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 or 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒, respectively. 
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For every 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝑆 do 
IF 𝑆𝑛
𝑙 == 𝐶 THEN 


















+ aux      -- (ii) 
 




For every 𝑙 ∈ {1, … ,𝑀} do 
Payoff
𝑛
𝑙 ← 0 































𝑙=1        -- (ii) 
 
7. Update (i) node 𝑛 AGoS in every layer and impact it on (ii) AGoS of the layer: 
For every 𝑙 ∈ {1, … ,𝑀} do 
Calculate 𝐴𝐺𝑜𝑆𝑛
𝑙         -- (i) 
AGoS
𝑙 ← AGoS𝑙 + AGoS𝑛
𝑙       -- (ii) 
 
8. At every layer, (i) calculate AGoS for neighbours of node 𝑛, (ii) impact it on the AGoS 
of the layer, add contributions of nodes at distance 1 from node 𝑛 (iii) to the partial 
AGoS of nodes at distance 2 of node 𝑛 and (iv) to the AGoS of the layer: 
For every 𝑙 ∈ {1, … ,𝑀} do  





𝑙        -- (i) 
AGoS
𝑙 ← AGoS𝑙 + AGoS𝑥
𝑙       -- (ii) 






𝑙  THEN 
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aux ← contribution to 𝐴𝐺𝑂𝑆𝑦
𝑙  from node 𝑥 in layer 𝑙 
AGoS𝑦
𝑙 ← AGoS𝑦
𝑙 + aux     -- (iii) 
AGoS
𝑙 ← AGoS𝑙 + aux     -- (iv) 
END IF   
 




Appendix B. Degree-Degree Correlation and Overlapping 
Degree-degree correlation in a multilayer is only meaningful for its multiplex subtype with 
the same set of nodes present in all layers, no inter-layer links, and in case these are supported 
on heterogeneous networks. 
Pearson correlation index is used to estimate the degree correlation between two layers. It 
varies between -1 (when individuals have the same degrees but in different network layers), 
passing by 0 (meaning layer networks with uncorrelated individual degrees) to 1 (when 
individuals have coinciding degrees in both layer networks). A methodology for correlation 
tuning was developed, based on a simulated annealing method proposed in (Nicosia & Latora, 
2015). The starting point is a set of two layers, second one replicated from first one. Then 
iteratively, one randomly selects a pair of individuals, 𝑁1 and 𝑁2, in second layer and switches 
their names in that layer. Implicitly, in second layer 𝑁1‘s neighbours swap with 𝑁2‘s and vice-
versa. If the individual switching moves degree-degree correlation towards intended target it 
is accepted; otherwise, it is accepted conditioned on a certain probability. This allowed 
deviation from the path towards target correlation is essential, in order to avoid getting stuck 
on local minima and to keep the parameter space of exploitation open. This logic is applied in 
cascade to the 𝑀 − 1 consecutive pairs of an M-layers multilayer.  
As in (Nicosia & Latora, 2015), a M-layers multilayer having a particular degree-degree 
correlation means that layers 𝑙 and 𝑙 + 1, whatever 𝑙 𝜖 {1, … ,𝑀 − 1} have that degree-degree 
correlation. As correlation between layers is non-transitive, the pairs of layers {𝑙 − 1, 𝑙} and 
{𝑙, 𝑙 + 1} having the same correlation does not imply the same value applies to {𝑙 − 1, 𝑙 + 1} 
pair of layers. Additionally and due to the inexistence of inter-layer links, the notion of 
consecutive layers is purely arbitrary, depends on labelling, as layers are statistically 
 
 
Figure B-1- Example of a Degree-Degree Correlation Matrix 
 
108 
indistinguishable from each other. If degree-degree correlation 𝑀𝑥𝑀 matrix is to be plotted 
for a M-layer multilayer resulting from the application of this algorithm, main diagonal values 
1 and diagonals next to main one assume multilayer degree-degree correlation. The matrix is  
symmetric. Values for other entries are not anticipated. An example of a correlation 𝑀𝑥𝑀 
matrix is depicted in Figure B-1. 
 
Overlapping is a different concept from degree-degree correlation, although not 
independent. Overlapping between two layers 𝛼 and 𝛼′ provide an indicator on how probable 





















1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝛼 
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                        
  (2) 
Although overlap concept applies to multilayers both with heterogeneous networks as with 
Horand networks, former case is the only one addressed because of its increased relevance 
due to degree heterogeneity. Overlapping between two layers was tuned by copying randomly 
links from one BA layer to the other, until reaching the pretended number of replicated links. 
Then, in the layer in construction new links are added such that (i) they are absent from 
reference layer, (ii) each node needs to have at least 𝑚 (=
<𝑘>
2
) connections and (iii) 
preferential attachment principle is taken into account when deciding on the nodes to be 
connected next by new links. The steps have been conducted ensuring that networks remain 
fully connected. 
Degree-degree correlation and overlapping are not independent variables, because one 
cannot be totally controlled without impacting the other, e.g. a perfect 1 overlapping implies 
a degree-degree correlation of 1. 
If layers 𝛼 and 𝛼′ have not a single link in common connecting the same pair of nodes, 
overlapping is null. If any pair of nodes linked in one layer is also linked in the other, 
overlapping is total.  
 
Along this appendix, the influence of degree-degree correlation and overlapping on 
multilayer behaviour is taken into account. Here we will conclude that in general degree-
degree correlation refrains cooperation and in particular for unconstrained (baseline) criteria 
favours topology enslavement, a phenomenon in which the system gets insensitive to system 
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parameters as enhancement factor (𝐹) or intensity of selection () in the case of Public Goods 
Games or alike, S or T in original pairwise games as Prisoner’s Dilemma. No matter the value 
of this parameter, the level of cooperation achieved coincides with the one the multilayer was 
initialized with. Overlapping also leads to topology enslavement because it implies degree-
degree correlation. For the constrained case, topology enslavement is also observed but driven 
by a chain of mechanisms of different sort described in appendix C. 
In an attempt to shed light on degree-degree correlation influence on cooperation evolution, 
average level of cooperation across layers was calculated as a function of degree-degree 
correlation and intensity of selection  for 8-layers multilayer with BA networks and an 
enhancement factor of 1.7, a value for which cooperation is viable for any investment criteria. 
The results discriminated by investment distribution criteria are presented in figure B-2.  
 
 
Figure B-2- Average Level of Cooperation for Degree-Degree Correlation versus Intensity of Selection (𝛽). 
Multilayer have 8 layers, 1000 (𝑁) individuals per layer, 〈k〉 equals to 4 and F values 1.7 and BA networks. In 
each layer, nodes were randomly initialized with half as Cooperators. 
 
 
The figure highlights two facts. The most notorious one is that, apart from baseline criteria 
for very low intensity of selections, level of cooperation decreases when degree-degree 
correlation gets stronger, a behaviour due to cumulative payoff. When degree-degree 
correlation is maximum, the cooperation level for all criteria reaching the value of 50%, 
precisely the proportion of Cooperators the multilayer was initialized with, is the second fact 
to highlight in the figure. This multilayer inertia in changing initial level of cooperation had 
already been noticed by (Kleineberg & Helbing, 2018) for the baseline case. 
The way a multilayer is constructed, it having a high degree-degree (Pearson) correlation 
means that the number of neighbours any node has in any layer with a high probability is 
similar to the set of neighbours the same node has across all layers in the multilayer. Thus, 
odds of a hub in a layer being also a hub in another layer increase with degree-degree 
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correlation. Let us now consider a hub node and a high degree-degree correlation between the 
layers in the multilayer. Because of this correlation factor, hubs are aligned across layers. The 
payoff collected in layers in which the node cooperates, because of it being cumulative, 
impacts all layers. This means that a hub can defect in a layer 𝑙0 with a high payoff collected 
in other layers where the hub cooperates. The Defector strategy of this hub in layer 𝑙0 because 
of its high payoff functions as a reference and tends to, if not to saturate the all layer as ALLD, 
at least to dry out cooperation in the neighbourhood. The initial strategy of bigger nodes in a 
layer, randomly determined, dictates the direction of saturation, ALLC or ALLD, of the layer 
or at least the neighbourhood. Moreover, when degree-degree correlation is high, a node tends 
to have the same neighbours in all layers, which means that if it has k degree it tends of have 
a total of distinct 𝑘 neighbours across all 𝑀 layers of the multilayer.  
Now let us consider a multilayer with maximum degree-degree correlation, investment per 
layer criteria, an arbitrary focal node and any one of its neighbours. These two nodes will 
share a link across all layers. If the neighbour is cooperative in 𝑁𝐶 layers, it will contribute to 
focal node payoff with 
𝐹
2𝑁𝐶




this neighbour now switches strategy from cooperation to defection in one of the layers its 
contribution to focal node payoff will be updated to 
𝐹
2(𝑁𝐶−1)
(𝑁𝐶 − 1), i.e., in spite of strategy 
update neighbour contribution to focal node payoff was preserved, as long as the neighbour 
kept cooperating in at least 1 layer, a condition with probability tending to 1 as the number of 
layers tends to infinity. This rational is easily extended to focal node change of strategy and 
the other distributed investment criteria. The bottom line is that degree-degree correlation 
tends to make individuals’ accumulated payoffs invariant in time. Additionally, having 
Cooperators been randomly positioned, the chances of an individual A switching strategy 
under influence of a neighbour B in a layer is equal to chances of symmetrical strategy switch 
between the same pair of individuals. This leads to the preservation of initial level of 
cooperation.   
On the other hand, for unconstrained baseline criteria, contributions of a neighbour in 
different layers are independent and an exclusive function of neighbour’ strategy in that layer. 
This suggests baseline not to be so dependent on degree-degree correlation as figure B-2 
illustrates. For a fixed intensity of selection, the variation of the level of cooperation versus 
degree-degree correlation replicates findings in (Kleineberg & Helbing, 2018). Still for 
baseline criteria and maximum degree-degree cooperation, topological enslavement derives 
from hub alignment across layers, which provides them a considerable strategy inertia, 
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minimizing the odds of a hub changing its strategy. Thus, the initial proportion of Cooperators 
in a multilayer coincides with the expected proportion of hubs functioning as sources of 
strategy spreading, leading to a final level of cooperation equal to the initial one. 
 Common to all criteria and apart from baseline case with minimum intensity of selection 
is that degree-degree correlation reduction favours cooperation. By not having hubs aligned 
across layers, the number of individuals being hubs in at least one layer increases, its global 
basin of attraction widens, i.e., the set of hub distinct neighbours across all layers increases, 
diversity settles in and cooperation levels raise. 
With no surprise, heat map concerning investment distributed per layer is similar to the one 
distributed per game one for 𝛽 〈k〉 times bigger, 〈k〉 being the average degree of the network. 
 
 
Figure B-3- Average Level of Cooperation for Degree-Degree Correlation versus Enhancement Factor. 
Multilayer has 8 layers, 1000 (𝑁) individuals per layer, 〈k〉 equals to 4, β values 0.1 and BA networks. In each 
layer nodes were randomly initialized with half as Cooperators 
 
Another perspective of analysis is to fix intensity of selection  to 0.1 and make the 
enhancement factor F and the degree-degree correlation vary. Results are depicted in figure 
B-3. Thin horizontal stripes taken from the bottom of the heat maps with minimum degree-
degree correlation reproduces the results already achieved in the right panels of figure 14. For 
higher values of F, as 1.7, cooperation decreases while correlation increases as it had already 
been explained. The other way around happens with lower values of F. For baseline and 
investment per layer criteria, the critical F beyond which cooperation fires decreases when 
degree-degree correlation increases. This is not totally surprising if one takes into account that 
for no degree-degree correlation this is a territory of defection. When correlation is added, 
nodes that are hubs in one layer tend to also be hubs in other layers with the same degree, as 
Pearson variation of correlation is used, and with the same neighbours considering how the 
multilayer is built. If these hubs are initialized as Cooperators in some layers degree-degree 
correlation reinforces their payload which make them a reference for neighbours to copy their 
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strategy spreading cooperation along these layers. It is this phenomenon that causes the 
defection region to recede in the heat maps for baseline and investment per layer criteria as 
degree-degree correlation increases. 
For investment distributed per game criteria, topological enslavement sets in. As it had 
already been identified in figure 14 and figure 16 from main body, cooperation levels tend to 
be independent of enhancement factor. Additionally, cooperation level exhibits almost no 
sensitivity to degree-degree correlation. This has to do with the fact that unless a node defects  
 
  
Figure B-4- Average Level of Cooperation in BA Multilayers as a function of Link Overlapping and 
Enhancement Factor. Multilayer has 8 layers, 1000 (𝑁) individuals per layer, 〈k〉 equals to 4, β equals to 0.1 
and BA networks. In each layer nodes were randomly initialized with half as Cooperators 
 
in all layers, the total amount it is committed to invest across all layers is fixed to 1 unit. So 
in opposition to what happens with other criteria, with investment distributed per game a node 
by being a hub does not experiment a change in its overall investment and in corresponding 
payoff impact. 
Analogously, the payoff contributions collected from neighbours does not change 
statistically by the fact of these neighbours having or having not their degrees (and 
neighbours) aligned across layers. Had the multilayer more layers, the heat map relative to 
investment distributed per game would be more uniform and the heat map for investment 
distributed per layer would get closer to former one.     
Overlapping measures how repetitive links are across layers. In the limit a multilayer 
having full overlapping means all its layers being equal. Figure B-4 plots for BA multilayers 
accomplished level of cooperation averaged across all layers as a function of overlapping and 
enhancement factor. Heat maps are not too different from previous figure, something aligned 
 
113 
with (Kleineberg & Helbing, 2018) observation that cooperation in multilayers is much more 
sensitive to degree-degree cooperation than to link overlapping, this having to do with the fact 
that overlapping cannot be introduced without degree-degree correlation. What is new in this 
heat map is dependency on the number of layers. For baseline, the critical F value beyond 
which cooperation triggers recedes as the number of layers increases but at expenses of 
cooperation where it is achieved to reach lower marks. With a higher number of layers and 
overlapping, hubs get aligned across layers and increase their payoff. Thus on the layers they 
cooperate the trend is for cooperation to spread. This explains why critical F backs off when 
the number of layers increase. In the parameter domain where cooperation succeeds and for 
higher degree-degree correlation, average cooperation scores less because topological 
enslavement sets in.  
Heat maps concerning investment per layer criteria are similar to the ones concerning 
baseline, sharing the same trends although with a larger cooperation domain.  
Topological enslavement and insensitiveness on enhancement factor F evolution with the 
increase in the number of layers is best portrayed in the heat maps concerning investment per 
game criteria.  
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Appendix C. Criteria and Topological Enslavement 
A multilayer of the multiplex subtype, i.e., with the same set of nodes present in al layers 
and no inter-layer links, with constrained investment criteria, be it investment distributed per 
layer or game, exhibits the characteristic that as the number of layers increases the 
accumulated payoff from individual’s interactions tends to converge to a constant value for 
all individuals in the population. In other words, the number of layers is inversely proportional 
to the observed variance of accumulated payoffs among nodes or individuals. A consequence 
of this disposition is that the multilayer gets trapped in its initial conditions and insensitive to 
game parameters as S, T or F, meaning that the level of cooperation reached at the end of 
simulation is no different from the one multilayer was initialized with. This applies to both 
pairwise games as Prisoner’s Dilemma and Public Goods Games, no matter the payoffs being 
averaged or accumulated. (Kleineberg & Helbing, 2018) had already noticed this phenomenon 
in an unconstrained (baseline) multilayer with heterogeneous networks but this fate was 
reached via a chain of mechanisms completely different from the ones in place with distributed 
investment, requiring a high degree-degree correlation to tight together individual payoffs in 
different layers in order to boost global hubs’ payoff.  
Here one presents a mathematical explication to why distributed investment criteria and 
topology lead to multilayer enslavement even in the absence of degree-degree correlation. The 
arguments to follow apply to homogeneous networks, but experimentation show that they are 
extensible to heterogeneous ones. 
 
Let us consider a multilayer with 𝑀 layers and where each layer corresponds to an 
independently generated network from the same type. For instance, all layers correspond to 
Horand or BA that are generated with the same parameters but independently. Let 〈k〉 be the 
average degree of each layer. Moreover, strategies are initialized at random. In each layer, the 
strategy of each individual is to cooperate with probability p and to defect with probability 
1 − 𝑝. 
The payoff of a randomly chosen focal individual 𝑁𝑓 results from the sum of two 
independent contributions: 
- 𝐶1: Contribution of node Nf investment across all layers of the multilayer and  
- 𝐶2 : Contribution of each neighbour investment across all layers. 
𝐶1 is a Bernoulli variable with distribution 
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 Prob (C1 = (
𝐹
2
− 1)) = Prob(Nf is Cooperator in at least 1 layer) = 
 1 – (1 –  p)M 





Contribution 𝐶1 depends exclusively on individual 𝑁𝑓 strategy across layers, being 
independent of his/her neighbours’ strategy. First moments of 𝐶1 are: 
 𝜇𝐶1 = E(𝐶1) = (
𝐹
2









As long as the multilayer layers are independent and Cooperators are assorted at random 




− 1) with a decreasing variance towards zero as the number of layers increase. 
Contribution 𝐶2 has no dependency on individual 𝑁𝑓 strategy and is given by 
 
C2  =  
𝐹
2
 ∗  [(𝑃11 +⋯+ 𝑃1𝐾1) + ⋯+ (𝑃𝐿1 +⋯+ 𝑃𝐿𝐾𝐿) (5) 
where 𝑘𝑙 represents the degree (number of links) of individual 𝑁𝑓 in layer l and 𝑃𝑙𝑖 the 
contribution of neighbour i in layer l.  
Let us know assume the particular case where all the layers are Horand networks. Then 
𝑘1 = 𝑘2 = ⋯ = 𝑘𝐿 = 〈𝑘〉 and individual 𝑁𝑓 will have 〈𝑘〉  ∗  𝑀 neighbours from all the layers 
in the multilayer. From a game played with each of the neighbours in a generic layer 𝑀0, 




< 𝑘 > (𝛿𝑆1,𝐶  + ⋯+ 𝛿𝑆𝑀0−1,𝐶 +  1 + 𝛿S𝑀0+1,𝐶 +⋯+ 𝛿𝑆𝑀,𝐶)
 , 𝑖𝑓 (𝑖)
0                                                                                                              , if (ii)
  (6) 
where condition (i) applies if neighbour i of individual 𝑁𝑓 in layer 𝑀0 cooperates, otherwise 
condition (ii) applies. Moreover, in equation 6, 𝑆𝑖𝐶 denotes the Kronecker delta, which is one 
if an individual in layer l Cooperates, being zero otherwise. Under these assumptions, the 










  (7) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑛 can be considered independent when networks are sparse, i.e., 〈𝑘〉 ≪  𝑁. The first 
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Considering the binomial distribution approximation to the Poisson one when  = 𝑀𝑝 ≫
1, 𝐸(𝐶2) the above expression further simplifies to 
 





(𝑙 + 1) ∗  𝑙!
+∞
𝑙=0
 =  
𝐹
2
 ∗  M ∗  
𝑝
𝜆
















Hence, as the number of layers increases, i.e., when  increases, the payoff of any node tends 
to 𝜇𝐶1 + 𝜇𝐶2  = (
𝐹
2
− 1) + 
𝐹
2
= 𝐹 − 1. Concerning, the variance of the payoff distribution 
(𝜎𝐶2
2 ), it can be calculated based on the variance of the contribution of a generic neighbour n 
in a generic layer l as follows: 
 𝜎𝑃𝑖𝑛
2 = 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑛
2 ) − 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑛)
2 
𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑛










where, we again consider the binomial distribution approximation to the Poisson distribution 
with  = 𝑀𝑝 ≫ 1, 
 
𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑛





















< 2 for positive l, 
 
𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑛








= 2𝑝 ∗  
𝑒−𝜆
𝜆2
 (𝑒𝜆 − 1 −  𝜆)  (14) 
Now, 𝜎𝑃𝑖𝑛
2  is positive by definition and is topped by 𝐸(𝑃𝑙𝑛
2 ) with is an 𝑂(−2). Thus, 
𝜎𝑃𝑖𝑛
2 tends to zero with −2. This implies that 
 
𝜎𝐶2















2 = 𝑂(𝜆−1) (15) 
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If we consider equations 4 and 15, the corollary that follows is that in Horand multilayers 
accumulated payoff variance tends to zero as the number of layers increase. Experimental 
evidences on first moments of accumulated payoff across a Horand multilayer are depicted  
 
 
Figure C-1- Payoffs Distribution for Horand Multilayer with Investment per Game versus Number of 
Layers. Networks are built with uncorrelated layers with  = 1, 〈𝑘〉 = 4, 𝐹 = 1.7, 1000 nodes (𝑁) per layer. . 
Layers were initialized with half nodes as Cooperators randomly chosen. Results were collected after 100 
generations, one generation being equal to number of layers ties 1000 iterations. 
Two facts are highlighted in the figure: payoff average tends to 𝐹–1 and its variation to zero as the number of 
layers increase. Although not presented, the extension of this phenomenon to BA multilayers was also noticed. 
 
in figure C-1.  
Having node payoff variance tending to zero has an additional consequence when it comes 
for a node to consider imitating a neighbour in a given layer with a different strategy: the 
argument of the exponential in Fermi distribution tends to zero, which allows its expression 











(𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋𝐴) (16) 
meaning that with equal probability the strategy of a node is maintained or updated. 
The probability of a node updating its strategy on a layer depends now only on it and one 
of its neighbours randomly chosen having different strategies, which depends on the level of 
cooperation on the layer. Dependency on nodes relative payoff vanishes as the number of 
layers increases. 
 
Up to now homogeneous networks with investment per game criteria were considered, but 
arguments are extensible to investment per layer criteria as a multilayer with homogeneous 
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networks with degree 〈𝑘〉, 𝛽0 intensity of selection and investment per game criteria behaves 
exactly the same as if it had investment per layer and 𝛽0/〈𝑘〉 intensity of selection.  
As all nodes tend to have a similar accumulated payoff and all layers look and behave alike, 
i.e., they are replicas from the same stochastic model, each generic layer can be mapped to a 
one dimension random walk alike model with dynamic probabilities of moving either way or 
staying in the same spot. Figure C-2 plots samples of time series on the evolution of the 
number of Cooperators for both the average number of Cooperators across a Horand 
multilayer and the number of Cooperators in individual layers.  
 
 
Figure C-2- Time Series of Evolution of Cooperation Level in 16 Layer Horand Multilayer with Investment 
distributed per Game. Networks are built with  = 1, 〈k〉 = 4, F = 1.7, 1000 nodes (𝑁) per layer. Layers were 
initialized with half nodes as Cooperators. On the right side multilayer average number of Cooperators is plot 
for 5 different runs. On the right side, for a single run, the evolution of the number of Cooperators per layer is 
plot. Saturation of some layers is noticeable.  
 
Once a multilayer is characterized at a particular point in time, its evolution depends 
exclusively on its status at that point in time being irrelevant the path leading to that status. 
This fact makes the evolution of the multilayer suitable to be studied as a Markov process in 
which the past has no influence on the future once the present is specified. Thus, in a Markov 
process x(t) 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥(𝑡𝑛)  𝑥𝑛 | 𝑥(𝑡), 𝑡  𝑡𝑛−1)  =  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥(𝑡𝑛)  𝑥𝑛 | 𝑥(𝑡𝑛−1))  (17) 
𝑥(𝑡) is generically an array with one position per layer. A special sort of Markov process is 
the Markov chain when the system can be described by a finite or countably infinite set of 
states such that the future evolution of the process, once it is in a given state, depends only on 
the present state and not on how it arrived at that state. A Markov chain is a stochastic model 
that can be described as a set of states, 𝑆 =  {𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛} and a set of events implying transitions 
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between states. The process starts in one of these states and moves successively from one state 
to another with a probability that is an exclusively function of the former and latter states 
irrespectively of eventual states visited before. Each move is called a step. If the chain is 
currently in state 𝑠𝑖, then the probability of moving to state 𝑠𝑗 is given by 𝑝𝑖𝑗. Naturally, ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑗  
= 1. A single layer with N nodes can be modelled by a Markov chain where each state is 
assigned a particular combination of strategies followed by nodes. For a system with N nodes 
and S strategies there are potentially 𝑁𝑆 different states. A multilayer with M layers can also 
be represented by a Markov chain, but the number of states skyrockets to 𝑁𝑆𝑀. 
In order to tackle this complexity and with no loss of generality, a single layer will be 
addressed instead as representative of the set of all multilayer layers, as all layers are replicas 
from a single agent-level dynamics reference. Moreover, a mean-field approximation will be 
used in which the identity of the individual nodes following a particular strategy will not be 
addressed, but instead only the number of nodes following each strategy will be accounted. 
With mean field approximation, a scenario where the layer can be divided by a frontier 
such that on each side of the line all nodes have the same strategy in terms of state 
representation cannot be distinguished from another one where nodes with different strategies 
are all randomly mixed. 
With mean-field representation, because reproduction is modelled via an imitation process, 
at each step of the process in the layer where imitation happens the number of Cooperators is 
altered by at most 1 unit. This implies 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 0 for |𝑖 – 𝑗| > 1. 
A state i is called absorbing if 𝑝𝑖𝑗=𝛿𝑖𝑗, i.e., once state i is entered it is exited with probability 
zero. ALLC and ALLD, i.e., state 1000 and state 0 will be absorbing states. Non-absorbing 
states are qualified as transient. 
The graphical representation of the Markov chain derived from mean-field evolution of a 
single layer is as in figure C-3. This Markov chain corresponds to the one describing the 
classical stochastic Drunkard’s walk process (or Gambler’s Ruin) (Grinstead & Snell, 1997) 
  




with the following differences: the probability of preserving the state is not zero (𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≠ 0) and 
the probabilities of changing state depends on present state. The two absorbing states map to 
home and bar states in Drunkard’s walk.   
Corresponding Markov transition matrix as described in 2.1.3 for finite populations, is 
given by the following expressions: 
   
 1 , 𝑖 = 𝑗 = 0 




 ∗  
𝑖
𝑁−1




 ∗  
𝑁−𝑖
𝑁−1
  ∗  ProbFermi (Sj 
 Si) , 𝑗 = 𝑖 − 1 𝐴𝑁𝐷 0 < 𝑖 < 𝑁 
 1 − p𝑖,𝑖−1 − p𝑖,𝑖+1 , 0 < 𝑖 < 𝑁 
 0 , 𝑖 = 0 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑗 > 0 
  , 𝑖 = 𝑁 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑗 < 𝑁 
  , |𝑗 − 𝑖| > 1 
 
(18) 
with 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖(𝑆𝑗  𝑆𝑖) representing the Fermi probability of node i with strategy 𝑆𝑖 copying 
𝑆𝑗 strategy from node j. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖(𝑆𝑗  𝑆𝑖) is a function of both node i and node j payoffs. 
As the number of layers increases, all nodes tend to share the same payoff and 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖(𝑆𝑗  𝑆𝑖) tend to 
1
2
. Let us focus on the content of 𝑝𝑖,𝑖+1, the probability of 
increasing the number of Cooperators. First factor, 
𝑁−𝑖
𝑁
, reflects the probability of first chosen 
node being a Defector. Second factor, 
𝑖
𝑁−1
, accounts for the probability of, given that a 
Defector has already been chosen, from N – 1 nodes to choose from, next node to select is 1 
of i Cooperators available. Clearly here mean-field approach is followed, as the concrete 
underlying network is not taken into account. Now that nodes selected are suitable for a 
strategy imitation, all it is lacking is a favourable probability from Fermi distribution.   
Markov transition matrix mixes absorbing and transient states. For an absorbing Markov 
chain P and after canonicalization is performed as in 2.1.3, one obtains the fundamental matrix 
N = ∑ 𝑄𝑘+∞𝑘=0  = (𝐼 − 𝑄)
−1 for P. The entry 𝑛𝑖𝑗 of N gives the expected number of times that 
the process reaches the transient state 𝑠𝑗 if it is started in the transient state 𝑠𝑖. This implies 
that the expected number of steps before the chain is absorbed, given that the chain starts in 
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state 𝑠𝑖, is given by 𝑡𝑖, the i-th element of t column vector t, with 𝑡 = 𝑁𝑐, where c is a column 
vector all of whose entries are 1 (Grinstead & Snell, 1997). 
The probability that Markov chain will evolve to absorbing state 𝑠𝑗 starting from transient 
sate 𝑠𝑖 is given by 𝑏𝑖𝑗 entry of matrix B resulting from 𝐵 = 𝑁𝑅. 
 
In what follows, Markov chain is applied to a single multilayer average layer with 1000 
nodes whose level of cooperation results from the average of Cooperators across all layers.   
Figure C-4 plots on its left panel the theoretical quasi-stationary distribution for the mean-
field approximation of single layer pretending to represent a multilayer with investment 
distributed per game and a number of layers tending to infinity. This quasi-stationary 
distribution reflects the probability of each transient state being visited until the multilayer 
saturates in any of the absorbing states. Considering all states equally probable for multilayer 
initialization and the ergodicity of the Markov chain, what is plot in left side panel is just 
∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑖
∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑗
, where the denominator is just a normalization factor to transform the number of visits 
in a state into a probability. This corresponds to equally weight each line of the fundamental 




Figure C-4- Theoretical results for a Mean-Field approximation of a Layer with Nodes with equal Payoff. 
Quasi-stationary distribution, number of steps until reaching an absorbing state and probability of reaching 
each absorbing state are plot for a mean-field approximation of a generic layer pretending to represent a 
multilayer with investment distributed per game and number of layers tending to infinity 
 
Vector t, with fields calculated as 𝑡𝑖 = ∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑗  is depicted in central panel. As expected, the 
number of steps increases further away from absorbing state initial state is located. Symmetry 
of the line results from problem symmetry, 𝑝𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑝𝑁−𝑖,𝑁−𝑗. 
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Finally the right panel depicts normalized bij for final absorbing state j equal to 0 or 1000, 
i.e., the probability of the system ending up in each of the two absorbing state as a function of 
starting state. Lines in graph are complementary because in an absorbing Markov chain 
𝑄𝑛  0 as the number of steps (n) increases, thus the probability that the process will be 
absorbed is 1, and 0 and 1000 are the only possible absorbing states.  
 
This quasi-stationary distribution uniformity of a generic layer implies an AGoS tending 
to zero which forces a multilayer to preserve the proportion of Cooperators with which it was 
initialized. On the other hand, as time unfolds the natural trend is for individual layers to 
saturate either as ALLC or ALLD. Thus, the initial proportion of Cooperators is reflected in 
the proportion of layers saturated as ALLC.  
This layer polarization is of no surprise, because this overall multilayer Drunkard’s walk 
alike process, having absorbing states of ALLC or ALLD, is doomed to converge to one of 
them. In this stochastic process, the probability of convergence to ALLC final state equals the 
proportion of initial Cooperators with which the system was initialized, which justifies why 
the initial proportion of Cooperators is preserved and why quasi-stationary distribution of 
states is uniform. 
In order to compare theoretical and experimentally the influence of initial Cooperator 
probability in multilayer evolution, a multilayer with 16 layers of BA and Horand networks 
with investment criteria distributed per game was independently initialized with a variable 
concentration of Cooperators. Usual enhancement factors were applied. The evaluation was 
performed both until and at saturation time. The results are depicted in Figure C-5. 
Focusing on BA multilayer, until saturation, final level of cooperation depends on initial 
one with almost no dependency on enhancement factor. Would the number of layers increase 
and this dependency would completely fade away. Additionally, for extreme initial 
probabilities, a sharp transition in final level of cooperation is noticeable. Considering again 
a single layer with equal payoffs representative of the multilayer, theoretical value for final 
level of cooperation results from plotting 𝐸(𝑁𝐶𝑓|𝑁𝐶𝑖), with 𝑁𝐶𝑖 and 𝑁𝐶𝑓 representing, 
recpectively, initial and final number of Cooperators. Taking into account that generic 𝑛𝑖𝑗 
entry from Markov chain fundamental N matrix represents the expected number of times the 
multilayer will be in state j , given that it starts in state i, one has 
 Prob(𝑁𝐶𝑓 = 𝑗|𝑁𝐶𝑖 = i)  =
𝑛𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑥𝑥
  (19) 
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  (20) 
The theoretical result of 𝐸(𝑁𝐶𝑓|𝑁𝐶𝑖 = 𝑖) is precisely what is plot on the top right panel of 
the figure. The matching is perfect particularly for extreme initial levels of cooperation. 
At saturation time the heat map is analogous apart from the fact that final level of 
cooperation varies linearly with initial one. Against this is as expected and already depicted 
in right panel of figure C-4. What happens for this BA multilayer as will be illustrated in 
appendix D when studying its AGoS is that all layers of the multilayer will saturate, some as 
ALLC; others as ALLD. Moreover, because the naming of the layers is arbitrary and layers 




Figure C-5- Topological and Criteria Enslavement in Multilayers with 16 Layers, Investment distributed per 
Game. Both BA and Horand multilayers have 1000 nodes (𝑁) and 〈k〉 = 4. Former one has  =
0.05 and 〈k〉 = 4, latter one  = 1.0. Multilayer layers are independent and randomly initialized with a 
number of Cooperators taken from a discrete random variable in the set 0 to 1000, inclusive. 
 
 
The proportion between the number of layers in different conditions will be such as dictated 
by initial level of cooperation. Topology and investment criteria enslave the multilayer 
because its evolution cannot be steered by acting upon enhancement factor.   
Reasoning on the basis of the Markov chain corresponding to a Drunkard’s walk stochastic 
process, the single layer the multilayer is mapped to is doomed to end up as either ALLC 
(𝑁𝐶𝑓 = 𝑁) or ALLD (𝑁𝐶𝑓 = 0), The probability of ending up as ALLC is given by the initial 




𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑁𝐶𝑓 = 𝑁) =
𝑁𝐶𝑖
𝑁
   (21) 
As there are only two outcomes possible, ALLC or ALLD,  
 E(𝑁𝐶𝑓) = 𝑁𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑁𝐶𝑓 = 𝑁) + 0𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑁𝐶𝑓 = 0) = 𝑁𝐶𝑖   (22) 
which leads one to conclude that final level of cooperation equals initial one. 
As in fact one has a multilayer instead of a single layer and as all layers saturate, the initial 
proportion of Cooperator population in the multilayer dictates the percentage of layers that 
saturate as ALLC, i.e., the final proportion as Cooperators in the system as all the other layers 
will saturate as ALLD. 
The Horand multilayer exhibits the same trends as described for BA multilayer but with 
deviations for small initial levels of cooperation, particularly for small values of enhancement 
factors. This deviation from the theoretical expectations is not surprising and will be 
experienced in following figures where it will be explained. Were the number of layers greater 
or the intensity of selection lower and the agreement between theoretical and experimental 
results would be better. 
   
Considering exclusively multilayers with investment per game criteria, the lines reflecting 
the way the number of layers, intensity of selection, type of network or enhancement factor 




Figure C-6- Final Level of Cooperation as a Function of initial One.  Each network has 1000 nodes (𝑁), 〈𝑘〉 =





the number of layers for a fixed intensity of selection, the closer experimental curve fits 
theoretical one. Higher values for intensity of selection require high number of levels for 
experimental lines to better fit theoretical ones. This makes sense because in the exponential 
argument controlled of the Fermi distribution controlling the probability of strategy imitation 
an increase in the β value is compensated by a lower payoff variance resulting from a higher 
number of layers and vice-versa. Higher values of enhancement factors are particularly useful 
for low initial level of cooperation. Something also expectable as it is essential for the few 
Cooperators to hold their ground.  
Theoretical and experimental lines share the same shape but the deviation between them is 
higher for smaller initial levels of cooperation. This is not surprising because the theoretical 
model is based on the approximation of a binomial distribution to a Poisson one, which is only 
valid for great values of  (= 𝑁𝑝). For smaller values of initial level of cooperation, 
theoretical model loses validity and so it is senseless to expect an exact match between these 
lines. 
Taking as a reference investment distribution per game criteria, for a given type of network, 
Bara or Horand, the number of layers determines de variance of accumulated payoff between 
nodes, which dictate the level of topological and criteria enslavement..  
For investment distributed per game, Figure C-7 depicts the fact that for a given number of 
layers, 16 in this particular case, a maximum intensity of selection can be identified below 
which multilayer evolution is stuck to initial conditions and insensitive to variations in 
enhancement factor. For Horand networks, the figure shows that up to intensity factors valuing 
1 and irrespective of enhancement factor, average level of cooperation does not change from 
initial values. Were the multilayer initialized with a different value and that same value would 
 
Figure C-7- Topological and Criteria Enslavement for 16-layers Multilayer, 1000 nodes (𝑁) per layer. 




be preserved. Moreover, if heat maps corresponding to a different number of layers are 
depicted, it will be noticeable that the wave front of the colour code corresponding to the 
initial level of cooperation with which the multilayer was initialized moves rightwards as the 
number of layers increase. 
For a distributed investment criteria, heterogeneous networks tend to have a behaviour 
similar to homogeneous one, but requiring more layers to achieve the same behaviour with 
the same intensity of selection. For a given network type, investment per layer criteria tends 
to experience the same behaviour as its investment per layers counterpart, but with a higher 
number of layers and/or lower intensity of selection. 
Defining enslavement as the condition of final level of cooperation in a multilayer with 
investment per game criteria differing in less than 20% from the initial level of 50% with 
which a multilayer was initialized, whatever the value of enhancement factor 𝐹 ∈ [1,2],  Figure 
C-8 displays the domain of the number of layers versus intensity of selection 𝛽 where 
enslavement rules. Were the enslavement criteria more demanding against acceptable 
fluctuation on the final level of cooperation, for the same number of layers a lower intensity 
of selection would be required.  
 
 
Figure C-8 - Domain of Topological Enslavement for Investment distributed per Game. Shaded areas 
represent the locus of number of layers l and intensity of selection 𝛽 parameters such that heat map ℎ𝑚𝑙(𝛽, 𝐹) 
displaying the level of cooperation achieved in a multilayer with l layers, initialized with half nodes as 
Cooperators, investment distributed per game, intensity of selection 𝛽 and enhancement factor F, for a given 
number of layer 𝛽 = max
𝑥
|ℎ𝑚𝑙(𝑥, 𝐹) − 0.5| < 0.1, x ∈ [10
−2, 10], ∀ 𝐹 ∈ [1,2] 
 
Node consistency is another possible comparison perspective of confrontation between 
experimental and theoretical results as depicted in figure C-9. Due to the finite number of 






Figure C-9 - Consistency Trend in Multilayers with Investment distributed per Game. For each initial level 
of cooperation the usual set of enhancement factors from 1 to 2, 0.1 apart was experienced. Error bars in the 
theoretical green line account for the discrete jumps in consistency due to the finite number of multilayer 
layers, each one with 1000 (𝑁) nodes. Experimental maximum, average and minimum consistencies due to 






 . The error bars affecting theoretical line in the figure mark 
the closest possible values of consistency taking into account that the multilayers have 16 or 
32 layers. For each initial level of cooperation all enhancement factors (𝐹) multiples of 0.1 
within [1, 2] interval were experimented and maximum and minimum levels of cooperation 




Figure C-10- Consistency in Horand Multilayers as the Number of Layers varies. F values 1.7, 〈𝑘〉 equals 4 
and all layers with 1000 (𝑁) nodes were initialized with half of its nodes random and independently chosen as 





average lines close up, the quanta in two discrete consecutive possible consistency values get 
smaller, which means shrinking the size of error bars assigned to theoretical line, and the 
experimental curve gets closer to the theoretical one. The matching between experimental and 
theoretical curves is weaker for low initial levels of cooperation for the reasons already 
mentioned. 
With an initial level of cooperation of 0.5 theoretical and experimental consistency lines 
mismatch. In order to evaluate how this mismatch evolves as the number of layers increase 
consistency for different network types was traced versus number of layers in the multilayer. 
The result is presented in figure C-10, which highlights the downward trend of consistency as 
the number of layers increases for distributed investment criteria, even for more unfavourable 
intensity of selections as the ones used. 
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Appendix D. Theoretical Aggregated Gradient of Selection 
with Distributed Investment 
Aggregated Gradient of Selection (AGoS) is defined as a time-dependent indicator that 
captures single layer network reciprocity and reflects the expected increase in the number of 
Cooperators to result from next evolutionary step (Pinheiro, Pacheco, & Santos, 2012). This 
capture is averaged across all nodes on a large number of network instances. For a multilayer 
scenario, there is an AGoS per layer. If the multilayer is of type multiplex with the same set 
of nodes present in all layers all layers are statistically indistinguishable, it is reasonable to 
also consider a multilayer AGoS resulting from the average of individual layer AGoS. 
Along this appendix, one derives a mathematical expression for the AGoS of a multilayer 
with independent instances of the same type of homogeneous network type in each layer, 
where Distributed Prisoner´s Dilemma is played subject to a distributed investment criteria.  
 
The expected variation in the number of Cooperators in the multilayer to occur during next 
evolutionary step can result both from a Defector copying a Cooperator’s strategy or vice-
versa. Let us start by focusing on the first possibility. In a multilayer with 𝑀 layers, a layer 
𝑀0 is randomly selected. Within this layer node 𝑛1 is chosen. Then, a 𝑛1‘s neighbour, 𝑛2, is 
randomly chosen. 𝑛1 and 𝑛2 follow Defector and Cooperator strategies, respectively. 𝑃1 and 
𝑃2 are 𝑛1‘s and 𝑛2‘s payoff, respectively. 
If p represents the probability of finding a Cooperator in the multilayer, the probability of 
𝑛1 copying 𝑛2‘s strategy, is given by 
 




If analysis is constrained exclusively to investment per game criteria, 𝑃1, a random variable 
corresponding to the accumulated payoff of 𝑛1, a Defector node, results from the sum of two 
components: 
 
𝑃1 = 𝐴1 + 
𝐹
2












− 1            , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 − (1 − 𝑝)𝑀−1                           
0                     , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  (1 − 𝑝)𝑀−1                                   
  (3) 
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Last branch applies if 𝑛1 node defects in all layers. 
Bi represent the contribution for the payoff of 𝑛1 from each of the 〈𝑘〉𝑙 neighbours of 𝑛1 in 











                 0                                , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                  
 (4) 
𝛿𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑙  values 1 only if node i cooperates in layer l. 〈𝑘〉𝑖𝑙 stands for the number of neighbours 
of node i in layer l. 
The contribution from 𝑛2 is 𝐶1, very similar, apart from fact that it is known beforehand 




〈𝑘〉2𝑀0 + ∑ 〈𝑘〉2𝑙𝛿𝐶𝑆2𝑙
𝑀
𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑙=1,𝑙 ≠ 𝑀0 
 (5) 
If one considers the constraint that networks are homogeneous, which means 〈𝑘〉𝑙 = 〈𝑘〉 = 





    , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑙
𝑀𝑝𝑙(1 − 𝑝)𝑀−𝑙
  0     , w𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (1 − 𝑝)𝑀                





 , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑙
𝑀−1𝑝𝑙(1 − 𝑝)𝑀−1−𝑙, 𝑙 = 1,… ,𝑀 − 1   (7) 
 
The binomial distribution emerges because nodes are random and independently initialized 
across and within layers. There are in total 𝑘𝑀 − 1 distinct 𝐵𝑖 variables contributing to 𝑃1. 
Taking into account that the density of the network is very small, because the average 
degree in each layer is much smaller than the number of nodes, 𝐵𝑖 variables can be considered 
independent. Additionally, for a large number of layers, 𝐶1 can be replaced by another 𝐵𝑖. So 
𝑃1 ends up being equal to  
 







As 𝑀 is considered large and 𝐵𝑖 variables are independent, its sum tends to a Gaussian 
distribution 𝑁1 = 𝑁(𝜇 = 𝑘𝑀𝜇𝜎𝐵𝑖 , 𝜎 = √𝑘𝑀𝜎𝐵𝑖) and one gets 
 




𝐵𝑖 is well characterized so its two first moments can easy and numerically be calculated. 














There is no contribution of node 𝑛2 to 𝑛1 payoff in layer 𝑀0 because 𝑛2 defects in this 
layer. 𝐵𝑖 variables in 𝑃2 are independent between them besides being independent on the ones 
from 𝑃1. Thus the variables 𝐵𝑖 in 𝑃2 tend to a Gaussian distribution 𝑁2 = 𝑁(𝜇 = (𝑘𝑀 −
1)𝜇𝐵𝑖 , 𝜎 = √(𝑘𝑀 − 1𝜎𝐵𝑖). Because a linear combination of independent Gaussian variables 
is also Gaussian, from payoffs subtraction it results 
 𝑃2 − 𝑃1 = (
𝐹
2
− 1 − 𝐴1 +
𝐹
2
𝑁3)  (11) 
with 𝑁3 = 𝑁(𝜇 = −𝜇𝐵𝑖 , 𝜎 = √(𝑘𝑀 − 1) + 𝑘𝑀𝜎𝐵𝑖) ≈ 𝑁(𝜇 = −𝜇𝐵𝑖 , 𝜎 = √2𝑘𝑀𝜎𝐵𝑖) 
One is now in conditions to express the expected increase in the number of Cooperators, 
given level of cooperation p: 









By simply exchanging variables, 
 𝐸(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 1 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟) =∑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷 → 𝑆𝐶|𝐴1, 𝑁3) 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴1)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑁3) 
(14) 
Reciprocally to what was performed here above, the probability of Cooperator 𝑛𝑥  with 𝑃𝑥 
payoff copying Defector 𝑛𝑦‘s strategy with 𝑃𝑦 payoff, is given by 
 




Although independent, 𝑃𝑥 has the same distribution than 𝑃2. Moreover, being also 
independent, 𝑃𝑦 has the same distribution than 𝑃1.  
Thus, the expected decrease in the number of Cooperators, given level of cooperation p, is: 
 𝐸(𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 1 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟) =∑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐶 → 𝑆𝐷|𝐴1̅̅ ̅𝑁3̅̅̅̅ ) 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴1̅̅ ̅)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑁3̅̅̅̅ ) 
(16) 
The bar on top of the variable is just to stress that variable is independent than the one 
without bar, but sharing the same distribution of probability. 
Finally the theoretical AGoS is given by 
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 𝐴𝐺𝑜𝑆 = 𝐸(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛 1 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 − 𝐸(𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛 1 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟) (17) 
The numerical calculation of the expression just obtained leads to figure D-1, applicable to 
networks with 〈𝑘〉 equal to 4. 
It must be stressed that in order to reach these results a number of assumptions were 
considered. They were: (i) number of layers must be high, such that the probability of a node 
initialized with defection in all layers is minimum and the number of 𝐵𝑖 variables is high 
enough to be approximated by a Gaussian distribution; (ii) the network must have a low 
density of edges so that 𝐵𝑖 become independent; (iii) degree of the nodes must fixed and (iv) 




Figure D-1- Theoretical AGoS for Horand Networks in Multilayers with Investment per Game Criteria 
Every single layer has 1000 (N) nodes 
 
What theoretical AGoS highlights with its minimum magnitude is that for multilayer in 
these conditions the number of Cooperators in the multilayer is not expected to change over 
time, whatever the initial conditions. This is what explains the topological and investment 
criteria enslavement. 
The conclusions reached for investment distributed per game are obviously extended to 
investment distributed per layer in homogeneous case. It is just a matter of intensity of 






Appendix E. Multilayers with different Types of Networks 
In the main body of the document, multilayers were considered of independent layers 
supported on network instances of a single type. Here we drop second constrain: layers are 
still independent but need to more to share network type. Figure E-1 presents results collected 
from a multilayer with half layers as Horand, another half as BA.  
 
 
Figure E-1- Multilayer with 8 layers BA or Horand vs. Mixed Multilayer with 4 layers Horand plus 4 layers 
BA. Level of cooperation and AGoS for pure 8-layer Horand and BA multilayer are compared with a mixed 
multilayer with half layers with Horand networks and the other half with BA networks. AGoS lines were 
calculated for intensity of selection 𝛽 = 1, enhancement factor 𝐹 = 1.6 and 1000 (𝑁) nodes per layer.  
Layers were independently initialized with half individuals as Cooperators or a number of Cooperators given by 
a random variable uniformly distributed between 0 and 1000, inclusive, depending on the level of cooperation 
or AGoS being calculated, respectively.  
 
Lines for single network type multilayers were recovered from graphics previously traced 
on document main body. Pure BA multilayers are more cooperative than Horand ones. In 
particular for enhancement factor 𝐹 = 1.6 and baseline criteria, Horand only 8-layer 
multilayer is defective. However, in the mixed scenario and due to contributions to 
accumulated payoff received from of some BA layers cooperation becomes feasible. As a 
general rule, the behaviour of the mixed multilayer is positioned somewhere between 
behaviours of pure ones.  
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